A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action by Programme, United Nations Development
James Madison University 
JMU Scholarly Commons 
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery 
3-2001 
A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action 
United Nations Development Programme 
UNDP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Public 
Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Programme, United Nations Development, "A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action" 
(2001). Global CWD Repository. 199. 
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/199 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized 
administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu. 
A Study of
Socio-Economic
Approaches to Mine Action
United Nations Development Programme 
Emergency Response Division
Mine Action Team
One United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017 USA
Tel. (1 212) 906 6313, Fax (1 212) 906 6887
www.undp.org/erd/mineaction/index.htm
ISBN 92–1–126139–2  UN Sales No. E.01.III.B.8
© United Nations Development Programme, 2001
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
7bis, avenue de la Paix
P.O. Box 1300
CH - 1211 Geneva 1
Switzerland
Tel. (41 22) 906 16 60, Fax (41 22) 906 16 90
www.gichd.ch




































Approaches to Mine Action
A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Actionii
ISBN 92-1-126139-2     UN Sales No. E.01.III.B.8
© United Nations Development Programme
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme or the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this
publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations,
the United Nations Development Programme or the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining  concerning the legal status of any country, territory or area, or of its authorities or armed
groups, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.





One United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
USA
Tel. (1 212) 906 6313
Fax (1 212) 906 6887
www.undp.org/erd/mineaction/index.htm
Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining




Tel. (41 22) 906 16 60
Fax (41 22) 906 16 90
www.gichd.ch
Geneva, March 2001
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helps people in 174 countries and
territories to help themselves, focusing on poverty eradication and democratic governance.
In support of these goals, UNDP is frequently asked to help create and implement policies
that are more responsive to the needs of ordinary people, and to help societies rebuild in the
aftermath of war and humanitarian emergencies.  UNDP is also an advocate for increased
development assistance and a more inclusive global economy.
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) supports the efforts of
the international community in reducing the impact of mines and unexploded ordnance. The
Centre is active in research, provides operational assistance and supports the implementation
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Foreword
The dramatic increase in the number of armed conflicts over the past decade hashalted, and often set back, social and economic development in many of theworlds poorest countries. These confrontations have led to tragic losses of
human life, large-scale population movements, destruction of physical assets and a
severance of trade ties. For the survivors of the war, a culture of militarization and
fear often remains long after the signing of peace agreements.
Reconstruction and reconciliation in these volatile circumstances are endeavours that
require the full range of economic, social and political instruments of the international
community. One of the first, and perhaps most fundamental steps is the restoration of
a sense of security. In most situations, this means providing people with the ability to
return to their communities, rebuild their homes, pursue their livelihoods and benefit
from basic services, such as access to water and safe road networks.
This essential first phase of post-war development is often blocked by the presence of
landmines. At a time when societies need to learn to live and work together, mines
have the triple effect of shattering individual lives, increasing the medical burden on
families and communities, and preventing States from developing land and rebuilding
infrastructures.
The United Nations system contributes to addressing the mine crisis through a
humanitarian and developmental approach called mine action. By articulating multi-
faceted responses and providing co-ordination mechanisms, the United Nations aims
to recreate an environment in which people can live safely, in which the needs of
victims are addressed, and in which economic and social development can occur free
from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination. The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) is assisting countries with mine action in support
of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe.
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is active in
research, provides operational assistance and supports the implementation of the Mine
Ban Treaty.  With a view to strengthening the effectiveness of the reponse to the tragic
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and enduring problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance, UNDP contracted
GICHD to manage a Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action  to take
a fresh look at how mine action activities are planned, managed and evaluated from a
socio-economic perspective.
We would like to thank the following donors who provided the funding to enable the
Study to be carried out: Canadian Department for Foreign Affairs and International
Trade; German Ministry of Foreign Affairs; International Development Research
Centre, Johannesburg; Survey Action Center, Washington DC; United Kingdom
Department for International Development; United States Department of State; and
the World Bank.
We hope that this Study will prove an important tool in strengthening the efforts of
mine action to respond effectively and efficiently to the communities that must daily
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Better managed mine action programmes
The various constituencies within the mine action community have made
significant strides in grappling with mine action in a humanitarian or
development setting. Mine action programmes have improved productivity,
safety, quality assurance, and technical standards, and learned how to develop
local capacities to assume responsibility for these aspects of mine action. Few
organisations still focus on the numbers of landmines and unexploded ordnance
(UXO) they have destroyed. Rather, they track and report the area and types of
land cleared, reductions in accident rates, and the number of development
projects assisted  all potentially useful outputs of mine action.
Many organisations are now trying to confirm systematically whether this
potential has been realised in fact: for example, whether crops are planted on
the cleared land and roads are being used; how many households are sustaining
themselves on the cleared land  the desired social and economic outcomes. In
some cases, organisations have conducted field audits to assess whether mine
action has created unintended problems, such as poppy cultivation or the
appropriation of cleared land by local élites, and whether corrective action is
required. A number of organisations are experimenting with new approaches
designed to address socio-economic problems and opportunities more directly.
Handicap Internationals proximity demining initiative described in the
Mozambique case study (Appendix 3) and the provincial planning process in the
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (PDR) (Appendix 2) are examples of this trend.
One area in which much further progress is required is financial transparency,
including the introduction of proper cost/management accounting systems by
implementing agencies and more complete reporting on the source and amount
of donor funding. In some cases, it appears that official donor agencies may
actively discourage the open publication of financial information.1
1 More than 20 requests by the study team for very modest amounts of financial data from
implementing organisations resulted in a total of two incomplete responses, with many
organisations citing disclosure restrictions written into their funding agreements by donors.
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On balance, however, the study finds that mine action programmes are becoming
better managed and further progress can be expected for a significant period.
A more capable mine action community
This process of improvement has taken place within individual mine action
programmes, but lessons learned in one locale are often adopted by the
international mine action community. Diffusion is taking place as a growing
cadre of experienced individuals moves from one to another programme, via
the network of technical and expert working groups and, more recently, through
tailor-made training programmes. Applied research is also contributing, with
the United Nations Study Report: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action
Capacities (Eaton et al., 1997) being an excellent example.
In addition, the international mine action community has developed a variety
of common tools that allow new mine action programmes to hit the ground
running. These include a number of international standards and model
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) employing the approaches developed
in the quality management field. New generations of Geographic Information
Systems (GIS), combining computer databases with graphic display and
mapping systems, allow experienced users to create management information
systems very quickly. As documented in the Kosovo case study (Appendix 1),
mine action programmes often can deploy such systems in humanitarian
emergencies well before similar tools are in place to support managers of other
sectoral programmes. Finally, as described in Chapter 2 of this report, the
Landmine Impact Survey provides a powerful tool to systematically document
the impact of landmine and UXO contamination on all communities within a
country, and to establish a preliminary ranking of priorities for technical surveys
and mine awareness.
The evolution of priorities within programmes
It is both understandable and proper that mine action practitioners focused first
on the how to issues, such as safety, quality assurance, and productivity. How
many mines were destroyed? How large an area was completely cleared of
mines? Did any accidents or breaches of safety procedures occur? The significant
costs and risks involved, and the tragic consequences when errors or omissions
occur, concentrate minds on ensuring the job is done right. Less attention was
given initially to the why of mine action  i.e., is the right job being done? In
part this was because the answer appeared obvious: mine action aims to reduce
human suffering.
Most agree that the humanitarian imperative should prevail during periods
when civilians are displaced by conflict and during re-migration in the
immediate post-conflict period. Populations are most vulnerable at these points
not only because risks are high, but also because refugees and returnees are
uncertain about the location of contamination, and because they are destitute,
with few reserves and limited options to risky behaviour.
The study found that the desire to prevent accidents continues to dominate task
selection in most programmes well after the post-conflict phase ends. Risk
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reduction generally prevails as the strategy of choice until the extent of
contamination is well understood by the mine action programme, ideally
through a comprehensive and systematic Landmine Impact Survey, which is
intent on, in the words of the Survey Action Center, arousing and informing
human compassion.
Indeed, this humanitarian imperative will likely remain the principal motivating
force behind the mine action movement, and a core objective of all mine action
programmes. But how does one assess which mine action tasks will result in the
greatest reduction of human suffering? Using Yemen as an example, Chapter 2
 Impact of Mine Contamination  describes the type of socio-economic analysis
that may eventually allow us to answer such questions with greater assurance.2
However, mine action also creates other opportunities: for land to be farmed,
for goods to be transported, and for schools to be re-opened. How should one
value such achievements and combine these with the deaths and injuries avoided
for a complete accounting of benefits? How should the trade-offs between risk
reduction and other socio-economic benefits change over time as a country
progresses from war to sustained peace?
Socio-economic analysis comes into its own as the why of mine action  and
the appropriate criteria to use in setting priorities  becomes less certain. What
quickly becomes apparent in our study is that priorities vary with time and
place. As countries recover from conflict, risks posed by landmine contamination
abate3 because (1) people learn what areas are contaminated, (2) people adapt
to the risks, and (3) mine action programmes deal with the most egregious
dangers. Focus begins to shift from immediate survival to sustaining livelihoods.
People resume their normal social and economic activities. In countries with
governments that seek to promote the well-being of their citizens, basic
public services are resumed and a coherent development strategy begins to
emerge.
The study found that the transition period from open conflict to sustained peace
poses real challenges for mine action programmes. Risk reduction remains
important but, as is apparent from the Mozambique and the Lao PDR case
studies, pressure builds to consider other social and economic goals. Mine action
programmes may be pulled in different directions by local governments, other
agencies, donors, and the local communities themselves. There is no certainty
that a clear picture will emerge how mine action fits into a coherent development
strategy. Evidence from all three case studies suggests that, more often than
not, the senior development actors  national governments, United Nations
sectoral agencies, international financial institutions  consider mine
contamination when it directly interferes with specific programmes and projects,
but otherwise fail to incorporate mine action into their planning.4  Without more
guidance from other development actors, mine action organisations will have a
difficult time ensuring that the outputs produced by mine action properly
2 This focused on three concepts: pressure on resources, intensity of past conflict, and institutional
endowment.
3 The risks posed by UXO may not decline as rapidly, perhaps because UXO contamination is
more diffused and because UXO is not so obvious a danger. These two factors may lead to
familiarity, complacency, and risky behaviour.
4 In current development parlance, mine action is not mainstreamed but remains an add-on.
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support broader development objectives and, hence, achieve the desired social
and economic results.
The example of Lao PDR and its recently-introduced annual work planning
process does demonstrate that mine action can be better integrated into broader
development planning, in this case at the district and provincial levels.5 This
may reflect that the conflict in Lao PDR ended almost a generation ago and the
mine action programme  although itself fairly recent  operates in a normal
development context.
Study findings support the view  albeit tentatively on the basis of limited
evidence  that there will be a common progression in the objectives of a mine
action programme as a country moves from conflict to normal development.6
When a country remains in conflict and during the immediate post-conflict
period, the overarching mine action objective will be to reduce human suffering
by reducing accidents. Conversely, in a sound development environment,7 the
objectives of mine action programmes will be set by national authorities to
advance the social and economic goals given in the countrys development
strategy and plan.
Unfortunately, less can be said with confidence about the transition period from
post-conflict to normal development. First, a countrys transition from war to
sustained peace may be far from smooth, and there are many examples of regress.
Second, there is no certainty that a developmental state  one that formulates
development goals and implements programmes to achieve these will take
hold even if peace is sustained. Such a state is required to establish clear social
and economic objectives that command general support and can guide mine
action managers in their decisions. Third, there is no one best way through these
transition periods. Even if all mine action programmes start with an overarching
concern to reduce human suffering and end by adopting the social and economic
goals set by host country authorities, the appropriate path from start to end will
be determined in large part by the underlying social and economic features
within each country.
Each country remains unique
One may theorise about general trends and common patterns across countries,
but can say with certainty that each country remains in many ways unique in its
principal social and economic features. Different socio-economic structures mean
that different priorities should prevail in mine action programmes.
This is clearly demonstrated in Chapter 3  Socio-Economic Analysis of Mine
Action. The same analytic technique  cost-benefit analysis  yields significantly
different results in Lao PDR and Mozambique. In the former case, our analysis
5 Lao PDR is very decentralised in some ways. Still, the case study recommended additional
measures to strengthen the link between provincial work plans and the national development
strategy and plan.
6 See also the Programme Context section in Chapter 1, Introduction.
7 Defining a sound development environment is beyond the scope of this study, but the principles
exposed in the World Banks Comprehensive Development Framework approach are sound. These
are (1) the need for a long term vision and strategy; (2) country ownership of development goals
and actions, (3) partnership among stakeholders, and (4) accountability for development results.
See <http://www.worldbank.org/cdf>.
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demonstrates that future UXO clearance can be justified on economic grounds
alone.8 Moreover, the analysis shows that the decision to establish the Lao
National UXO Programme (UXO LAO) as the national clearance centre was
certainly defensible on economic logic, as future benefits should eventually
justify the heavy start-up and capacity-building costs. Conversely, the analysis
for Mozambique suggests that large-scale clearance of agricultural land will
not, in itself, make a significant net contribution to Mozambiques continued
development. A more targeted approach is appropriate, and two suggestions
are offered:
First, adequate land is generally available in all regions except Mozambiques
south. But even there the main vulnerability cited by farmers is drought, not a
shortage of land. This suggests that economic and social benefits would accrue
more from investments in water control than general mine clearance, and
clearance activities should support small-scale irrigation and other water
projects.
Second, seasonal labour shortages  and particularly womens labour  are
typically a more binding constraint on smallholder agricultural production in
Mozambique than is land. A 10 per cent increase in the time women have
available to tend crops would pay greater dividends than a 10 per cent increase
in the land available for cropping. Once again, mine action in support of village
water projects that reduce the time women spend collecting water would result
in higher economic and social benefits than general mine clearance of agricultural
land.
The lesson from economic analysis9 suggests that mine action managers need to
understand the principal social and economic features of the mine-affected
countries and their communities and identify the specific factors that limit
economic growth and bind people in poverty. Mine action that addresses these
binding constraints should be accorded priority.
The information economics of mine action
The study acknowledges and supports the consensus that the humanitarian
imperative dominates mine action priorities in the conflict and immediate post-
conflict period. It will also dominate during the start-up phase of new mine
action programmes even when, as in Lao PDR, this occurs well after the conflict
has ended. However, in this latter case the consensus that compassion rules
in priority setting is not always based on the certainty that this is the best thing
to do. Rather, as the discussion in Chapter 2 on the Landmine Impact Survey
makes clear, this is the best we can do, given available information.10
8 This is an important finding given the conclusion of the first published cost-benefit analysis of
mine action (Harris, 2000a) that: No matter how much the benefit figures are reconsidered, the
costs of de-mining in Cambodia  and almost certainly in other low income areas  are far
greater than its benefits (p. 223).
9 The study of mine-contaminated communities in Yemen in Chapter 2, using the methods of
rural sociology, found that blocked access to water was a good predictor of the likelihood of mine
accidents. Water is often a critical resource in developing countries.
10 Chapter 2 also makes clear that the way forward is not simply to collect more detailed information
within the Landmine Impact Survey. Efforts to collect more quantitative data at this stage (e.g.,
the area mined rather than simply the presence of landmines) would result in a parallel decline in
the reliability of that data.
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In many ways mine action management is as much about information as it is
about landmines. In the early days of a programme, the struggle is to acquire a
comprehensive base of information. The Landmine Impact Survey does this in
order to assess the scope of the contamination problem and to identify a limited
number of communities  those that stand out in sharp relief because of the
risk of future accidents  for priority action. By necessity, some detail is
sacrificed for comprehensiveness. Over time, more detailed information,
reflecting a broader range of social and economic concerns, is required to make
ever-finer decisions concerning priorities. Acquiring this information entails
costs. How can the right information be obtained at the right cost?
Two broad strategies can be employed. The first is analytic: roughly, using more
data and more processing. The second is responsive: adopting the priorities
identified by government officials, community representatives, and other
development actors. Both approaches have merit and should be seen as
complements rather than alternatives.
Responsive approaches tap into the information and expertise of others, who
often are far more knowledgeable than mine action personnel on the problems
posed by contamination and the opportunities likely to arise if that contamination
is addressed. Responding to priorities identified by local people also increases
their sense of ownership. The danger with responsive approaches is that
government, community, or aid agency officials may, through ignorance or
wilfulness, represent their interests over those of the people in mine-affected
communities. Therefore, for two reasons, mine action organisations cannot afford
to abandon analytic approaches. First, they must be in a position to determine
whether the priorities identified by others are reasonable and are likely to
represent public rather than private interests. Second, because other development
actors often fail to incorporate mine and UXO contamination into their planning,
mine action organisations must have sufficient knowledge to be proactive in
obtaining the information and co-operation they require from these expert
sources.
The study finds that the information required for proper mine action
management expands in both scope and detail over time. In a sound
development environment, a modest capacity for socio-economic analysis is
required by mine action programmes to ask the right questions of the right
people to obtain the required information. Where the development environment
is less than ideal  whether through failures of the government, the donor
community, or both  mine action programmes require greater capacity to
obtain the necessary data and undertake their own socio-economic analyses to
turn this data into useful information. However, even in very imperfect
development environments, partnering with other willing development actors
 including local community-based groups  is usually better than operating
independently.
Measures of our ignorance
This report documents approaches that can be used to (1) set priorities based on
the problems created by landmine and UXO contamination, and (2) evaluate
some of the principal benefits arising from mine clearance. It also provides
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brief examples of how the benefits accruing to risk reduction might be evaluated.
But these latter examples remain largely hypothetical and, hence, rather
unsatisfactory.
In the case of risk reduction, the study team did not come across a single report
that adequately documents how much the accident rate has fallen due to mine
action. While it is clear that the numbers of landmine and UXO accidents have
fallen in many countries having mine action programmes, it remains unclear
how much of the decline is the result of mine action. Declines also result from
people learning to avoid contaminated areas or from spontaneous declines in
risky behaviour.11 As well, a significant proportion of the decline may simply
reflect the end of large population movements caused by conflict and re-
migration.
Untangling this skein adequately would require accident data over time for
contaminated communities that have not received mine action assistance, so
these could be compared with similar communities that have received such
assistance. Of course, once a mine action programme is established in a country,
it would not withhold assistance from certain communities so such an
experiment could be run. While a number of countries that did not have mine
action programmes in place until years after a conflict (e.g., Lao PDR) could
serve as natural experiments, in no case do we have adequate data to chart
the decline in accidents over time. These problems are further complicated
because data on current accidents is incomplete in most countries with
established mine action programmes. Therefore, we remain unable to
determine the impact of mine action in total, let alone estimate the decline in
accidents due to the various components of mine action such as mine awareness
or clearance.
The task of evaluating victim assistance efforts is perhaps even more
complicated12 because the term embraces so many objectives and activities.13
Even restricting the analysis to the survivors of landmine/UXO accidents
themselves, there is a wide continuum of care required, stretching from
emergency medical care through continuing medical treatment then a number
of stages of rehabilitation (physical, psycho-social, socio-economic).
Complementary measures are required (e.g., legislation, community disabled
committees) to lessen discrimination against disabled persons. Also, costs
associated with assisting landmine survivors are largely determined by the
capacity of the local public health system. If major components of this system
(e.g., prosthetic centres) must be built from scratch with international assistance,
costs increase massively but these services are then available to all the physically
disabled (and often to combatants injured by landmines)  what portion of
these capacity-building costs should be apportioned to landmine survivors?
11 This could result from demonstration effects (i.e., seeing ones neighbours blown up while
trying to harvest landmines/UXO) or because destitution falls as the conflict recedes and normal
lives are resumed.
12 As of writing, the Survey Action Center/Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation in Washington
DC are planning to conduct a study to quantify the benefits of mine victim assistance.
13 As well, the definition of victim often includes not only those directly injured by landmines
but also their families who suffer emotional, social and economic hardship, and even mine-affected
communities who lose access to land and other resources.
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Concluding remarks
In sum, mine action has made great strides over the past decade and further
improvements can be expected in the coming ten years.14 Central to the ongoing
performance improvement process will be careful control of costs; enhanced
priority-setting based on responsiveness to stakeholders using transparent
criteria (supplemented by socio-economic analysis); and a readiness to embrace
ever closer co-ordination with development initiatives, particularly by exploiting
the spatial planning opportunities afforded by GIS. The present study represents
only a first step in this process.
14 By the end of the decade, a number of States that adhered quickly to the Ottawa Convention on
the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines should have cleared all anti-personnel mines on their
territory. In addition, the United States 2010 demining initiative should have come to fruition.
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Background to the study
Historical background to mine action
At the end of the 1980s, as the international community became aware of the
significance of the global impact of the indiscriminate use of landmines, a series of
programmatic interventions were developed or strengthened to respond to the crisis.
A range of mine-specific humanitarian activities have since evolved: minefield survey,
minefield marking and fencing, mine clearance, mine awareness, mine victim
assistance, and mine ban advocacy. Taken together, they have become the core
components of what is now referred to as mine action. Though initially dominated
by military figures and organised in accordance with emergency response procedures,
mine action has increasingly sought to join with traditional development activity.
The objective of the study and its intended beneficiaries
But mine action means much more than merely certain mine- or UXO-specific
interventions. According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), it comprises:
all the activities geared towards addressing the problems faced by populations as a
result of landmine contamination. It is not so much about mines as it is about people
and their interactions with a mine-infested environment. Its aim is not technical 
to survey, mark and eradicate landmines  but humanitarian and developmental
 to recreate an environment in which people can live safely, in which economic,
health and social development can occur free from the constraints imposed by
landmine contamination, and in which victims needs are addressed. (UNMAS,
1997a)
The various constituencies in the mine action community have already made significant
strides in grappling with mine action in a humanitarian or development setting. In
brief, mine action programmes are becoming better managed and further progress
can be expected for a significant period of time. Yet, although mine action is a relatively
young discipline, its cost-effectiveness is coming under increasing scrutiny by donors
Introduction
Chapter 1
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and academics alike. Thus, the primary objective of this Study of Socio-Economic
Approaches to Mine Action is to identify social and economic analytical tools by which
mine action programmes can be more effectively planned, managed and evaluated.
Accordingly, the Study is intended to provide guidance and focus primarily to mine
action programme planners and managers, but also to donors, by generating
opportunities to assess more effectively the relative benefits and costs of mine action
programmes. Of course, the ultimate beneficiaries of the Study should be mine- and
UXO-affected communities.
Study methodology
The Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action was officially initiated in
November 1999 at the behest of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
UNDP contracted the Study to the Geneva International Centre for Demining (GICHD),
an international organisation dedicated to advancing the cause of mine action around
the world. The final terms of reference of the Study were developed at a two-day
round-table of selected experts (the Study Core Group),1 who met in late October
1999 in Geneva to confirm the aim, scope, constraints and overall framework of the
study.
The evidential core of the Study is its three case studies, which are included as
Appendixes 1-3 to this report. Through discussions with stakeholders and concerned
communities the case studies sought to document, from both a social and an economic
perspective, how the mine threat is assessed currently, how priorities are determined
by mine action programme planners and managers, taking into account external factors,
and how the impacts of mine action programmes are evaluated. The three mine action
contexts selected  Kosovo, Mozambique, and the Lao PDR  were chosen to
represent post-conflict emergency, transitional, and development contexts for mine
action, respectively.
The Study began with a detailed literature search and review and an overview of
relevant ongoing initiatives, in particular the Landmine Impact Survey being
implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) in Washington. Terms of reference
and partners for the country case studies were developed in parallel with this effort.
In Kosovo, Shawn Messick, a consultant with SAC, was chosen to research and write
the case study, the original draft of which was submitted in February 2000. In October
2000, John Flanagan, the head of the UN Mine Action Co-ordination Centre in Pristina
(MACC) provided information to update the case study. Ted Paterson, a consultant
with the GICHD and UNMAS, conducted field research in the Lao PDR in May 2000
and wrote the case study report and accompanying economic analysis. Mr Paterson
also developed the sections devoted to the economic analysis of mine action in Kosovo
and Mozambique.
The Mozambique case study was researched and written by Ananda S. Millard and
Kristian Berg Harpviken of the Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities Project
(AMAC), based within the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) using
funding provided by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in
Johannesburg. During her field research, Ms Millard conducted three case studies of
mine-affected communities, spending approximately two weeks in the field for each
1 The role and responsibilities of the Study Core Group are defined in Appendix 4 and the members of the
Group are listed in Appendix 5.
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case. In addition to the community case studies, the report also draws on document
studies, interviews with key individuals in Mozambican mine action and on earlier
field research conducted by Millard for the AMAC project. The earlier field research
was conducted in October 1999 and was facilitated by Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Mozambique. An in-depth AMAC report, including the three community studies in
full, has been issued as a PRIO report in both printed and electronic form.
Ian Mansfield, the Mine Action Team Leader at UNDP, provided overall guidance
throughout the project. Eric Filippino, the head of the Socio-Economic Study Group
at GICHD, was responsible for the conduct of the study. Ted Paterson wrote and
edited the study report with Stuart Maslen;2 Chapter 2, however, was contributed
by Aldo Benini of SAC, Washington DC. Jack Glattbach copy-edited the final draft
text and Françoise Jaffré laid out the report for final publication.
The first draft of the Study was discussed at a meeting of the Study Core Group in
New York in August 2000. Following this meeting, revisions and additions were made
to the text and a second draft was circulated to the Core Group in late November
2000. A small meeting of relevant experts was hosted by SAC in Washington in early
December 2000, focusing on the economic analysis developed by the Study. Following
this meeting, and taking into account other comments from the Core Group and other
stakeholders in the case studies, the Study was finalised and printed. An Operational
Handbook to assist in the implementation at field level of the studys recommendations
will be field-tested during Spring 2001; once finalised, the Handbook will be distributed
by the UNDP Mine Action Team in New York.
Report layout
In addition to the main findings and the present introduction, the Study is made up of
five chapters and a series of Appendixes. Chapter 2 addresses the impact of mine
contamination, looking specifically at the ongoing Landmine Impact Survey being
co-ordinated by SAC in Washington DC. Chapter 3 discusses the socio-economic
analysis of mine action, with particular attention paid to the economic analysis of
mine and UXO clearance. Chapter 4 considers how priorities are, and should be, set in
response to government priorities, priorities set by other development actors, and
community needs. Chapter 5 considers the monitoring and evaluation of mine action,
looking at how far mine action has  to date  been willing to embrace developmental
approaches to these techniques. Chapter 6 assesses the role, actual and potential, of
GIS, not only within mine action but also in wider development co-ordination.
Following the Study bibliography, the Appendixes contain edited versions of the three
case studies from Kosovo, Lao PDR, and Mozambique, respectively.
Relevance of socio-economic approaches
to mine action
Value to mine action of socio-economic approaches
As is the case with other organisations faced with mammoth tasks and modest
resources, those in the mine action community are forever confronted with two
principal challenges. First, they want to do the job right  an issue that has correctly
2 Both Ted Paterson and Stuart Maslen worked as GICHD consultants.
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taken pride of place in mine action because of the terrible safety issues posed by
mine and UXO contamination, and the threats to life when accidents occur. The
technical expertise of military engineers, health care professionals, and public
educators is needed to ensure that all mine action tasks are done safely and efficiently.
But second, mine action organisations need to ensure they are doing the right job.
Socio-economic analysis comes to the fore in addressing this second issue.
Mine action directly improves peoples security, and hence their lives, when it removes
clear and present dangers posed by contamination, whether through clearance,
marking, or awareness building. Landmine contamination also imposes constraints
on the use of land and freedom of movement. Mine action removes these constraints,
allowing communities to recover from conflict.  It can also create new opportunities
for people, individually and collectively, to build more prosperous and sustainable
livelihoods. But these opportunities are not certainties. The long-term benefits of mine
action therefore depend on, first, whether the opportunities created are large or
small and, second, the likelihood that people in affected communities will be able
and motivated to rebuild their communities and capitalise on new opportunities
created.
In brief, mine action organisations can enhance their impact by targeting larger
opportunities and more pressing constraints. Unfortunately, there are no ready maps
marking such targets. Indeed, similar patterns of contamination will pose different
problems in different mine-affected communities, and individuals within each
community often will have very different views on which mine actions should be
undertaken first. In the absence of ready maps, reasonable people need to use
reasonable approaches to assemble evidence that can point to large opportunities and
pressing constraints, thus identifying the right job at any particular time
and place. The various social science disciplines such as economics, anthropology,
and sociology all provide reasonable approaches for collecting and interpreting
evidence concerning the problems posed by mine contamination, the potential benefits
that may accrue if these problems are addressed, and the likelihood these benefits
will be realised.
Like others in the international humanitarian and development communities, mine
action organisations must also demonstrate to donors, local government agencies,
and people in the affected communities that they are doing the right job and doing it
right. Project and programme plans outline how problems will be solved on paper.
But eventually mine action organisations must show they have made an impact,
which simply means they have improved peoples lives out there in the real world.
This is a difficult task. The social sciences also offer concepts for describing and
measuring the benefits accruing from mine action, thus providing a basis for
accountability plus feedback to allow learning from experience and improvements in
performance.
Socio-economic approaches allow us to compare alternative mine actions, select the
right or most beneficial tasks, and demonstrate that valuable results have been
obtained. In short, the value of socio-economic approaches to mine action is that these
approaches allow us to value mine action and its achievements.
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Implications for mine action operations of socio-economic
approaches
The various social science disciplines provide different systems for assembling data
and converting it into useful information  the right data in the right format at the
right time to the right person. Systematic information allows donors and others to
identify which mine action programmes, and which organisations, are delivering the
most benefits with the resources entrusted to them.  Systematic information also allows
mine action personnel to learn about the real problems created by mine contamination
and how best to address these. The best learners will prosper and the performance of
the mine action community will, over time and on average, improve. If the collective
performance of the mine action community is good and getting better, donors will
continue to provide funds rather than reallocating these to other humanitarian and
development pursuits.
The implication is that socio-economic approaches provide means for evaluating mine
action.  A further implication is that learning organisations will prosper. Given that
this process is already well under way, mine action programmes and individual
organisations have begun to devote resources to understand better the social and
economic implications of mine contamination and mine action and to learn how to
improve performance. It should be borne in mind, however, that socio-economic
analysis itself consumes scarce resources. While mine action will benefit from socio-
economic analysis, at some point the costs of further analysis outweigh the incremental
benefits.
Programme context
The nature of a mine action programme depends on many factors. Some of these
relate to the nature and extent of mine contamination, but others include (1) the
countrys economy and social structure, (2) the workings of the donor community in
that country, and (3) the progress  or lack thereof  toward peace and sustainable
development. To do their tasks correctly, mine action organisations must understand
landmines and UXO. But to select the correct tasks, these organisations must
understand the context in which they operate.
Socio-economic context
Effective mine action organisations work on the priorities of the people in mine-affected
countries and communities. Setting the proper priorities requires an understanding
of the basic features of the local society and economy. How are people organised into
households, communities, tribes, and so on? How do households meet their food and
income requirements, and to what resources do they need access in order to sustain
independent livelihoods? What are the main risks they face, and what strategies do
they employ to cope with misfortune? Are households relatively equal or are there
vast differences in wealth and status? Is the society homogeneous or are there
pronounced ethnic, linguistic, or religious divides? What domestic and economic tasks
fall to women alone? Does significant trade take place across regions, between rural
and urban communities, and with the wider world? Can the State provide basic public
services to the bulk of its citizens?
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Such socio-economic features will largely determine what the affected communities
will identify as priorities for mine action. Therefore, the key to improving the
effectiveness of mine action programmes is, to a large degree, enhanced knowledge
of the socio-economic structures of mine-contaminated communities.
Development actors
Successful mine action organisations need expertise on the technical aspects of mines
and UXO plus the capacity to learn about the socio-economic milieu in which their
beneficiaries live.  They also need to operate effectively within the global aid system
 with its many flaws  to get the resources needed to help mine-affected
communities. Success requires learning the ways of the worlds humanitarian and
development agencies, a community with its own distinct culture, norms, and habits
of mind. This community, and the aid system in general, appears to have many strange
practices. It funds short-term projects to tackle long-term problems. It employs rigid,
mechanical planning models to deal with complex and shifting development problems.
It throws money at certain countries or issues while ignoring others that are equally
pressing. To achieve their missions and, sometimes, simply to survive, mine action
organisations must understand the rules of engagement governing aid operations:
how to keep donors satisfied and compete with other worthy organisations for funding
(See Box 1). For while development fashions come and go, long-term success depends
on achieving results. (See Box 2: The Language of Results).
Landmine contamination imposes new constraints on poor communities, rendering
land unusable, causing insecurity, isolating communities and, most tragically, killing
and maiming innocent people. These new constraints are the negative impacts of
landmine contamination, which landmine impact surveys aim to document as a basis
for establishing priorities. (See Chapter 2: Assessing the Impact of Mine Contamination.)
Successful mine action can remove these new constraints, allowing the affected
communities to recover. In the language of results, mine action outputs such as usable
land, safe roads, and people who can conduct their daily affairs with security, may
lead to recovery as an outcome. However, if the country and its communities were
poor before the conflict, recovery implies continued poverty. The impact of mine action
alone will not be the transformation of underlying social and economic features of
countries and communities. To contribute to such a broader impact, mine action
organisations need to adopt loftier objectives or, more commonly, team with other
development actors who aim to alter the underlying social and economic structure
that trap communities in poverty.
Conflict and post-conflict situations3
The nature of the development problématique in a country, hence the current
preoccupations of the development community working there, evolves over time for
a variety of reasons, including the changing course of conflict. The threat from
landmines and other battlefield debris exists, by definition, as a result of conflict. Such
conflict may be regional, involving two or more countries, or it may be internal,
involving two or more armed factions. Conflict may also exist within a country between
the governing authorities and armed groups of the population. Regardless of the form
and extent of the conflict, UXO caused by the conflict has the potential to create a
lasting humanitarian problem  with social, economic and environmental dimensions.
3 This section is adapted, with thanks, from McAslan and Bryden (2000).
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Box 1: The Logic of Development Programmes
Development is a complex phenomenon and a difficult task, further complicated
when foreign donors provide the resources needed to promote development. The
international development community has created a variety of tools to cope with these
complications, which have in turn spawned a specialist language within this community.
Many of the tools are based on programme logic models.  In brief, the plan for a
project is built by:
Ø first, identifying the development problem and, hence, the purpose of the project;
Ø second, identifying what the project must produce (outputs) to address the problem;
Ø finally, specifying the inputs needed to produce those outputs, thus defining the
logical sequence:
Inputs ð Outputs ð Purpose
If the problem is too large or complicated to manage as a single project, a
programme will be established. This is simply a collection of development projects, each
designed to address part of the problem. The solution to the overall problem (i.e., the
big objective) can be termed the goal, and the chain of logic then becomes:
Inputs ð Outputs ð Purpose ð Goal
              (Project objective)         (Programme objective)
Building on this approach, many development agencies require the use of logical
framework analysis (LFA). The framework is created by putting the logical sequence in
one column, and adding columns for  in the traditional version of an LFA  (1) the
information needed to assess whether progress is being made, (2) how that information
will be obtained, and (3) critical assumptionsa underlying the plan. Below is a highly
summarised representation of the projects logic and how progress will be monitored
and evaluated.
The Traditional Logical Framework Analysisb
Logic Progress Means of Critical
indicators verification assumptions
Goal Indicators of goal How to obtain the goal Assumptions
attainment. indicators.
Purpose Indicators that the How to obtain the Assumptions
projects purpose has purpose indicators.
been attained.
Outputs Indicators that specified How to obtain the Assumptions
outputs have been output indicators.
delivered.
Inputs Indicators that the inputs How to obtain the input Assumptions
were available. indicators.
a Assumptions underpin the logical argument for the project. Thus, the project goal
should be attained if (1) the projects purpose was achieved and (2) the listed
assumptions hold true. If one discovers the assumptions will not be true, the project will
need to be re-thought and perhaps re-designed.
b There are many variants.
A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action18
The circumstances that exist after a conflict has ended depend on many factors, and
the form and extent of the required humanitarian and developmental assistance will
vary. However, for planning purposes five general states can be identified between
the extremes of open conflict and stable self-dependency.
Open Humanitarian Transition Assisted Stable self-
conflict emergency assistance development dependency
Of course, there is no guarantee that a country in conflict will progress smoothly
through these five states.4 Indeed, it is possible for more than one of these states to
co-exist within the same geographic area. Local conditions may enable one part of a
country to progress rapidly to stable self-dependency, or at least to assisted
development, while open conflict may continue elsewhere.  Afghanistan, Somalia and
Sudan are examples of countries where different states of conflict and post-conflict
currently co-exist. This report deals with the three of these five states that are most
relevant to mine action: humanitarian emergency, transition assistance, and assisted
development.
4 Some modern conflicts  termed complex emergencies  shred the institutional fabric of a society.
In complex emergencies, movement through the five states should be viewed more as an objective than
a natural progression.
Box 2: The Language of Results
The concerted effort to promote development in Asia, Africa, and the Americas
began in earnest in the 1950s. While a number of countries have achieved stunning
success, results have generally been disappointing. There are more people living in
absolute poverty today than ever before, and many countries are now worse off than
a generation ago. Unsurprisingly, many observers and donor governments have criticised
the performance of the development industry, leading most development agencies to
intensify their focus on achieving results. Results arise at many levels. For example, the
following is a list of what might be achieved, in whole or in part, through mine action in
a community:
Ø One hundred landmines are removed and destroyed;
Ø Six hectares of land are cleared;
Ø Twelve tons of wheat are grown on the cleared land;
Ø Three families sustain themselves and prosper on the cleared land.
The first two examples in the list are outputs  things achieved directly by the mine
action agency using the inputs provided by donors. The third example is an outcome,
arising when the intended beneficiaries use the outputs to achieve something they
value. The final item is an impact  the enduring socio-economic effect to which mine
action has contributed.a In fact, a hierarchy or chain of results exists in which outputs
contribute to intended outcomes, which in turn contribute to the broader social and
economic impacts desired.
This results chain corresponds to the programme logic sequence outlined in the
previous box, and can be summarised in a variation on the traditional LFA.
The results-based logical framework analysis
Logic Results chain Progress indicators Critical
  chain assumptions
Goal Impact Impact indicators Assumptions
Purpose Outcome Outcome indicators Assumptions
Inputs Output Output indicators Assumptions
a  This specific use of the terms output, outcome, and impact is from the Canadian




The absence of conflict does not necessarily indicate that all warring factions are willing
and keen to accept the status quo. It may indicate fatigue, or the opportunity to
consolidate and regroup, or it may be the result of an enforced and unwilling
compliance by massive, well-resourced and capable peacekeeping forces. In the
immediate aftermath of conflict, the conditions for a stable, long-lasting peace are
unlikely to be present.
This phase may also be characterised by the absence of a coherent and effective
governing authority. There may be a serious ongoing threat from undisciplined factions
and militia with local opposition to peacekeeping activities. The civil infrastructure
may have collapsed and there may be large numbers of refugees and internally
displaced persons. There will be despair and a high level of deprivation and suffering.
Such deprivation and human suffering will attract international interest and the call
for an urgent humanitarian response. This response will be underpinned by the
international non governmental organisations (NGOs) and aid agencies, assisted by a
plethora of ad hoc relief initiatives. Although well intentioned, these initiatives may
not be accurately focused, and the support provided may not always be appropriate.
The United Nations Emergency Relief Co-ordinator will be responsible for providing
cohesion and coherence to the international relief programme(s).
The mandate for international assistance will normally be based on Chapter VI of the
United Nations Charter. United Nations military forces may be needed for
peacekeeping, but their effectiveness and utility will be subject to the consensus and
consent of the former warring factions. Peacekeeping tasks may involve: observation,
monitoring and the supervision of truces, cease-fires and elections; interposition;
demobilisation and disarmament; humanitarian relief and its protection; and the
establishment and maintenance of law and order.
Initially, emphasis will be given to mine action in support of emergency humanitarian
activities and peacekeeping tasks, rather than building an effective indigenous capacity.
Although there may be much confusion and uncertainty at this early stage, it is vital
that all forms of mine action are co-ordinated at the earliest opportunity.
Civilian agencies will be encouraged to deploy demining teams. Such teams may
initially require support and assistance from in-place peacekeeping forces, including
information on the general security situation as well as technical intelligence on the
mines and mined areas. Some logistic support may also be necessary, particularly
during the initial stages. The scale and impact of the mine threat will become more
apparent at this stage with an increasing demand for appropriate, effective and timely
victim assistance, together with a growing need for mine awareness  in particular
for refugees and internally displaced persons as they return to their homes in greater
numbers.
It may be necessary for peacekeeping forces to support civilian agencies with the
mapping of mined areas, and some hazardous areas may need to be marked and
fenced. Peacekeeping forces will not normally be used for humanitarian demining,
although there may be circumstances when limited military involvement would
be appropriate  such as route clearance to enable the delivery of essential
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humanitarian supplies, or to provide an interim capability prior to civilian agencies
being deployed.
Transition assistance
A crucial period exists between the humanitarian emergency and assisted development.
During this transition phase the emphasis will shift from urgent humanitarian
assistance to longer-term reconstruction and development. Projects will include the
building of basic accommodation for shelter, medical care and schooling, and the
development of a communication network. External assistance (including the use of
peacekeeping forces) may be needed for urgent reconstruction activities, although
care must be taken to prevent a dependency culture that will hinder a return to
normality. The end of this period will be marked by the emergence of a recognised
governing body demonstrating effective governance, and an effective legal system
that guarantees fundamental human rights. The structures will be in place to ensure
that funding for longer-term development programmes can be applied judiciously.
During the transition phase, emphasis will be placed on building an indigenous mine
action capacity including: institutional and legal arrangements, the training and
deployment of mine survey and clearance teams, the development of a national mine
action authority  often referred to as a mine action centre  and the transfer and
collation of information from NGOs, civilian agencies and United Nations
peacekeeping forces. United Nations responsibilities will focus on the mobilisation
and prioritisation of resources, and the provision of an effective interface between the
host nation, donors and demining agencies. The United Nations will continue to
provide guidance on clearance standards, technology and quality.
In this phase, there are often very large demining investments made to support the
rehabilitation of the transportation system (roads, railways, air and sea ports), public
utilities (power, water, communication), and other critical economic assets, such as
factories and mines. These investments are designed to jump-start the economy,
re-establish basic public services, and facilitate the transition from war to sustainable
development.5 Because speed is essential, the funding agencies will often choose
commercial demining firms and the need to build local mine action capacity may not
be fully considered. It is important that mine action organisations meet the relevant
donors and encourage them to consider the longer-term implications of their plans.
Frequently, such projects can be designed to contribute to long-term solutions as well
as achieving the task at hand.
Assisted development
A key characteristic of the development phase is the existence of a central governing
authority with a clear mandate from the population, and with the growing confidence
of the international community. By this stage, essential services and utilities will have
to be restored, the fear of violence will have abated, opportunities for employment
will be improving, and the foundations will be in place for a recovery to a state of
stable self-dependency. International assistance will focus almost entirely on longer-
term reconstruction and redevelopment programmes; in particular those aimed at
restoring the countrys infrastructure, services, agriculture and industry.
5 See World Bank (1998).
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By this stage it is likely that the responsibility for mine action will be vested in the
host nation, although some assistance may still be required from the international
community. The priorities for mine action will be determined nationally, with advice
from the United Nations. Ideally, mine action programmes will use local managers
and local manpower, although it may be necessary to use external agencies for the
provision of specialist equipment, services and, if requested, quality control and
financial audit.
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Chapter 2
Assessing the impact of
mine contamination
Mine action management can be as much about information as it is about landmines  and
acquiring comprehensive bases of information is a major struggle in the early days of mine
action programmes. To strengthen the information baseline, Landmine Impact Surveys can
effectively assess the scope of contamination and help identify communities for priority attention
by mine action programmes. This chapter, based on a submission from Aldo Benini of the Survey
Action Center (SAC) in Washington DC, describes the concepts, techniques and constraints of
Landmine Impact Surveys, which represent the core of the Global Landmine Survey process
being managed by the SAC.
Introduction
Some 60 countries, especially in the developing world, are currently affected to a greater
or lesser degree by landmines and other explosive remnants of war. The widespread
use of landmines and/or the presence of UXO typically results in prolonged and acute
social, economic and environmental harm extending far beyond the localised human
suffering commonly inflicted by other conventional weapons. They impact negatively
on development, obstructing post-conflict rebuilding, and the provision of, and access
to, health and education, rendering fertile agricultural land unusable, and impeding
the free circulation of goods and labour. And the high levels of disability that result,
in particular from the use of anti-personnel mines, affect not only the individuals
caught in a mine blast but also their families, and in turn, their communities and
society at large.
Yet, not all mine-affected countries and communities suffer equally. Some are better
equipped  and resourced  to deal effectively with the threat than others. And
since international funding is limited, careful attention must be paid to determining
who is most in need of outside assistance, and with what level of urgency. As a
consequence, from its inception, mine action has sought to quantify the scope and
nature of the threat posed by landmines and UXO as part of the requisite planning
and prioritisation process. Initially, assessments tended to be formulated in terms of
numbers of mines. Notoriously, these early estimates were often found later to be
A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action24
exaggerations, and quantities of explosive remnants of war did little to categorise the
threat posed to communities. Later, the size of areas of land suspected to be
contaminated was calculated, but still the information provided was inadequate.
Planning for mine action requires accurate and timely information on the form, scale
and impact of the threat posed by mines, UXO and other explosive hazards. Such
information will come from assessment missions and surveys, from ongoing local
demining and mine awareness projects and tasks, and from local knowledge. Surveys
involve the systematic collection, assessment and processing and recording of
information. The information gathered from mine action surveys will normally
be owned by the national mine action authorities, and should be made widely
available.
The definition and categorisation of mine action survey have developed, and continue
to develop, to reflect the changing requirements and perspectives of the international
mine action community.
In July 1996, international standards for the survey of mined areas were proposed at a
conference in Denmark. These proposals were taken forward by a United Nations-led
working group and incorporated with other recommended procedures, practices and
protocols into the United Nations International Standards for Mine Clearance Operations.
The standards proposed three levels or functions of survey:  a general (level 1) survey
to collect information on the general locations of suspected or mined areas; a technical
(level 2) survey to determine, accurately delineate, and, if possible, mark, the perimeter
of mined locations initially identified by a general survey; and a completion (level 3)
survey to accurately record the area cleared. 
Not long after these standards were published, it was recognised that the survey
process should not only define the form and scale of the mine and UXO hazardous
areas, but should also address the impact on individuals and communities affected
by the mines and UXO. This important change in emphasis was led by the Survey
Working Group, which represented a group of NGOs active in mine action. The
experience gained over the last three years has been invaluable in understanding the
needs, scope, and indeed the limitations, of mine action survey at national and local
levels.
These lessons learned are reflected in the revised International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS). IMAS has dropped the terms level 1, 2 and 3. Instead, it uses the terms national
survey, technical survey and post-clearance documentation.
A national survey is defined as a comprehensive inventory of all reported and/or
suspected locations of mine and UXO contamination, the quantities and types of
explosive hazards, and information on local soil characteristics, vegetation and climate;
and an assessment of the scale and impact of the landmine problem on the individual,
community and country. These two elements of a national survey (recording the
mine and UXO hazards and assessing the impact) are interdependent, although in
some situations it is not possible to collect both categories of information concurrently.
A technical survey is defined as the detailed topographical and technical investigation
of known or suspected mined areas identified during the planning phase. Such areas
may have been identified during a national survey or have been otherwise reported.
The primary aim of a technical survey is to collect sufficient information to enable the
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clearance requirement to be more accurately defined, and for the subsequent clearance
operation to be conducted in a safe, effective and efficient manner.
IMAS replaces the concept of a level 3 survey by providing general guidance on the
type of information required on completion of the task. This should include details of
the cleared area(s)  as proposed in the original level 3 survey. But it should also
include inter alia details of the clearance organisation, procedures and equipment used
to clear the area, details of the quality assurance conducted and post-clearance
inspections, details of reduced and cancelled area(s), and details of any incidents and
accidents.
Although not addressed in IMAS, the concept of a level 4 survey  has been suggested
as a means of confirming whether land is being used after clearance as envisaged.
Such a survey would represent a logical final stage in the process of identifying and
assessing the scale of the hazard and its impact, planning for the removal of the hazard,
removing the hazard, and finally confirming that the impact has been removed  or
at least reduced.
The scope and significance of the Landmine Impact
Survey
Several Landmine Impact Surveys are currently being undertaken within the Global
Landmine Survey process being managed by the SAC. The survey in Yemen was
completed in summer 2000, and at the same time surveys were ongoing in Cambodia,
Chad, Mozambique and Thailand. In a format adapted to the emergency conditions,
a modified impact survey was done in Kosovo in winter 1999/2000.
The scope of the Landmine Impact Survey is deliberately limited. One of the essential
objectives of the survey is to provide a ranking of communities by severity of mine
impact that can inform the allocation of mine action resources. Indicators are used,
and are combined in an index  the Mine Impact Score  to create the ranking. For
that purpose, the Survey records types of problems that the mines have created for a
community. It does not go deeply into measuring the numeric extent or degree of
those problems.
Indeed, the value of the survey information must swiftly be addressed. Surveys are
expensive, yet it is still rare that questions are asked about the value of the returned
information, or about how design interventions might affect validity and reliability
of surveys, and thereby their value.
A recent computer simulation undertaken by the SAC of the informational value of
the Landmine Impact Survey using the Mine Impact Score that is its core (see below
page 28ff.) explored this precarious terrain. In a hypothetical world populated with
mined communities, two utility variables were evaluated against different information
scenarios. These dependent variables were:
Ø The reduction in loss of life and health, measured as the difference between the
number of victims in the past 12 months and the zero victims once the community
has been completely demined; and
Ø The net present value of demining, defined as the present value of the income of
demined cropping land and roads minus the cost of demining them.
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A limited budget was voted for the total effort of demining in all scenarios.
Communities were assigned for priority demining using these four criteria.
Ø A random-sequence scenario, using no prior knowledge about the communities;
it picked them in a random order from the list and continued demining until
exhausting the budget.
Ø A minimal-knowledge scenario, using the government census as prior
information; it assigned communities by decreasing population size, on the
assumption that mine hazards and road-demining benefits were positively
correlated with population. It had the same budget limit as above.
Ø The Landmine Impact Survey scenario selected communities starting with those
with the highest impact score. It had the same budget limit.
Ø The perfect-knowledge scenario was the baseline. It used the entire knowledge
simulated into the data set.
However, since no monetary value of saved lives was permitted, the last scenario had
to choose between a maximum economic benefit and a maximum accident reduction
strategy. Both are possible; here we explore the economic strategy because it
(imperfectly) emulates what a decision-maker with additional Technical Survey
information (the closest to being omniscient!) could do. In other words, this scenario
assigns communities by descending present value of demining.
The budget for these scenarios was arbitrarily set to equal the cost of the first 20
communities in the perfect-knowledge scenario. (The absolute values of the costs and
benefits are almost irrelevant; what matters are the proportions between the scenario
results.) Several simplifying assumptions were made. One of them was that
communities are either completely demined, or not at all.
Only demining was considered among the repertory of mine action activities. The
economics was limited to physical capital; the cost and benefits of victim care,
rehabilitation, and of secondary effects on families were considered to be absorbed
into the victim reduction variable. However, for a proper understanding of the model,
it may be wise to state a principal difference: while, in the model, demining has only
positive effects on hazard reduction, its economic value may be negative in some
communities that have, for example, long stretches of road mined but have only small
populations to benefit.
The results are summarised below. The perfect-knowledge scenario gives priority to
high net-benefit communities; it spends most of its budget on a small number of
communities with high demining costs but also high returns.
By contrast  and this is the interesting part  the Landmine Impact Survey portfolio
is strongly drawn to communities with comparatively many recent victims. It has a
low preference for communities with high economic benefits from demining. The
reason is that the Landmine Impact surveyors do not effectively pick out such
communities. The kind of information they are able to collect at this stage, and the
qualitative scoring of the livelihood and institutional blockages, do not flag high-
benefit communities of this type.
The population-based minimal-knowledge strategy does a better job than the perfect-
knowledge strategy, simply because of a correlation between population size and
recent victim numbers. The random-sequence strategy exceeds the Landmine Impact
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Survey portfolio in economic benefits. There are sample fluctuations in this scenario,
of course, but it also did better in a second run. Many of these outcomes are variable
with the model parameters, and more experimentation would be needed to explore
sensitivities. However, two findings may be repeated in order to advance a tentative
consequence:
Ø The Landmine Impact Survey-based portfolio does better in accident reduction
than a purely economic benefit maximising strategy. By implication, it does more
poorly on the economic side.
Ø It does better in accident reduction than a purely random selection of communities.
However, it does not do any better in picking communities with good economic
benefits from demining.
In consequence, there need to be bridging elements between the Landmine Impact
Survey and a cost-benefit analysis of demining particular physical assets in the affected
communities. A cost-benefit analysis would require information, for example, on farm
productivity, precise surfaces and prices in the local property markets, things that the
Survey does not collect.
It follows that the Landmine Impact Survey, if one looks only at the Mine Impact
Score using current definitions, has value for the qualitative, compassionate, and
victim-related mobilisation of mine action resources for affected communities.
Information needed to make cost-benefit based decisions for physical asset demining
will need to be collected in another step such as during a Technical Survey.
The results are very tentative. They are based on a simulation that has not widely
varied its parameters, and has not done a great number of runs with the set parameters.
More analysis is needed of the inferential potential of the survey data, and this will be
facilitated when the correlations among indicators become empirically known from
the first country surveys. It is desirable that developers of other indicator systems do
similar investigations of their information value. As a form of such exercises, computer
simulation should be used aggressively.
Of course, the purview of the Landmine Impact Survey may not satisfy all mine action
professionals. In fact, because mine action is carried out, if not propelled, by professions
with well-developed doctrines and strong networks, it is entirely foreseeable that
pressure for the rationales, design and practice of Landmine Impact Surveys to change
Scenario Communities Cost of Returns Net benefit Annual victim
demined demining  from demining reduction
(US$) (US$) (US$)
All communities 91  1,524,579    2,872,508   1,347,929 74
Perfect
     knowledge 20     706,985    2,416,006   1,709,021 22
Landmine Impact
     Survey 38     600,947       985,062      384,115 59
Minimal
     knowledge 37     623,977       809,040      185,063 37
Entirely random 40     591,423    1,003,612      412,189 34
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will follow obvious professional lines:
Ø The demining community, staffed largely by ex-military personnel, will press
for more Technical Survey elements to be included, enriching the Landmine
Impact Survey with technical data. Their demands may go beyond the current
provisions for size estimates and visual verification of mined areas. This behaviour
is illustrated by the effort to draw mined area polygons during data collection in
Thailand, prompted by the close co-operation between the foreign NGO and the
national mine action centre, an organisation of the armed forces.
Ø The social and medical professions, concerned with victim assistance, may
find systematic gaps, such as on the victims of older date, and will want to see
the data collection formats changed to their needs.
Ø On the donors side, the concern with the impact of the mine action projects
will call for economic analyses, such as cost-benefit analyses, and thereby exert
pressure for the adoption of stronger metrics.1
The Mine Impact Score as a compassionate measure
The Mine Impact Score is the central element of the landmine survey design. While its
basic function  to permit a priority ordering of communities  is easy to understand,
its technicalities may defy quick comprehension.
Technicalities
The Mine Impact Score is a property of the community, not of any or all of the mined
areas in or around the community, nor of the victims that have come to harm there.
The score is indifferent to the number and size of the mined areas; it responds to these
three aspects of the local mine problem:
Ø The nature of contamination,
Ø The types of livelihood and institutional areas to which mines are blocking access,
and,
Ø The number of recent victims.
Technically, the score is a linear combination of two contamination variables (presence
of mines, presence of UXO), 10 livelihood and institutional blockage variables, and of
the number of recent victims. The first two groups hold binary variables, with values
1 and 0, to express statements of the kind: Problem of type X does occur somewhere
in the community  yes or no. The number of victims, by contrast, is their actual
natural number counted over the past 24 months, not the truth value of the assertion
that there had been some victims in that period. The coefficients are the weights that
users can set in response to their preoccupations and country conditions; the Survey
Working Group, chaired by the SAC, that oversees the Global Landmine Survey process
has prescribed weights for some of the variables and has given rules for others that
country surveys may set within limits (Survey Action Center, 2000).
The 13 arguments of the score are composite truth values of qualitative statements,
and the number of victims, over all mined areas in the community. Some of them are
truth values of indicators that are themselves composite statements from several more
specific indicators. For example, Some infrastructure is blocked is true if some bridge,
power line, factory or any other of several specifically enumerated infrastructure
subtypes is blocked. In terms of statement calculus, the sub-type and mined area-
1 A metric is the set of technical instructions of how to measure a concept, condensed to a variable with
permissible range of values, defined unit and dimension.
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specific statements are connected by disjunction, the or-operator (Stoll 1961:57);
in the formal algorithm of the indexing machine the truth values of the composites
are calculated as x = IF(SUM(arguments)>0,1,0).
Figure 1 is an influence diagram of the concept of mine impact as used in the Landmine
Impact Survey. Data on contamination, recent victims, as well as on livelihood and
institutional blockages, is factored into the impact score. Some data is collected on
victims of less recent date and on mine awareness education, but it does not influence
the computation of the score.
Figure 1: Influence Diagram for the Mine Impact Concept
Used in the Landmine Impact Survey
As an example of an actual result, Figure 2 displays the distribution of impact scores
of the 592 affected communities surveyed in Yemen.
Figure 2: Histogram of the Community Impact Scores in Yemen
A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action30
The left skew of the distribution is conspicuous. The majority of the affected
communities in Yemen have low scores. Few communities (14) have scores higher
than 10 and are considered, in the current classification, highly impacted.
Text and alphabet
The Mine Impact Score is a composite index, and the indicators that form part of it
were first chosen by persons who had knowledge of the subject matter (hence its
claim to content validity), but may not have bothered about how to implement a
formal algorithm. Many of the survey contributors and users, however, may at best
be indifferent to, at worst suspicious of, the way the indicators have been hard-wired
into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)2 scoring algorithm.
They may be confounded by the contrast between the limited freedom to set weights
for the indicators on the one side and the inaccessible black box of the composite
statement calculus on the other. They may intuitively understand the recent-victim
variable, since counting and summing natural numbers is trivial, but may despair of
understanding the remainder of the scores components.
They may be helped with an analogy: the relationship between a text and the alphabet.
Suppose, for a moment, that the key community informants were using a special
language for the accounts of the local mine problems they give the survey staff. In this
language, every type of mine problem would be represented by a particular letter,
such as blocked access to irrigated crop land by the letter I. Each unit
occurrence of this particular problem, such as an acre of blocked irrigated land,
would give rise to an instance of that letter. As the interviewees described their
community neighbourhood by neighbourhood, field by field, they would form
words using those letters. The more pervasive the mine problems to be described,
the longer their narrative  while the more diverse the problems, the larger the
alphabet.
What every student of the Landmine Impact Survey may want to understand is the
fact that the livelihood and institutional blockage component of the impact score is
not proportionate to the length of the text. Rather, it is proportionate, in a loose
manner of speaking, to the scope of the alphabet. The number of different types, not
the number of tokens, is what counts.
That particular metric, of course, is open to objections, as several critics have pointed
out. If, for example, a farmer finds one mine in a corner of his orchard yet is still
perfectly able to harvest the other 95 per cent of his fruit trees, his discovery will make
the same contribution to the overall score as would happen if mines put out of operation
the entire non-irrigated crop land in his community. In other words, the index is way
too sensitive at the low-intensity end of mine infestation, and is very dull at the high
end. It is not well calibrated.
Two considerations attenuate for the absence of proper calibration. First, within the
limits of efficient and reliable data collection during most Landmine Impact Surveys,
there is no way to define meaningful units for the occurrence of mine effects other
than persons hurt. An exception may be made for fairly homogenous societies with
long-standing mine action programmes, such as irrigation-based rural
Cambodia, where data on inaccessible farm area may be readily available. In general,
2 The IMSMA is a sophisticated GIS-based database that has been developed by the GICHD on behalf of
the United Nations.
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however, the information economics of the Landmine Impact Survey will forbid
stronger metrics.
Second, societies learn. The hazard from mined cropland, to stay with our example, is
not simply the static product of the number of people who depend on farming and of
the square metres of unusable land. The ability to develop alternative livelihoods will
be a complex function of population size, institutional endowments, and response to
previous mine accidents. Thus, even if the mined surfaces were exactly measured, the
respective damage to persons and livelihoods would probably be less than
proportionate to their actual areas, and more to, say, their square root or to any other
of the power functions common in learning models.
In other words, the Mine Impact Score as a largely qualitative measure may be more
valid than it would seem at first glance. Its validity, however, will be restricted to the
objectives of the Landmine Impact Survey to create a meaningful ranking of
communities in terms of mine impact. It will not characterise a community very well
for the purposes of a Technical Survey.
This discussion is important because other systems of indicators for mine action will
be faced with similar problems. Whatever the system, it will need to define rules for
qualities (types of problems) and quantities (counted or measured tokens). It may
imply hazard and utility assumptions that are non-linear. It may need rules for
connecting statements that are far from obvious. The current Mine Impact Score,
however imperfect, illustrates how such a calculus can be implemented. Nor does the
Landmine Impact Survey stand alone in its use of weak metrics; the use of softer
presence/absence type of data is recommended in many situations where high
quality ... quantitative data [is] expensive, intrusive, or otherwise impractical to
obtain (Orwin et al., 1998:246). Figure 3 (page 32) offers an illustration of how
enumerators collect data in the field for the Mine Impact Score.
Compassion
This discussion so far has been technical. Given that the Mine Impact Score takes
more than 10 substantively different arguments, this is understandable. But the
technicalities are less important than the basic intent of the impact score, which is to
arouse and inform human compassion. The impact score signals those communities
which have, by several standards, suffered greatly from mines and elevates these
communities for priority attention of the mine action community. The working
assumption is that communities scoring high on this index are also the ones in which
mine action has a greater potential for reducing future suffering.
The symmetry between past actuality and future potential is, of course, not unique to
the Mine Impact Score, and is key to the functioning of a number of organised systems
of social memory. Educational testing, credit rating, codification of styles in art and
science come to mind, among others (Luhmann, 1996:319ff.).
Commonly, such systems display two important characteristics. First, they accept a
measure of oscillation, such as in a series of good and bad school marks in the same
student, or between the score of the Landmine Impact Survey and the new insights
that later mine action contacts with the same communities may produce  in other
words, they demand a good, but not too high, predictive validity.
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Figure 3: An Intuitive Approach to the Mine Impact Score
Some readers may find it easier to understand the score when they look over the shoulders of
enumerators who do the actual figuring in the field. Enumerators use forms like the one below.
In the weights columns, weights will have been defined for them, on a country-specific basis,
for the ten institutional and livelihood areas enumerated. Later, the scores will be recalculated
in the database.
Locality identifier:                          District: Community:
Indicators Weights Points    Score
to add
The community reported that
 there were mines. If so, give 2 points _____
 there was UXO If so, give 1 point _____
Subtotal for explosives realm:_____
 access to some irrigated crop
land was blocked. If so, give points _____
 access to some rainfed crop
land was blocked. If so, give points _____
 access to some fixed pasture
was blocked. If so, give points _____
 access to some migratory
pasture was blocked. If so, give points _____
 access to some drinking
water points was blocked. If so, give points _____
 access to some water points
for other uses was blocked. If so, give points _____
 access to some non-cultivated
area was blocked. If so, give points _____
 access to some housing area
was blocked. If so, give points _____
 some roads were blocked. If so, give points _____
 access to some other
infrastructure was blocked. If so, give points _____
Total number of points (sum of weights) to be equal to 10 points
Subtotal for socio-
economic realm _____
 there were ____ mine victims in
the last 24 months. Multiply with 2 points for victims _____
Points for victims _____
Total mine impact score:
 
If the impact score is 0, rank the community as having no known mine problem
If the score is between 1 and 5, the impact is considered to be low.
If the score is between 6 and 10, the impact is considered to be medium.
If the score is higher than 10, the impact is considered high.
Impact ranking:  
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Secondly, they need to be able to portray history as a kind of living present into which
future actions and outcomes can be integrated. At a deeper philosophical level, it is
probably this factor which, more than others, bred disappointment with the old
generation of general mine surveys, prior to the socio-economic perspective. What is
unique to the Survey is the interpretation of the future potential in terms of human
suffering and its reduction  as opposed to specific numeric expressions in terms of
recovered production, saved lives, or development funds disbursed.
The compassionate character of the Mine Impact Score may be a blessing in disguise.
The weak metric makes it nearly impossible to place a value on human lives and
therefore does not open arguments between proponents of accident prevention and
those who prefer livelihood rehabilitation. Imagine a different survey that uses a
stronger metric in the form of cost-benefit analysis. In some rural communities, high-
value irrigated farms may have known few victims for considerable time, simply
because previous accidents due to intense movements discerned danger areas
precisely. On the other hand, women collecting firewood from vast tracts of low-value
shrub land may keep stepping on mines with shocking frequency. Given a limited
budget for demining, assumed costs of demining and net present values for different
types of land, and failure to develop alternative household energy sources, the cost-
benefit analysis will imply a trade-off between capital investment and human lives.
The metric of the Landmine Impact Survey avoids, or at least postpones, such thorny
debates.
Communities as basic units of the Survey
The case for community-level Indicators
It could be argued that a description using only individuals and mined areas could
do the landmines problem better justice than a community-based survey does. In
such an arrangement, communities would at best provide convenient addresses for
victims, survivors, landowners and perhaps other sets of interested persons, as well
as for the mined areas. Surveyors would not have to bother about the nature and
boundaries of communities, or about the effects that mined areas have on people other
than the most palpably afflicted individuals. Philosophically, an individual-based
description might be more in tune with modern times. Images of survivors with a
personal identity tell the strongest stories, and on-site mine action requires the
identification of individuals for such things as medical aid and land ownership. Within
given communities, not all individuals are equally affected, and differential impact
may be more finely characterised in terms of social status than by inclusion in a
community with a summary impact score.
There are several reasons why a community-based description and analysis should
be pursued. Most powerfully, the mine action community depends on estimates of
the affected population. At the required level of aggregation, it is difficult to see how
this figure could be established other than as the population of all the affected
communities. The total may be broken down by communities of greater or lesser
impact, but the need for some global figures will not go away.
Less obvious is the fact that communities are actors who solve problems of individuals
living with mines. Despite dependency on outside markets and bureaucracies,
individuals and families survive, by and large, thanks to institutions that are controlled
by their local community. The nature and strength of these institutions, and their
A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action34
measurement within the limits of key informant interviews, should therefore be of
concern to the Landmine Impact Survey.
Moreover, the relationships that exist between the community characteristics and
behaviours toward landmines form a background on which it may be easier to validate
the Mine Impact Score. For example, do the scores for the affected communities show
a similar distribution to the one that we find for the probabilities of mine accidents?
Would it be similar to the one for local demining effort if we could construct an index
for this, proving that severe impact goes together with extreme risk-taking in order to
open more roads and lands? Would a similar correlation be established between the
impact score and the amount of approved development budgets that cannot be spent
because of mine problems?
Figure 4 exemplifies a possible structure drives behaviour model. In each box,
concepts are not complete, but some are given as examples, together with a possible
metric. Note that the Mine Impact Score is not part of this diagram; it is not a member
of either the structural or behavioural sets, but is a hybrid formed of elements of both.














Community-level factors: The example of Yemen
Such questions were investigated, in a small measure, in the Yemen survey. The leading
hypothesis was that the probability of mine accidents did not only depend on the
number of mines and the size of population living near them. The risk would be
reduced by the amount of time the communities had had to adapt to the local
contamination and by the strength of the institutional endowment. Unfortunately (for
reasons of survey design, not of data collection performance), not enough good data
was available on other behavioural variables, such as local demining effort or impaired




Figure 4: A Model of Structure and Behaviour in Mine-Affected Communities
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Distance of nearest mined area to centre of community was discarded because it
was difficult to interpret in the case of dispersed village communities. Years since
mines last laid, too was left out in order to reduce the number of variables in the
regression model. The two institutional modernisation variables are ex-post
interpretations of a factor pattern.
Of further note is the fact that the conduct of armed conflict in the region is less
straightforward in its influence on the local ability to avoid mine accidents. The basic
idea is that the intensity of conflict is spatially concentrated, and that this extends to
the density of mining or UXO littering. Therefore, if the accidents in this community
and in this period are only one sample realisation of the local hazard, the accidents in
neighbouring communities are significant covariates of the local hazard, too. This
measure may be proxied by the distance to the nearest other community with recent
mine victims.
Turning to the subject of institutional endowment of surveyed communities, in Yemen
eight indicators were used:
Ø Is the community an ordinary village, or is it the centre of a higher administrative
tier (sub-district or upward)?
Ø Does the community have a primary school?
Ø Does the community have a secondary school?
Ø Does the community have a health care facility?
Ø Is the community connected to a telephone service?
Ø Do at least some of the households have access to piped water supply?
Ø Do at least some of the households have electricity?
The selection of those indicators followed predefined fields in the database rather
than a theoretical framework already validated in other community studies, but the
indicators were thought to be sufficiently diverse at least for an exploratory analysis.
This was done using principal component analysis (See below: The Institutional
Endowment of Mine-Affected Communities).
Concepts Associated variables
Pressure on resources: Size of population
Access to water bodies blocked
Intensity of past conflict: Contaminated area
Distance of nearest mined area to centre of
community
Years since mines last laid
Distance to nearest (other) community with some
recent mine victims
Institutional endowment: Degree of institutional modernisation
Degree of technical modernisation
For the accident model, the following concepts were used and measured, with data
available for almost all of the 592 affected communities:
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The Institutional Endowment of Mine-Affected Communities
  Communities Rotated component matrix
Variable with Institutional Technical
Has secondary school 15% .75 .09
Is ordinary village 90% -.72 -.10
Has health care facility 17% .69 .21
Has primary school 56% .59 .06
Fuel is available 11% .47 .47
Has telephone service 9% .21 .66
Has piped water supply 19% .06 .76
Has electricity 24% .06 .80
Variance explained   36% 16%
Correlation with log of current population  .48 .32
Note that fuel loads equally strong on both factors. It is shown under the institutional
factors for mere conventional reasons.
The results regarding recent accidents and numbers of victims are fascinating:
Ø Mine-affected communities are subject to two distinct regimes. One set of factors
determines whether a community has any mine accidents at all. A different set of
factors determines, for communities that do suffer accidents, whether they have
more or fewer victims. Blocked access to water is a common factor of both regimes.
Ø The strongest influence for being totally accident-free is exerted by the regional
conflict history. In other words, the risk of new accidents increases considerably
if neighbouring communities too have suffered mine accidents.
Ø The technical modernisation factor and the access to water bodies come second
and third in the power to avoid accidents.
Ø In communities that do have mine accidents, the size of population, the
contaminated surface, and the distance to the nearest mined area are all positively
associated with the number of victims.
Ø However, this is far less disturbing than the finding that the degree of institutional
modernity is of influence neither for being without accidents at all nor for the
number of victims. This is a slap in the face of conventional wisdom. It suggests
that the presence of government personnel does not enhance the communities
problem-solving capacity in the case of landmines.
Figure 5 visualises the proportional influence of these factors for each regime: total
avoidance of accidents, and number of victims.
On the practical side, the results suggest the need to carefully investigate several policy
and practical consequences: the need to take technical survey resources not only to
communities classified as highly-impacted, but also to their neighbours; higher weights
for blocked access to water, and the creation of alternative employment via technical
investment rather than full-scale demining.
For the discussion of socio-economic indicators, one other result seems noteworthy:
the distributions of the estimated probability for a community to have at least one
mine accident in a two-year period (Figure 6) and of the Mine Impact Score are both
37Assessing the Impact of Mine Contamination
heavily left-skewed, in spite of the fact that the two measures are largely independent
of each other. This would lend credence to the validity of the Mine Impact Score as a
realistic measure of the harm reduction potential.
Figure 5: Strength of Community and Conflict Background Variables, Yemen
Through this kind of analysis, the Yemen survey also vindicates the possibility of a
structural sociology of landmine-infested communities. Some may want to place such
an effort in some more sophisticated framework, such as the neo-Durkheimian trinity
of differentiation, pluralism and solidarity (as Frank W. Young has done in his life-
long study of small communities; Young and Young, 1973; and Young, 1999). Others
will prefer to travel without much theoretical baggage. The choice is a matter primarily
of taste, data availability, and the tolerance of practitioners for socio-speak. The
Landmine Impact Survey design has been content to seek basic information with which
to characterise the institutional endowment, and therefore local problem-solving
capacity, of the affected communities. However, it is difficult to see how in the long
run the Global Landmine Survey can build bridges to development co-operation and
programme evaluation without validated indicators that speak understandably to
those foreign worlds.
More theoretical development seems necessary, perhaps on the lines of some of the
community behaviour work done in rural sociology, notably OBrien on outside
network influences (1991) and Zekeri (Zekeri et al., 1994) on the connection of past
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history and development efforts. The latter works with confirmatory factor models
that should be explored for models of mine-affected community behaviour and for
indicator design to supply the relevant data.
Non-communities: The work-around in Kosovo
Communities as social groups capable of self-description are key to the Landmine
Impact Survey methodology. But they are not available in all situations. In Kosovo,
immediately after the return of the refugees in mid-1999, foreign military and relief
organisations knew more about landmine and UXO contamination than did the
population of Kosovo. Also, many returnees and other citizens stayed in temporary
quarters away from their former communities. Truly knowledgeable local key
informants were rare.
Essentially, communities were not investigated through key informant interviews,
not only because of time and information constraints, but also because of conceptual
problems. In a province with a history of violent opposition between state and ethnic
groups, an authoritative list of communities with which local people  supposing
they still lived there  would identify was not available.
That social baseline was replaced by physical data on settlements, roads and land use,
chiefly extracted from satellite imagery, and by data on the lowest administrative tier
for which polygon shapes and (incomplete) population estimates were available. In
Kosovo, these were over 300 units known as districts.
As a result, the analysis that served mine action priority setting relied heavily on
spatial constructs. Priority rankings were worked out for two kinds of entity:
Ø Suspected areas for area reduction and clearance, and
Ø Districts for mine awareness education.
3 Based on a logistic regression model.
Figure 6: Probabilities for Communities to Have Mine Accidents3
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The metrics used were stronger than those of the Mine Impact Score in a normal
Landmine Impact Survey. For the classification of districts, the percentage of
contaminated land was used. For the suspected areas, the score used was a composite
index, with a weaker metric, but the validation of its components relied on strong
metrics. Not all of the validations were straightforward, however, and more precise
measurement did not always mean that the concepts were easier to understand (see
Messick, 2000).
The scoring variables themselves, and their validation correlates, depended on remote
and unobtrusive measurement, at least until the results of aggressive area reduction
through community visits were worked in. No emanation from the post-conflict society
influenced the data and the analysis, except for awareness education sites, accident
locations, incomplete district population updates, and post-return incident and
suspected area reports. Notably, no systematic and useful data on types of mine impacts
was available other than those inferred from distance to settlements and roads, and
from land use.
Initially, the data on suspected areas and on accident locations was of modest reliability,
but this improved with the increasing visits made by organisations in different branches
of mine action to the communities. These improvements were not accompanied by
significant acquisition of social data, notably because sector-specific relief and
reconstruction agencies did not have relevant data or failed to translate it to a common
reference.
The Kosovo survey attained its objective of providing decision tools for mine action,
and it did so within useful time, creatively exploiting a limited gamut of data. Some
of the spatially defined data, such as land use, was ready only after several months of
astute inter-agency diplomacy. During the same period, other data would slowly
improve in reliability and completeness.
The point is, however, that despite stronger metrics to begin with, and improved
reliability over time, very small gains were made in validity and sophistication of the
underlying socio-economic model. Such gains can hardly be expected from a survey
that cannot harness enough knowledge from the affected populations themselves.
That was not a major problem in Kosovo, where mine action resources were plentiful
to reprioritise specific interventions when new information became available (such as
about communities with fresh accidents). Similar situations, however, can occur
elsewhere. As in Kosovo, unobtrusive measurement of physical variables may be more
rapid or cost-effective than interviewing local residents. One can speculate that this
will increasingly happen if and when aerial detection technologies become available.
A related, less readily manageable scenario arises when mined areas are very large,
with each of them able to affect several communities. The physical characteristics of
such areas may be relatively well known, but the attribution of impacts, either to the
individual mined area based on what it does to a plurality of communities, or to the
individual community, which shares the same resources with many neighbours, may
be challenging. Such seems to be the case, for example, in the border area between
Thailand and Cambodia. In principle, a dual approach should be feasible: a survey of
communities each rated by the normal score (multiple counts of the same mined area
do not disturb this process), as well as a scoring of mined areas, using spatial metrics
and population weighting. The logic for this has not yet been created.
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Concluding remarks
The Landmine Impact Survey as part of the Global Landmine Survey has moved from
design to testing and to data collection in several countries. The survey has been
completed in Yemen, and, in a modified format, in Kosovo. Several other surveys are
under way, each demanding and making an amount of conceptual adjustments while
trying to stay faithful to the core requirements. The relevant organisational
environment, too, is evolving, and in this co-evolution the survey design is not above
challenge even at a time when the first complete surveys garnered international
applause.
The core logic of the Landmine Impact Survey, and the one hard-wired into the
database, uses a weak metric to assess degrees of mine problem severity. The weak
metric is part of the price paid for a community-centred approach. It allows the
calculation of a Mine Impact Score that is both a qualitative and compassionate
construct. Also, it keeps information costs down during this phase. It can inform a
community ranking for priority mine action, but within this selection special surveys
may be needed subsequently for victim assistance needs or for the selection of specific
area for clearance considering costs and benefits.
The weak-metric approach is easy to criticise, but difficult to replace. Elements have
been injected into the survey format that threaten mission creep and hybridisation
while improving the commonality with some of the mine action professions. The
international survey management will need to keep a good balance between stability
and improvement of a standard design on the one hand, and openness and creativity
on the other.
Alternative indicator systems to the one used in the Landmine Impact Survey are
perfectly conceivable. Whatever their logic and metrics, the fundamental challenges
will remain similar. There is painfully little valid theory around of the behaviour of
mine-affected communities on which to ground conceptual frameworks and indicator
systems. The Yemen survey has proven that advances are possible. Nevertheless, the
challenges of relevancy, validity and reliability will remain omnipresent. The unit
costs in a particular line of surveys will go down with replications in more countries,
but new needs may also come up for sequential products. New efforts will be needed,
not only for technical information, but more so to keep the flame of compassion
burning.




With the transition from open conflict to sustained peace, mine action programmes are
challenged to extend their focus from risk reduction alone to contributing to the broader
goals of national socio-economic development. This chapter illustrates how cost-benefit
approaches can be used to assess mine action programmes. Based on case studies of Lao
PDR and Mozambique, it demonstrates how such analysis can inform mine action programme
managers and policy-makers  in two countries at similar levels of development but with
quite different social, economic and cultural characteristics.
Introduction
In brief, economic analysis is concerned with decisions. Some of these relate directly
to the use of scarce resources and entail an evaluation or comparison of:
Ø The costs and benefits expected to arise from deciding on one course of action (is
the decision justifiable in any sense?); and,
Ø The different sets of expected costs and benefits arising from alternative courses
of action (is the decision justifiable when compared to other feasible alternatives?).
As such, economic analysis applies certain techniques (to ensure logic and consistency)
to selected information and evaluates the results. However, economic analysis is also
concerned with a broader set of decisions relating to:
Ø What is to be valued (the information basis, including whose information counts);
and,
Ø How it is to be valued (the evaluative framework)?1
These underlying decisions or value judgements are often implicit or hidden. One of
the most important benefits of thorough economic analysis is that it often brings into
the open the value judgements that policy- and decision-makers are making implicitly.
1 Those interested in these broader aspects   economics as a worldly philosophy can refer to books
by two recent Nobel laureates: Sen (1999) and North (1990). See also the section The Mine Impact Score as
a compassionate measure in Chapter 2, p. 28.
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Cost-benefit analysis2
Consider a simple example of the type of decision that a UXO LAO manager might
face. She has been requested to clear some land for wet season rice paddies. Based
on UXO survey information and on unit cost data from headquarters, she estimates it
will cost about US$4,000 per hectare to clear the land. Based on information obtained
by headquarters, she also knows the average yield per hectare should be worth about
US$370 to the farmer next year, and that this will rise on average by over 2 per cent
per year thereafter. Good rice land is a valuable asset in Lao PDR. Although such land
is rarely sold, headquarters has developed a formula for imputing the sale value of
land. With this information, the manager could prepare the following chart (Figure 7)
depicting the likely economic costs and benefits relating to the clearance of one hectare
of land over the coming ten years.
Is the UXO clearance justified on economic grounds?
In this example, simply adding the figures gives a total economic benefit of over
US$6,350.3 Costs will be only US$4,000, but these must be incurred today, while the
benefits are spread over the coming 10 years. Might not the farmer be better off if he
was simply given US$4,000 today to put in the bank to earn interest over the coming
ten years?4 The answer to this question depends, of course, on the interest rate available
on bank deposits and it turns out in this example that, if the expected interest rate is
over 6.95 per cent, the farmer would be better off with the money than the land.
Discounting
Making an economic comparison between costs and benefits that will arise in the
future requires discounting to convert future values into present values (see
2 This section uses data from Lao PDR and the study of UXO LAO  the Mine Action Centre (MAC) in
that country.
3 About 64 per cent of this is from the rice produced and 36 per cent from the value of the land.
4 If UXO LAOs ultimate objective was to increase incomes of poor farm households, in theory it could do
this by spending money on UXO clearance or, alternatively, by giving the money directly to the poor
households.
Figure 7: Simple Cost-Benefit Example
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Box 3: Discounting and the Time-Value of Money). The basic formula used is PV =
FV/(1 + r)y, where: PV = present value, FV = future value, r = annual discount rate,
and y = number of years.
Box 3: Discounting and the Time-Value of Money
If given a choice between receiving money today and the same amount sometime
in the future, people typically choose to take the money immediately. This phenomenon
is termed the time-value of money, but it holds more generally for any good or
benefit: most chocolate-lovers will choose chocolate today over the promise of the
same chocolate in a month. Similarly, most people will want to delay a cost (or a bad).
Put in other words, people discount the value of future benefits. The rate of discount
is calculated by seeing how much more of the future benefit a person would demand
to exchange it for the benefit today.
For example, if a person would be just willing to exchange US$100 today for US$110
a year from now, her annual discount rate is 10 per cent, and the calculation is US$100
x (1.10) = US $110. The equivalent amount in two years would be US$100 x (1.10)2 =
US$121, and the general formula is FV = PV x (1 + r)y, where:
FV = future value PV = present value
r = annual discount rate y = number of years
This is equivalent to the basic formula for discounting a future value to calculate the
present value:
PV = FV/(1 + r)y
Figure 8 depicts the stream of future benefits (both rice produced and the imputed
sale value of the land) before discounting, while Figure 9 (page 44) compares the
future and present (discounted) values of the rice produced.
Building a useful model: Key parameters
A very simple model is useful for explaining basic cost-benefit concepts, but even the
simple rice economy in Lao PDR is more complicated, and it is important to
understand its features to ensure the model can usefully (and safely!) serve as a tool
Figure 8: Future Values of Crops and Land
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for decision-making. The key features of the rural economy is Lao PDR are:
Ø Almost all rural households farm, and the vast majority of these grow rice;
Ø Land is allocated to households by the community authorities. While most farmers
have ownership-like control over their land, households cannot generally buy
or sell land. Therefore, there is no market for agricultural land, and land values
cannot be gleaned from market prices;
Ø Rice yields vary by farming system, as follows:
Farming system Average yield Annual growth in yield
per hectare (1997) per hectare (1985-97)
Rain-fed wet-season rice 2.9 tons 1.47%
Irrigated dry season rice5 4.0 tons 4.20%
Upland (sloping land) rice 1.6 tons 1.48%
Overall (weighted average) 2.7 tons 2.45%
Ø The average farm-gate6 price for rice was US$177.10 per ton in 1997.
Ø Farmers save some of their crop to use as seed the following year, and there are
spoilage losses during storage;
Ø Use of improved seeds, fertiliser, and other modern inputs is low, but rising
quickly in the Mekong corridor (where there is little UXO contamination);
Ø The minimum acceptable economic internal rate of return (see Box 4: Net Present
Value and the Internal Rate of Return) used by the Asian Development Bank for
its projects is 12 per cent per annum. This is an appropriate, albeit conservative,
discount rate;
Ø Many rural households do not have enough arable land, so household members
spend a significant amount of time on non-agricultural pursuits, including
hunting;
Ø The rural agricultural wage rate is about US$1 per day, but few opportunities for
wage work exist in rural areas except during seasonal planting and harvesting
peaks (i.e., when farmers are fully engaged on their own land).
5 The yield figure for irrigated land is for the dry season irrigated crop only. Farmers might also plant
rain-fed wet season crop on the same land.
6 This refers to the price actually paid to farmers, which is much lower than the price in shops due to
transport, processing, and marketing costs.
Figure 9: Comparing Present and Future Values of Crop
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Box 4: Net Present Value (NPV) and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
The NPV is simply the present value of benefits minus the present value of costs. The
basic formula for any one future year is NPVy = (By - Cy)/(1 + r)y , where 
NPVy  = NPV for year y
By  = Value of benefits in year y
Cy = Costs in year y
The symbol E is often used as shorthand to indicate the calculation is repeated (in
this case, done for each year) and the results are added together. Therefore, the full
formula is
E NPVy = E (By - Cy)/(1 + r)
y.
The IRR is the discount rate that would have to prevail for the NPV to equal zero (i.e.,
for the present value of the stream of benefits to equal the present value of the stream
of costs). A high IRR indicates a good investment.
Based on the above, our baseline cost-benefit model will use the following eight
parameters7 to calculate the PV of benefits:
1. Farming system/crop: lowland wet season rice
2. Yield: 2.9 tons per hectare
3. Growth in average yield per hectare: 2 per cent per annum
4. Less: inputs and spoilage losses: 20 per cent of production
5. Price: US$177.10 per ton
6. Number of future years: 20
7. Discount rate: 12 per cent
The above yields an interim figure  the NPV of the next 20 years of rice production
on a hectare of cleared land. This is US$3,545.37. We will use this amount as the imputed
sale value of the land 20 years hence.8
8. Imputed sale value of land: PV benefits = US$3,545.37
For costs, we have two items: the cost of UXO clearance itself, and the value of the
extra household labour that will be required to farm the cleared land. For the latter,
the new land only provides economic benefit if a farm household spends time clearing
it of vegetation, planting, tending, and harvesting. This means household members
will not have as much time available for other activities, including hunting, tending
livestock, fishing/aquaculture, gathering firewood/making charcoal, weaving, etc.
Such activities bring economic benefits, which the household will lose if it cultivates
more land.
Wet season rice cultivation lasts about five months, farm households cultivate about
1.6 hectares on average, and the rural daily wage rate is about US$1 per day. Assuming
the new land is allocated to land-poor households that now have only 0.6 to 1.0
7 We have not included the value of livestock production in this model, because UXO does not impose
significant risks for grazing, and Lao farmers graze stock on rice lands after harvest so no significant
grazing land is lost as rice fields are expanded. Livestock is an important issue for land mine clearance in
countries such as Afghanistan. The Socio-Economic Impact Study for Afghanistan (Mine Clearance Planning
Agency, 1999) found milk and meat from livestock was the most significant economic benefit from mine
clearance.
8 One generally must be very careful not to double count various costs and benefits, but this example
does not imply double counting. Rather, the sale price for land to be used for agricultural purposes will
be based on the expected profits from the lands future crops. Past profits would be a good predictor of
future profits, so we are simply using a measure of past profitability to establish a guesstimate for the
land value. Any reasonable figure would do  the advantage of this one is that it is already generated by
the model and no additional calculations are required.
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hectares, this suggests an extra hectare would take about half a farmers time over
about 100 days, so 1/2 x 100 days x US$1/day = US$50 opportunity cost of labour per
hectare per year.
Before UXO clearance costs are considered, the NPV result for the baseline model is
equal to US$3,539.43, implying that clearance costs averaging US$3,540 per hectare
would be justified on economic grounds alone.
Preliminary cost studies commissioned by UXO LAO indicate its average unit cost9 in
1999 to clear a hectare of land was between US$4,000 and US$4,400.10 This is projected
to fall to perhaps US$3,000 for the year 2000 due to higher productivity. These various
clearance cost figures give the following results:
UXO clearance  NPV before clearance Final NPV11 IRR12
US$3,000 US$3,540 US$540 14.2%
US$4,000 US$3,540 (US$460) 10.5%
US$4,400 US$3,540 (US$860) 9.4%
Upland rice land
UXO LAO also clears land for households to grow upland rice. Productivity in terms
of yield per acre is significantly lower for upland rice  1.6 tons per hectare rather
than 2.9 tons per hectare. Also, it takes far more labour to grow rice using shifting
cultivation practices: slashing existing vegetation, burning biomass (twice), fencing
(to keep out cattle), and much more weeding than is required for lowland rice, where
flooding the rice paddies controls weeds. Using the lower yield figure and doubling
the imputed cost for household labour yields an NPV before UXO clearance costs of
only US$1,412, and the following results for the various clearance costs:
UXO  clearance NPV before clearance Final NPV IRR
US$3,000 US$1,412 (US$1,588) 4.7%
US$4,000 US$1,412 (US$2,588) 2.4%
US$4,400 US$1,412 (US$2,988) 1.7%
Irrigated land
The yield for irrigated land is significantly higher than for wet season rice as used in
our baseline scenario. Because of better water control, average yield per hectare is
four tons for the dry season crop alone. But this is the second crop; normally farmers
would plant a wet season crop on the same land, growing this without irrigation, so
9 The unit cost includes direct clearance costs (labour, explosives, fuel, etc.) plus overheads for capital
equipment and administration including salaries of Lao managers. It does not include salaries for
international personnel, treating these as start-up and capacity-building costs. We incorporate these
costs in the final sections of this chapter.
10 The higher figure is based on the number of hectares cleared as reported in the UXO LAO study (579).
The Work Plan 2000 reports a higher figure for hectares cleared (622), implying a lower cost per hectare.
11 Discounted at 12 per cent.
12 The IRR figures indicate what the discount rate would need to be for UXO clearance to be a break-even
proposition. Higher rates indicate a better investment.
47Socio-Economic Analysis of Mine Action
the total annual yield for the land is 6.9 tons per hectare. Conversely, some arable
land is lost to irrigation canals. UXO will need to be cleared from this land as well.
Assuming this averages a little over 11 per cent, the average yield per hectare of cleared
land (both crop growing and irrigation canals) would be 6.2 tons per hectare.
Farmers using irrigation also make greater use of inputs, which our model captures
because we calculate input costs as a percentage of yields. Greater use of modern
inputs also means yields are growing faster  say 3 per cent per year rather than 2
per cent. Finally, labour requirements are significantly higher, both for the second
crop and to maintain the irrigation canals. We will assume imputed labour costs to be
four times higher than the baseline case, or US$200 per annum.
The above adjustments yield an NPV before UXO clearance costs of US$7,524, and the
following results for the various clearance costs:
UXO Clearance NPV before clearance Final NPV IRR
US$3,000 US$7,524 US$4,524 27.4%
US$4,000 US$7,524 US$3,524 21.3%
US$4,400 US$7,524 US$3,124 19.7%
Future prospects
The analysis is conducted on the basis of 1999 clearance operations and 1997 rice
production and price data (the latest available). The model predicts the same clearing
operations would yield higher NPVs in 2000 because (1) clearance costs are dropping
as productivity increases, and (2) agricultural productivity is rising.13 For example,
considering only the effect of 2 per cent/annum increases in agricultural productivity,
the model projects a hectare of wet season rice land cleared in 2000 will be worth
2.21 per cent more than one cleared in 1999. This effect will grow at compounded
rates with rising agricultural productivity, so UXO clearance will look increasingly
attractive over time, particularly if UXO LAO can also continue increasing its
productivity.
Sensitivity analysis
Cost-benefit and other types of economic analysis are based on models, which are
simplifications of reality. Often, important elements are unwittingly left out or the
social scientists do not have in-depth knowledge of the real situation and use
inappropriate figures. As such, analysts should always be prepared to alter their
analysis based on new information. But the cost of monitoring information is high, so
it helps to hone in on those items that make a significant difference. Sensitivity analysis
is sometimes used to identify the parameters in a model that cause significant changes
in the results.
13 This assumes rice prices will remain constant in real terms (i.e., adjusted for inflation), as will the major
UXO LAO cost elements (salaries, equipment, explosives, etc.), or that the two move in parallel. Rice
prices tend to fluctuate significantly because of the agricultural protectionism of developed countries.
Agricultural productivity also fluctuates from year-to-year because of the weather and pests, so it is
important to consider multi-year averages and long-term trends in productivity.
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The following table shows changes in the final results as the various parameters are
changed (using the baseline case and medium clearance costs of US$4,000 per
hectare).
Parameter 10% change to  % change in NPV Absolute change
before clearance in IRR (at
costs US $4,000 cost)
Average rice yield
  per hectare 3.19 tons +11.1 +1.26%
Average sale price Same as above
Productivity increase
  per year 2.2%/yr +1.7 +0.2%
Input/spoilage costs 22% -2.8 -0.32%
Discount rate 13.2% -9.5 -0.11%
Household labour
  costs per year US$55 -1.1 -0.12%
From this, the critical parameters are: first, rice yield and farm-gate price (equal changes
to these have the same effect in the model);14 second, input/spoilage costs; and third,
the rate of productivity increase. Changes in yields and prices should, therefore, be
monitored.15
So What (1)? Analysis for management
While UXO LAO managers should be interested in the sensitivity analysis results
concerning what information and trends they should be monitoring, they have no
control over things like average crop yields or rice prices. To be truly useful, a model
should address some of the typical decisions that managers and policy-makers are
required to make  the things they can influence, at least in part.
We have already seen that changes in the cost of UXO clearance are extremely
important in determining whether clearing agricultural land will be justified in
economic terms (whether measures in NPV or IRR terms). Cost control and staff
productivity are, therefore, always very important for mine/UXO clearance
programmes. In Lao PDR, UXO LAO has already taken steps to (1) reduce staff salaries
by over 20 per cent and (2) improve its logistics management to control costs and
reduce equipment downtime. Plans are also in place to adapt the training programme
based on experience to date, which should means new staff will be more productive.
There are other areas in which UXO LAO, and mine action managers in general, have
some influence over outcomes. An important area is work planning, including co-
ordination with other agencies. A common problem is that land is cleared of UXO
with the expectation that it will be farmed in the coming crop year, but for various
14 Note however that an increase in price would not benefit a farm household if it was entirely in the
subsistence economy (i.e., they neither buy nor sell rice) unless the increase causes it to engage in marketing.
As well, an increase in price would be slightly more attractive to a household that does market rice,
because no extra labour would be required. Conversely, an increase in yield would require some additional
labour in harvesting and processing the crop. To keep the model simple, we have assumed this additional
labour is small.
15 Although the study team could not obtain official figures, the average price of rice seems to have fallen
in recent years to an estimated US$135 per ton in 1998 and as low as US$112 per ton in 1999. Prices also
vary significantly within Lao PDR, with average prices being highest in the central provinces and lowest
in the north (Bourdet, 2000).
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reasons16 it lies fallow. Because of the time value of money, such delays can significantly
reduce the economic benefits accruing to UXO clearance. For example, using the
baseline case and clearance costs of US$4,000 per hectare, a one-year delay in putting
the land to use after clearance will reduce the NPV by US$330 and the IRR by 0.92 per
cent. Clearance costs would then need to be below US$3,210 per hectare to justify
UXO clearance on economic grounds alone. In general, UXO clearance offers
contingent benefits (i.e., whether potential benefits accrue is contingent on other
things happening). As such, co-ordination with other agencies  and with the
communities themselves  is critical to increase the likelihood that benefits will accrue
as planned.
Mine action managers must also sequence their work over the year. Generally, they
consider climatic conditions that complicate transportation to work sites and the
effectiveness of certain equipment. However, there is also a seasonal pattern to
agriculture. In Lao PDR, land preparation for lowland wet season rice begins about
mid-May (with some regional variations), while transplanting from seedbeds is done
in late June and early July. Therefore, clearance would need to be completed by late
June if the land is to be planted the same year. Conversely, upland rice growing entails
land clearance and burning from January through early April, so clearance would
have to be completed much earlier if the land is to be used.
In general, mine action managers should factor the seasonal dimensions of the local
agricultural economy into their work planning.
So What (2)?  Analysis for policy
While economic analysis can help with work planning and day-to-day management
decisions, in fact mine action managers do not base decisions on cold financial logic
alone. Quite properly, they consider many factors when setting work priorities. Many
of these relate to logistics, but some are, broadly, socio-economic (poverty, food
security, child safety, etc.) or environmental (e.g., reduction of slash-and-burn
practices).
For both effective management and accountability, it is important that the evaluative
framework and information basis of decision-makers is made explicit (See Box 5: Values,
Information and Policies). Policy decisions and the publication of policy statements serve
these purposes, but only to a degree. Acknowledging that trade-offs will be made
between, say, maximising the income stream to society as a whole and meeting the
food security requirements of impoverished households in remote areas does not
answer the question: How much weight is given to food security relative to income
maximisation? Without answering this question, how can donor governments be sure
their taxpayers money given to mine action is being used in a manner consistent with
their countrys humanitarian values? How can senior managers in a national mine
action programme be sure that the decisions made by implementing partners and
provincial co-ordinators reflect the same values and priorities?
16 Such delays could occur for many reasons, including: the land is not allocated to a farm household;
critical inputs (e.g., credit to buy bullocks, seed) are not available at the right time; the government does
not complete planned resettlement in time; no agricultural extension services are available to resettled
households, who do not know how to grow crops appropriate for their new land; too much food aid is
delivered, depressing local food prices and making it unattractive to plant rice.
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Such questions will never be fully answered. However, economic analysis, broadened
into socio-economic analysis, can help make these value judgements more explicit.
For example, in Lao PDR, farmers in flat terrain and close to roads produce higher
average yields, for four main reasons:
Ø Their land is easier to farm, with less labour;
Ø They have access to modern inputs (high-yielding seed, commercial fertiliser,
tractors, etc.);
Ø They have access to markets, giving them financial incentive to buy modern inputs
or invest in water control measures, increase yields, and sell their surplus
production;
Ø They have access to markets supplying incentive goods such as televisions
and inexpensive textiles, which improve their quality of life.17
UXO clearance of flat terrain close to roads is also cheaper. Therefore, economic analysis
will show benefit-cost ratios are higher for flat lands close to roads because (1) benefits
are higher and (2) costs are lower. High yields and low-cost delivery of public services
are both socially desirable outcomes that are captured by economic cost benefit
analysis. Social cost-benefit analysis is sometimes used to modify analytic results by
giving explicit weight to other socially desirable outcomes, in line with explicit policy
decisions.
For example, we might distinguish three categories of land, with different yields and
UXO clearance costs but holding all other parameters constant, as follows:18
Characteristics Flat, all-weather road Flat, dry-season road Flat, remote
Average yield 3.5 tons per hectare 2.9 tons per hectare 2.5 tons per hectare
Clearance costs US$3,500 US$4,000 US$4,400
NPV before clearance US$4,349 US$3,540 US$3,000
IRR 14.9% 10.5% 7.7%
17 Subsistence farmers must assume extra risk to engage in the market economy. For example, they may
have to borrow money to purchase modern inputs, and they may depend on agricultural extension workers
 who might not be around when needed  to learn new farming practices. Financial incentives alone
are generally not sufficient to entice farmers to accept such risks unless they can also buy things that
make life easier and more enjoyable.
18 The medium flat, dry-season road example is our earlier baseline case.
Box 5: Values, Information and Policies
Decision-making always involves choices, and the choices made depend on what
the decision-taker values and the information at his/her disposal. Further, values influence
the information base in two ways: by determining (1) in part, what information is
collected, and (2) the weights placed on different types on information.
Economists and accountants are often criticised for making decisions based purely
on financial or countable income figures. More generally, there is a danger that what
isnt counted doesnt count because many decision-makers give full value to
quantitative data while discounting qualitative information, which often is of critical
importance. However, neither is it acceptable for managers of publicly- funded
programmes to discount quantitative data and base decisions on information they
value more highly without making these value judgements explicit.
In this light, policies can be viewed as serving two main functions  as explicit
statements of values, and as a means for allowing decentralisation.
In making values explicit through policy statements, elected officials and senior
administrators inform subordinates what information to value, and how. Subordinates
can then be expected to make  roughly  the same decision as the senior officials,
and can be held to account if they do not.
ð
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The results obtained by cost-benefit analysis can be modified in three ways: by
adjusting the costs, the benefits, or the discount rate. In this example, one simple way
of adjusting costs to tilt results in favour of less-advantaged households is to use
average UXO clearance costs  in this case, US$4,000 per hectare.19 This does not
alter the NPV before clearance, but changes the IRR results to 13.1 per cent, 10.5 per
cent, and 8.7 per cent respectively.20
Social cost-benefit analysis typically adjusts the benefits to give extra weight to socially
desirable outcomes. In Lao PDR, one of the national development priorities is
increased food production to achieve food security.21 UXO LAO could, via a policy
decision, give higher value to rice that will be directly consumed by a food-deficit
household  typically by multiplying the yield expected from their newly-cleared
land by a number greater than 1. The conversion factor then makes it explicit how
much extra weight we are giving to rice production that contributes to the household
food security objective, in addition to the standard economic benefit. For example, if
we set the food security conversion factor at 1.25, we are giving 25 per cent more
weight to rice that will be directly consumed in a food-deficit household.
Strictly speaking, we should only do this conversion for the portion of future
production that is necessary for household food security. The arithmetic is modestly
complicated, and we do not want UXO team leaders to do long calculations before
making each clearance decision. Accordingly, the calculations can be done at
headquarters and summarised on tables or graphs such as the following (for the
sequence of calculations, see Box 6: Calculating Food Security Adjusted Yields):
Expected yield Household size (hectares)
2 3 4 5 6 7
< 2.40 tons per hectare Clearance not justified
2.40 tons per hectare X X X X X Clear
2.47 tons per hectare X X X X Clear Clear
2.56 tons per hectare X X X Clear Clear Clear
2.65 tons per hectare X X Clear Clear Clear Clear
2.74 tons per hectare X Clear Clear Clear Clear Clear
2.82 tons per hectare Clear Clear Clear Clear Clear Clear
> 3.00 tons per hectare Clearance always justified
UXO LAO managers could use a similar approach to give greater weight to clearance
that would allow slash-and-burn farmers to resettle on flat land to grow rice in less
environmentally harmful ways. Once again, the advantage of this approach is that it
makes explicit critical value judgements that policy-makers and managers are making
anyway. Once these are in the open, they can be debated to ensure, in a more concrete
manner, that the policies are consistent with government priorities and donor values,
and that subordinates understand and can apply the policies more consistently.
19 This approach is often used, based on the value judgement that all citizens should have equal access to
certain essential public services. For example, Canada Post requires the same stamp on letters from one
Toronto address to another as on letters sent 4,000 miles from Toronto to Vancouver.
20 Note that UXO LAO does not yet have cost accounting systems in place to give different standard costs
for different combinations of terrain and road access. In using the overall average clearance cost, it is
implicitly favouring beneficiaries in more remote communities.
21 Food security must be assessed at various levels - national, regional, community, household, and
individual - that are inter-related but not the same. Our discussion focuses on household food security.
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In many situations, such debates will raise other special cases. Quite often however,
debate might show that just about every group is a special case. Either there is no
justifiable reason for privileging one group over others equally impoverished, or the
question of equity might best be dealt with by making a explicit policy decision to
exclude services to well-defined groups that are relatively well off.22
Box 6: Calculating Food Security Adjusted Yields
In the example above, we assume UXO clearance will be justified on social and
economic terms if the adjusted yield promises to be above 3 tons per hectare. Starting
with the expected yield obtained by the agriculture department or local informants,
the adjusted yield is obtained in the following steps:a
1. Calculate the milled rice requirements by household size.
2. Divide the result by 51 per cent to obtain the equivalent paddy requirements (i.e.,
49 per cent of paddy rice by volume is lost in storage or milling, or saved as seed);
3. Subtract the paddy requirements from the expected yield to obtain the amount of
surplus paddy. If the result is negative, use zero;
4. Multiply the paddy requirements by 1.25 (the conversion factor) and the figure
obtained for surplus paddy by 1, then add the two results.
5. Multiply the expected yield by 1.25 to obtain the maximum possible adjusted yield.
6. Take the lesser of the results from steps 4 and 5 as the adjusted yield.
a  These calculations are for households that presently do not have any land (e.g.,
resettlers). Information on rice requirements and losses in converting paddy rice to milled
rice is from: Government of Lao PDR, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1999:17, Table
8: Rice Balance Sheet for 1995-2000.
22 In Lao PDR, this might be commercial farmers and/or farmers growing export crops who have more
than, say, five hectares. These people might use commercial UXO firms as their decision to expand the
cropping area is, essentially, a commercial proposition. Alternatively, UXO LAO could provide services
on a cost recovery basis.
Figure 10: Cut-Off Line for UXO Clearance
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Evaluating the entire clearance programme
The models developed allow an assessment of whether to clear a particular area of
land in the future. The clearance cost per hectare is a full-cost figure including both
direct labour, materials, fuel, etc., plus overheads for UXO LAO management,
equipment depreciation and maintenance, local training costs, and similar items, based
on 1999 cost and productivity figures. However, very significant sums were invested
since late 1995 in building UXO LAOs capacity, and in the early years its clearance
productivity was far lower. Can we say anything about the likely return on investment
to these start-up and capacity-building costs?23
First, it must be emphasised that these historic costs have already been incurred.
Economists refer to these as sunk costs and sunk costs should not influence future
decisions. Significant capacity in UXO LAO has already been paid for and should be
used as the NPV of future benefits promises to exceed that of future costs. The following
exercise, therefore, is more relevant for donors when considering how best to establish
new programmes in the future for mine contaminated countries.
To evaluate the entire clearance programme in Lao PDR, we need to start from its
beginning in 1995 and compare the total costs against the benefits accruing from all
clearance operations to this point in time. We then need to forecast total clearance
costs and total clearance benefits into the future.
Estimating total clearance costs from 1995
UXO LAO and its implementing partners perform both clearance and risk reduction
(roving clearance and community awareness), so total costs must be apportioned
among these functions. In 1999, an estimated 62 per cent of field staff time was spent
on clearance, with the rest going to risk reduction. Detailed figures are not available
for prior years, but we know risk reduction  particularly roving clearance  was
given higher priority in earlier years, while there is pressure to shift more resources to
clearance in the future. The following table gives our estimates for total costs (including
international salaries) plus the percentages allocated to clearance.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 (est.)
Total costs
  (US$000s) 1,091 4,371 8,206 10,031 10,293 10,615
% Clearance 45 50 55 60 62 64
Clearance
  costs 491 2,186 4,514 6,019 6,382 6,794
We project total costs will decline over a number of years to US$6 million in 2006 as
international staff are withdrawn, and the proportion of total field staff (i.e., deminers
and community awareness personnel) allocated to clearance to increase gradually
until it reaches 80 per cent.
23 As well, the cost figures per hectare used earlier do not include the continuing capacity-building costs
(i.e., the salaries and benefits of international technical advisors and trainers).
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Estimating how many hectares will be cleared
An estimate for total benefits requires (1) the number of hectares cleared and (2) the
estimated NPV from the average hectare cleared. For the first item, figures for 1996 to
200024 are:
Year and hectares cleared Index (1996 = 100) % increase (year-on-year)
1996  24 100
1997 - 159 663 553
1998 - 292 1,217 84
1999 - 578 2,404 98
2000 - 1000 (projection) 4,167 73
We need a projection for the hectares likely to be cleared in future years, but cannot
simply extrapolate from earlier years as UXO LAO was growing rapidly from 1995-
2000, and this will not continue in the future. Total growth in clearance operations
since 1996 stemmed from increases in (1) the number of deminers, (2) the percentage
of time each deminer works on clearance (as opposed to roving), and (3) the average
productivity of a deminer. For the first two items, we project UXO LAO will stop
expanding in 2001 and that it will gradually reallocate from roving to clearance until
86 per cent of total deminers time is spent on clearance by 2004.  But how can we
estimate future productivity increases?
As a basis for this, we first need to understand the reasons behind the rapid increase
in clearance to date. The following table gives our estimates for three sources of increase.
Source of increase 1997 1998 1999 2000 (est.)
Additional deminers 309% 17% 7% 22%
Reallocation to clearance 8% 8% 7% 4%
Productivity Increase 50% 46% 72% 36%
Total year-on-year increase25 563% 84% 98% 73%
About 54 per cent of the total increase in production (i.e., hectares cleared) from 1996
to 2000 is due to expansion of the programme (more deminers), with about 3 per cent
due to reallocation of deminers from roving to clearance. A substantial increase in
labour productivity26 (i.e., the number of hectares cleared per deminer working on
clearance) accounts for the rest. The pattern of labour productivity growth in the past
gives some basis for estimating future productivity growth. Labour productivity
increases peaked in 1999.27 Following the peak (a 72 per cent year-on-year increase), it
appears the rate of labour productivity growth will fall by half in 2000. We therefore
project future productivity increases will decline by half each year. Based on these
assumptions, the number of hectares cleared in future years is depicted in Figure 11.
24 Based on clearance rates for the first four months of 2000 relative to the comparable period in 1999.
25 Note, these columns do not add to the total  productivity increases are multiplicative. Using 1997 as
an example, the formula is Total Increase = (100%+309%) x (100%+8%) x (100%+50%) - 100%. In this case,
we know the Total Increase and the increases in both the number of deminers and the reallocation from
roving to clearance, so we calculate the productivity increase as a residual.
26 Note, some of the increase in labour productivity may be due to better use of equipment, in which
case this term could be called total factor productivity.
27 We assume the peak in productivity growth did not occur earlier because managers were new and
busy expanding the programme (both numbers of personnel and provinces covered) until late 1998.
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28 It will increase to almost US$3,620 for 2000.
29 Similarly, the NPV of wet season rice land cleared in earlier years would be slightly lower than in 1999.
30 For example, the cost of replacing rural roads averages US$30,000/km (World Bank, 1997a:iii).  Clearing
the entire length of the road to a width of 20 metres means a maximum area clearance of two hectares for
every kilometre of road. Bids for this type of clearance range up to US$2,000/ha (because the road is not
in fact mined for its entire length). Therefore, total costs of perhaps US$4,000 provide an immediate
benefit of US$30,000  a net benefit of US$26,000 and an IRR (assuming the clearance is done fully six
months before the road is reopened) of 5,525 per cent. Even if the road has deteriorated and requires
reconstruction at, say, US$15,000/km, the internal rate of return for clearance six months prior to the
road reopening would be over 1,300 per cent.
31 Calculated in this manner, average clearance costs per hectare were about US$11,040 in 1999, rather
than the US$4,400 estimated in UXO LAOs Cost Capture Study (unpublished). This gives an idea of the
scale of how dramatically international salaries and benefits push costs up.
Estimating NPV of benefits
We already have developed a model suggesting the NPV of clearing a hectare of rain
fed rice land, at a 12 per cent discount rate (the baseline case), was about US$3,540 in
1999.  Agricultural productivity is increasing at about 2 per cent per year, so the NPV
of clearing the same hectare will be higher next year.28 This pattern will continue as
agricultural productivity increases over time.29 We also know the NPV of clearing
irrigated land is significantly higher, and will increase faster over time because of
higher rates of productivity increases. It is hard to estimate average values for other
clearance tasks (intensively farmed vegetable plots, roads, schools, health clinics, etc.),
but these are likely to be significantly higher on average than that for rain-fed
agricultural land.30
The basic model
Based on the above discussion, we will use the following parameters to build a model:
Ø Clearance costs = total costs x percentage attributable to clearance;31
Ø Hectares cleared = actual figures to 1999, then increased by projected changes in
numbers of deminers, percentage of deminers time spent on clearance, and labour
productivity increases;
Ø Labour productivity increases = calculated at 72 per cent for 1999 and projected
to decline by half each year thereafter;
Ø NPV of cleared rain-fed agricultural land = US$3,540 in 1999, adjusted for prior
and future years for growth in agricultural productivity (estimated at 2 per cent
per year);
Ø Average NPV of land cleared = 125 per cent of rain-fed agricultural land (as
portions of the land cleared will have higher NPVs than rain-fed rice land).
Figure 11: Projected Hectares Cleared
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Figure 12 provides a graphical depiction of the result (evaluated to 2015). The clearance
programme should begin to generate net benefits in 2002, and these benefits will grow
over time with increases in agricultural and labour productivity. It results in an IRR
of 9.81 per cent if evaluated from 1995 to 2015, but the IRR increases as the period is
extended. For example, the IRR is 12.67 per cent if the model is evaluated to 2025. In
addition, no adjustment has been made to compensate for tied-aid costs, which we
estimate have reduced the value of capital equipment by almost US$3 million, or 18
per cent of the US$16.65 million in capital equipment provided by donors. Charging
this cost directly to donors rather than to UXO LAO increases the IRR to 10.85 per
cent (1995-2015) and 13.52 per cent (1995-2025).
Based on the assumptions used, the decision to establish UXO LAO in 1995 was
certainly defensible on economic grounds, at least with respect to clearance operations,
as future benefits will eventually justify the heavy start-up and capacity-building costs.
We must emphasise that, now these sunk cost investments in UXO LAOs capacity
have been made, the evaluation for future operations alone is far more positive.
Evaluating just the period from today to 2020 yields an IRR of almost 54 per cent.32
Sensitivity analysis
The above figures are based on multiple assumptions. How sensitive are the results to
the various assumptions?
This model is very sensitive to changes in the assumptions regarding average yields
for rice (and the price of rice) and to the ratio of the average net present value of all
land cleared to that of rain fed rice land. It is quite sensitive to changes in the assumption
32 One need not worry that all the clearance will be completed before 2020. The figures used in the model
imply about 410 km2 will have been cleared by 2025. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has estimated that
up to 1,100 km2 are contaminated in Xieng Khouang province alone.
Figure 12: Costs and Benefits of UXO Clearance (baseline case)
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for future labour productivity increases.33 UXO LAO cannot influence agricultural
productivity or the price of rice, so the management implications are that it (1) targets
its clearance well and (2) keeps experimenting with ways to increase the productivity
of clearance without, of course, compromising safety.
In retrospect, it appears the 1995 decision to establish the UXO LAO clearance
programme was sound, even when only the economic benefits are considered. Looking
ahead, now that UXO LAO has built significant capacity, it should begin to yield
significant net economic benefits within the coming few years, assuming it continues
to be well managed.
The Case of Mozambique34
Mozambique is a large (800,000 km2 or the size of the United Kingdom (UK) and
France combined), sparsely populated country (between 17 and 20 million people,
depending on assumptions concerning excess mortality due to HIV/AIDs).35 With an
extremely long (2,470 km) coastline along the Indian Ocean, Mozambiques north-
south axis is far longer than its east-west, which complicates transportation from the
food-surplus north to the food-deficit south.36 This was further aggravated by the
colonial pattern of investment, which encouraged the export of agricultural raw
materials to Portugal rather than an integrated local economy. Except for a few mission
schools, Africans did not have access to education, and the mass exodus of Portuguese
prior to independence in 1975 left the economy without skilled labour. The commercial
network servicing rural areas also collapsed with the departure of Portuguese and
Asian merchants, and marketed agricultural production fell 43 per cent in the two
years leading to independence. The countrys dire economic straits were further
complicated by a prolonged civil war, with rebel forces supported first by Rhodesia
and later South Africa. When peace was achieved in 1992, Mozambique was perhaps
the worlds poorest country.
33 High wage increases would have a similar effect.
34 Statistics are from a variety of sources including the World Development Report: 2000-2001 (UNDP,
2000b) and the CIA Country Factbook (CIA, 2000).
35 The national census in August 1997 indicated a population of 16.1 million; about 2.4 million lower than
projected. Its population density (22 inhabitants per km2) is the same as for Lao PDR, but a far higher
proportion of its land is cultivable.
36 As a result, maize prices in the south are sometimes 2.5 times higher than in the north and centre (FAO/
WFP,  2000:2).
Parameter 10% decline to  New IRR Absolute change
(Baseline = 9.81%) in baseline IRR
Average rice yield
  per hectare 2.64 tons 6.17% -3.64%
Average sale price
  of rice Same as above
Agricultural produc-
  tivity increase per year 1.82%/yr 9.39% -0.42%
Ratio of NPVs (average
  for all cleared land to
  rain-fed rice land) 1.14 6.54% -3.27%
Decline in rate of
  labour productivity 45% of prior years 8.28% -1.53%
  increases. increase.
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Mozambique has achieved a remarkable economic turnaround since 1992, with one
of the highest growth rates in the world. Still, it remains very poor, with an estimated
Gross National Product (GNP) per capita of only US$230 (about US$800 in Purchasing
Power Parity, or PPP, terms) in 1999. Its infant and child mortality rates stand at 147
and 219 per thousand live births, and 26 per cent of children under five are moderately
or severely malnourished. Life expectancy is estimated at between 38 and 46 years.
Sixty per cent of the population is below the food poverty line. Less than a third of
people have access to safe water. Mozambique has been ranked 169th of 174 countries
on the Human Development Index.
Key social and economic features37
Given its size and low population, Mozambique is considered a land abundant
country. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy and the countrys strong growth
in recent years has been led by smallholder agriculture.38 This growth has stemmed
from bringing more land under cultivation rather than increasing yields per hectare
via more intensive agricultural practices. Agriculture remains characterised by low
productivity. Few modern inputs are used and little of the output marketed. And
rural areas are ill served by economic and social infrastructure  in 1996-97, the mean
distance of rural households to a market was 16 km and to a health clinic 29 km.
About 80 per cent of Mozambiques poor live in rural areas, and about 90 per cent of
rural adults work in agriculture. Rural areas are also vulnerable to periodic droughts
and floods. The devastating floods of February-March 2000 killed 700 people, displaced
250,000, and put up to two million in severe economic difficulty.
On average, Mozambique has sufficient land for its three million households and for
further extensive growth, but the situation varies significantly across regions. There
is little free land remaining in the three southern provinces and local shortages have
been created by large land grants to commercial concerns.39  Many of the largest
tracts of available land in the north and west remain unserviced by roads or public
services.
Climatic conditions also vary considerably, with the south being drier and more
vulnerable to drought. The best soils are also found in the highland areas in the western
and northern regions. Because of differences in rainfall and soil, households need
different amounts of land for cultivation. The following table summarises data
concerning average landholdings, available land, and food insecurity across
regions:
Region Average hectares Ratio: arable to Average months
per household cultivated land of food insecurity
reported
North 2.42 7.19 2.3
Centre 2.35 6.73 3.4
South 3.29 1.15 5.0
Total 2.54 5.60 3.7
Sources: World Bank (1997b:25, 171); de Marrule (1998:113); authors calculations.
37 This section draws extensively on World Bank (1997b, 2000), Government of Mozambique (1998), and
the Economics Research Paper Series published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Michigan State
University, <www.aec.msu.edu/agecon/fs2/mozambique/index.htm> (accessed 20 September 2000).
38 Value added in agriculture and livestock grew at more than 9 per cent per year since 1996.
39 Confirmed land concessions of over 9 million hectares were reported from 1986-93, with another 1.75
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Land poverty and land tenure systems
There also are important cultural differences within the country, with the Zambezi
River dividing the patrilineal land tenure systems in the south from the matrilineal
north. Indigenous tenure systems have been influenced by Muslim beliefs in coastal
areas and by the Portuguese legal system, resulting in a diversity of traditional
practices. Customary systems are not recognised in Mozambique land law, which
creates insecurity in both the modern and traditional sectors. Subsistence farmers may
lose land rights because concessions are given to commercial concerns, but the latter
groups often fear reprisals from local groups or arbitrary cancellation of their titles if
traditional authorities are able to get official recognition for their traditional claims
over the land.
Mine clearance makes more land available for agriculture and other activities.
Therefore, it provides significant economic benefits in areas of land scarcity. Given
the relative abundance of arable land, most development planners have assumed land
poverty is a localised phenomenon in Mozambique (i.e., there are specific areas of
general land shortage created by population pressures or land grants to commercial
interests). They assumed that, elsewhere, customary land tenure practices would grant
usage rights to households that could make use of it. Recent research indicates this
may not be true. One study found:
Ø A significant group of land-poor households in northern Mozambique (Nampula
and Cabo Delgado);
Ø Land inequality throughout the country is similar, and this inequality has changed
little since the ending of the war;
Ø Land holdings are a major determinant of household income. Thus, land poor
households face both a serious income shortage and a critical food security
problem (de Marrule, 1998:ii).
Most of the observed land poverty is not due to general land scarcity in the area
surrounding a community, rather in proportional terms, 83 per cent of the total
variation in land holdings is due to factors within the villages, while 17 per cent is due
to factors between villages. An important determining factor seems to be kinship
lineage: those belonging to a strong lineage are more likely to get access to more
and better land, compared to other households that belong to a lineage considered
weak (de Marrule, 1998:69).
Food systems
There are a wide variety of farming/food systems in Mozambique. One classification
of these gives four principal systems:40
Ø Highlands/Midlands  more than 200 metres above sea level, with better than
average rainfall, low likelihood of crop failure, and suitable for most crops (40
per cent of total area);
Ø Lowland plains and coastal  combination of fishing, crop production, livestock
rearing, and trading, with generally good rains (13 per cent);
Ø Major river basin  good soil fertility and irrigation potential, featuring both
food crops and horticulture, plus fishing, but vulnerable to floods (32 per cent);
Ø Drylands and semi-arid  located mainly in the south, with average rainfall less
million in unconfirmed reports. Assuming half the area is arable, this amounts to over 15 per cent of arable
land. World Bank (1997b:173). Kloeck-Jenson (1998:240) reports at least 20 million hectares have been
acquired via concessions between 1992 and 1994 alone.
40 Government of Mozambique (1998:9).
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than 600 millimetres per year. Food crops are susceptible to drought, and the
region generally is in food deficit. Livestock production and employment income
(including remittances from migrants to South Africa) is important (15 per cent).
The north generally produces significant food surpluses, the south is normally in deficit,
and the centre can be either in surplus or deficit.
Mozambique clearly has a heterogeneous rural economy, and one must be wary of
generalisations. Recent efforts to develop cost-effective approaches for monitoring
income and nutritional status have had to include 10 sources of household income to
capture variations across regions and food systems, as follows:
Percentage of average household income (across 7 zones)
Income component Minimum Maximum
Food crops 18.8% 30.4%
Non-food crops (e.g., cotton) 2.9% 16.9%
Fresh production 1.4% 9.7%





Wage labour 5.7% 22.7%
Micro-enterprise income 1.8% 22.6%
Source: Government of Mozambique, MAP/MSU (2000a); authors calculations.
Food crops and livestock are everywhere important, but rural households clearly
pursue a variety of strategies to cope with poverty and reduce vulnerability.
Gender issues
Very strong divisions of labour between men and women typically prevail in rural
households. For agriculture, men clear land and assist in land preparation for planting,
but women plant, tend, harvest and process crops in addition to their heavy familial
and household responsibilities (e.g., fetching water and firewood). Where a man has
more than one wife, he will establish a farm (machamba) for each; essentially, these
operate as separate households. Men often migrate within Mozambique or regionally
to earn and remit income, and well as hunt or fish41 to supplement food supplies.
The basic cost-benefit model
Given the varied nature of Mozambiques rural economy, a cost-benefit analysis should
consider a range of production values and prices. The following uses data on maize
yields and prices for a sample of 210 smallholder farmers in Nampula Province, broken
into three different production practices:42
Ø A high-input package (improved open-pollinated maize plus fertiliser);
Ø Improved planting and weeding practices only (using local seed, without
fertiliser);
41 Women also collect molluscs and shore fish, but these have little commercial value in Mozambique.
(Government of Mozambique, 1998:26)
42 Data in this section comes from Government of Mozambique, MAP/MSU (2000b).
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Ø A control group of farmers using traditional practices (no improved seed or
fertiliser).
These resulted in different average yields, and required different amounts of household
and hired labour, as follows:
High Input Improved Practices Traditional
Average yield (kg/ha) 2,700 1,950 1,247
Household labour days 108 108 116
Wage labour days 60 60 0
While total grain production has expanded at 12 per cent per year in Mozambique
(1990-98), most of the increase has come from bringing more land into production
rather than higher yields per hectare. We assume for the baseline analysis that yields
per hectare have been rising at an average of 2 per cent per annum for traditional
practices, and 2.5 per cent when improved or high-input practices are adopted.
Maize prices have strong seasonal variations  low in the post-harvest period (late
summer) and rising to a peak in January, as depicted below.




Therefore, farmers can earn more by storing their maize and selling it when grain
stocks get low. However, on-farm storage losses (estimated at 2 per cent per month!)
are significant with traditional storage systems.
Assuming clearance costs of US$7,00043 per hectare, evaluating for 20 years, and
including an imputed sale price for cleared agricultural land (as in the model developed
for Lao PDR), the resulting IRRs are:
Summary results (IRRS) Include value of household labour44
No Yes
High yield 3.03% 0.42%
Improved management -0.23% -3.84%
Traditional -2.44% -7.56%
43 Landmine Monitor Report 1999 gives an estimated average cost of US$6,176 per hectare for Mozambique
(p. 48). However, the areas reported cleared by some operators are clearly too high, and likely represent
the entire length of roads, power lines, and railways surveyed and cleared, rather than the clearance
alone. Dropping just the cheapest operator and calculating the average for the rest gives an estimate
just over $8,400, and costs are likely to have dropped since then. Costs for some operators including
Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) and Norwegian Peoples Aid seem far higher than this average.
44 Two cases are evaluated for each production system. In the first, no value is given for household
labour. In the second, household labour is valued at the wage rate reported for paid labour (about $0.72
per day).
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Given the IRR expected for a project funded by the World Bank or a regional
development bank typically is 12 per cent, even relatively high-yielding land in
Mozambique does not provide attractive economic returns to mine clearance when
the clearance cost is US$7,000 per hectare. How much then would clearance costs
have to decline to provide an IRR of 12 per cent for each of the above production
systems?
Clearance costs required to yield 12% rates of return (in US$):
Include value of household labour
No Yes
High yield 3,116 2,273
Improved management 2,085 1,279
Traditional 1,576 711
It is apparent that costs would have to be dramatically lowered for mine clearance of
agricultural land to be justified on financial grounds alone in Mozambique. However,
as was demonstrated in the analysis of the UXO programme in Lao PDR, the
combination of productivity increases in both agriculture and clearance operations
does enhance the financial pay-off from mine clearance with each passing year. Starting
from our baseline cases, how long will it be before mine clearance in Mozambique
will be an attractive proposition in financial terms?45  Assuming clearance costs fall by
5 per cent each year, the answers are:
Years to breakeven (starting with $7,000/ha costs in 1999):
Include value of household labour
No Yes
High yield 11 16
Improved management 12 24
Traditional 22 34
With reasonable estimates for productivity increases, mine clearance of agricultural
land in Mozambique remains far from breakeven in simple financial terms.
Extensions
Improving transportation infrastructure and farm-gate prices
Why is the case of Mozambique so different from that of Lao PDR, a similarly poor
country? The first reason is that Mozambique has more arable land than Lao PDR.
Mozambican smallholders quite rationally use more of the abundant factor of
production (land) relative to the scarce factors (modern inputs, tools, labour). Mine
clearance adds to the already abundant factor of production. In NPV terms at a 12 per
cent discount rate, the estimated future production for 20 years from one hectare of
land, plus the sale value of it after that time, is about US$1,655 in Mozambique, whereas
45 The Lao PDR case assumed the average NPV of land cleared would be 125 per cent of the NPV of the
baseline case (rain-fed rice land). This adjustment is not made here as we already are analysing a range of
land and cropping systems.
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it was estimated at US$3,540 in Lao PDR. Good land is simply worth less  perhaps
less than half  in Mozambique than Lao PDR.46
A second reason is that Mozambican farmers receive a very low proportion of the
retail price for their principal crops. The transportation infrastructure in Mozambique
is rudimentary and transport and handling costs between the port and farm-gate
add  36-74 per cent to the price of exported maize (Jeje et al., 1999:29).
Third, the retail prices are themselves depressed. Industrialised countries block imports
of most food crops from the developing world, while at the same time subsidising the
exports of their own agricultural products. Both actions reduce export markets for
Mozambican farmers. This, plus the poor north-south transport links, means maize
remains in regions where there is a surplus, pushing local retail prices down. Local
farmers thus receive only a small portion of a depressed price.
Increasing maize exports to other countries in Southern Africa holds great promise
for those parts of Mozambique that can produce surpluses, particularly the north,
which generally does not experience droughts on the same cycle as the rest of southern
Africa. One study of maize exports to Malawi in 1998 found that northern producers
benefit at no cost to southern consumers, with producer prices increasing from US$17-
28 per ton47 since the opening of this trade48 (Government of Mozambique, MAP/
MSU, 1999b:18).
Continued success in export markets coupled with gradual improvements in farm-to-
market transportation should result in higher producer prices on top of (and probably
stimulating) rising yields per hectare, substantially increasing the rates of return from
mine-free land.
The following table outlines changes in some of the key findings for the case of
improved practices, assuming farm gate prices start 15 per cent higher and rise
3 per cent per year for the next five years:
Improved producer prices No change in Increasing producer prices
producer prices (baseline)
IRR -3.84% -1.04%
Clearance cost to yield 12% IRR US$1,279 US$1,855
Years to breakeven 24 15
This shows substantial improvements in the pay-offs from mine clearance, but not
enough to justify clearance of agricultural land in financial terms alone.
46 This is consistent with other findings. Andersson et al. (1995) estimated agricultural production might
increase 3.6 per cent in affected communities in Mozambique; far lower than Cambodia (135 per cent) or
Afghanistan (88-200 per cent). The study also found few incidences where Mozambicans try to remove
landmines (unlike in other mine-affected countries), suggesting most households can cope by avoiding
the mines.
47 This represents 13-28 per cent of the average farm-gate price used in the cost benefit model.
48 Of course, households that are net purchasers of maize in the north would pay higher prices, which
may increase their vulnerability (Government of Mozambique, 1998:15-16). However, more households
in the north are net suppliers of maize, so the region as a whole benefits strongly.
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Shadow wages49
A significant adjustment might be made on the basis of surplus labour. This arises
when there is a large pool of unemployed or significantly underemployed people and
the mine action organisations are recruiting from this pool. In such a case, the social
cost of employing them is less than the salaries paid by the mine action organisations.50
The social cost is the value of the lost production in their alternate employment (termed
the Marginal Product of Labour or MPL). The salary received in addition to the MPL
is viewed as a financial transfer, not an economic cost.51
The ADP has a staff of about 500 deminers, virtually all of whom are demobilised
soldiers.52 A study on the socio-economic integration of demobilised soldiers in
Mozambique indicates that average 1997 incomes of 93,000 demobilised soldiers
amounted to approximately US$290 per annum.53 ADP pays deminers about US$160
per month, with perhaps another US$40 per month in benefits, so their incomes are
over seven times what they would earn on average if they were not working for ADP.54
Local salaries amount to perhaps 45 per cent of total costs for mine action organisations
in Mozambique. Assuming the shadow wage is a maximum of one-fifth of the financial
wage bill and treating the rest as a transfer means the net economic cost to
Mozambiques society (i.e., foregone production from alternative employment) of
clearance falls from US$7,000 to US$4,480 per hectare. Evaluating the previous case
(improved producer prices) at both monetary wages and shadow wages yields
the following comparative results:
Use of shadow wages Evaluated at monetary Evaluated at shadow wages
 wages
IRR -1.04% 2.51%
Clearance cost to yield 12% IRR US$1,855 US$1,841
Years to breakeven 15 10
With this adjustment, mine clearance of basic agricultural land with improved practices
turns slightly positive, but its economic return remains far below what is needed to
justify these activities on economic grounds alone.55
49 This term refers to the value of a persons production in alternative employment (i.e., to evaluate what
he or she would contribute to societys well-being). When there is widespread unemployment and
underemployment because of surplus labour, this shadow wage may be far lower than the wage
actually paid to a worker in a modern organisation. One must be very careful about surplus labour
arguments in land-abundant economies, but this analysis focuses specifically on demobilised soldiers.
50 Of course, the same argument holds true for any development activity that hires surplus labour.
Some of these may be more labour-intensive and, therefore, more beneficial in these terms than demining.
51 The general economic logic is that a simple transfer from one person to another changes the income
distribution but not societys total income (roughly, GNP). For example, someone might give money to
his/her mother and society is not short-changed. Taxes are also transfers from private individuals to
governments, and are not treated as economic costs (unless they are high enough to discourage economic
activity or fuel corruption).
52 We are unaware if the mine action NGOs (HALO Trust, NPA, Handicap International) have hired
demobilised soldiers. Certainly a number of the commercial firms have done so.
53 Barnes (1997:9), plus authors calculations.
54 It seems unlikely in Mozambique today that they would obtain well-paid positions elsewhere. ADP has
fired 70 deminers for various reasons, all of whom remain unemployed. (Conversation with Derek Baxter,
Technical Adviser, and Pedro Martinez, Director of Finance, ADP, 19 July 2000).
55 Note also that this analysis is done from the perspective of Mozambiques society. In this case the
transfer is from ADP to a Mozambican citizen and, therefore, imposes no cost on society as a whole.
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This of course does not mean that mine action has not contributed significantly to
Mozambiques reconstruction and development. Most mine clearance seems to have
targeted key infrastructure (roads, railways, power lines)56 for which rates of return
are often very high. Early mine clearance also facilitated the return of refugees and
internally displaced persons, reducing burdens on international refugee agencies plus
neighbouring countries and their populations, paving the way for the rapid recovery
of Mozambiques agricultural production and, most fundamentally, speeding the
recovery of the countrys social fabric. Mine action organisations also have made an
important contribution to peace-building by providing attractive employment for
significant numbers of demobilised soldiers. The analysis does suggest, however, that
large-scale clearance of agricultural land will not, in itself, make a significant net
contribution to Mozambiques continued development, largely because land is
abundant in most of the country. A more targeted approach will be necessary.
Tighter targeting of mine clearance
Food security
At the beginning of this chapter, using data from Lao PDR, we gave an example of
broader social cost-benefit analysis in which extra value was placed on clearing land
for land-poor households that are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.
Mozambique is not short of land in general, but specific regions are. However, these
are mostly in the dry south, where the major vulnerability faced by farmers is drought
and (as was made clear in 2000) floods. This suggests that economic and social benefits
would accrue more from investments in water control than general mine clearance. In
this case, clearance activities should be planned to support small-scale irrigation and
other water projects (e.g., water points for cattle; village potable water schemes).
We also saw that specific households are land poor throughout Mozambique because
of the manner in which land rights are allocated via both customary and official
systems. In one excellent study of a traditional land rights system (de Marrule, 1998),
households from a weak lineage (Nloko) are more likely to be land poor, even if
there is no general shortage of good land in the surrounding area. Could such
households be targeted?
Unfortunately, this would be extremely difficult. The study notes the general belief
that luck follows lineage. When respondents were asked why members of rich Nloko
should get more land, the answer came back to natureza:57 the Regulo would think
that the poor individual would not be able to adequately farm the land (de Marrule,
1998:76).
Another complicating factor is related to traditional coping arrangements based on
the extended family. Key informants were asked what would happen if someone
from a poor Nloko nevertheless managed to get, for example, a cotton field and make
a good profit, attempting to reinvest that in cotton or another income-generating
However, ADP receives virtually all its funding from donor countries, which might reasonably have a
different view concerning whether the adjustment is warranted. Even from ADPs perspective, the salaries
paid are a cost for which it must account.
56 Based on somewhat conflicting figures in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines Landmine
Monitor Reports for 1999 and 2000, we estimate 78-85 per cent of the total area reported as cleared has
been for infrastructure.
57 Implying that ones position, originally given by Deus, comes to be seen as part of the persons character
(natureza) (de Marrule, 1998:75, footnote 24).
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activity? The response was that the members of the extended family would come to
that person requesting assistance (essentially food and cash), and soon that profit
would be used-up by being spread-out among many in the Nloko (de Marrule, 1998:77).
Targeting clearance to benefit land-poor households would require: (1) intimate
knowledge of the customary land rights system in the local area; (2) the identification
of specific land-poor households; and (3) a means to overcome the customary land
rights system to ensure the cleared land actually goes to the intended household(s).
Even if these formidable information problems could be overcome, it may well be
that the land-poor household will not make good use of their extra land, because its
members would have to share the fruits of their labour with others in their kinship
lineage.
Targeting women
Another possible targeting strategy would be projects that benefit women. In
Mozambique, women are responsible for planting, tending, harvesting and processing
crops, as well as numerous other familial and household responsibilities. Time studies
suggest daily schedules of 14 to 16 hours for women, with cropping and water gathering
each accounting for three to four hours daily (World Bank, 1997:52). Reducing the
burden on womens time would certainly be just, and will contribute to the well-
being of all household members.58 Because of their central role in agricultural
production, reducing time burdens on women may also result in significant economic
benefits, as the following example suggests.
Consider a community where direct access to the closest water supply point has been
mined. Because of this, 40 women in the community spend an average of 3.5 hours
per day obtaining water (the Mozambican average). Clearing access to the water point
would reduce this to 1.5 hours. What are the social and economic pay-offs? These will
depend on how the women allocate their free time. Assume 60 per cent goes to
raising crops, and the Marginal Product per Labour day (MPL) averages about 4.2 kg
of maize (Government of Mozambique, MAP/MSU, 1998b:42).59 The benefits are
(evaluated for 20 years and recognising the water supply point has a capital value
at the end of that period):
Clearing water supply point Valuing just agricultural Valuing all time at MPL
production of agriculture
NPV, discounted at 12 per cent US$9,711 US$16,171
This implies that clearance costs of over US$9,700 would be justified on economic
grounds alone if only the incremental agricultural production is valued. Costs of
US$16,171 would be justified under the reasonable assumption that the time women
choose to spend on non-agricultural pursuits is just as valuable to them and their
households as time spent cropping.
Why are these results so positive when the earlier analysis suggested clearance of
agricultural land is not a good investment? The scarce (and therefore, valuable) factor
58 A major cause of malnutrition in infants may simply be the lack of mothers time to give them more
than two feedings per day, when they require four to five for adequate calories (World Bank, 1997b:52).
59 At 1997 exchange rates (US$1 = Mt 11,500) and reported prices (Government of Mozambique, MAP/
MSU, 1998b:82), this amounts to US$0.42 per days labour.
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of production for Mozambican smallholders is womens time. Clearing a water supply
point augments the scarce factor of production and delivers high returns.
Clearly, there are some types of mine clearance in Mozambique that offer very
significant social and economic returns. Indications are that some mine action operators
in Mozambique are aware of this, and are testing new approaches. Handicap
International focuses on small-scale proximity clearance in Inhambane. HALO trust
has initiated demining fire brigades in Niassa province for quick response to so-
called low priority tasks. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is
working with the National Demining Insitute (IND) on the Integrated Mine Action
Development Strategy (IMADS) concept. From 1998, NPA started to include
community development services  in the form of Quick Impact Projects  in its
demining sites. Socio-economic analysis strongly supports the thrust of the
Mozambique case study, suggesting experiments with such community-based
approaches are needed.
However, there is no guarantee the incremental benefits will outweigh the added
costs. In this case, as with development projects in general, the balancing of costs and
benefits is complicated by a further issue: who pays the cost, and who reaps the
benefits?
Incentives and community development
The last point is critical to economic analysis because there are many subsidies and
transfers embedded in all aid-funded programmes, most public services, and many
private operations. Typically, private rates of return will differ from social IRRs,
sometimes substantially. Certainly donor IRRs will vary from those of recipients.
While recognising that altruism exists and is sometimes (as with aid) a potent force,
economists generally find it safer to assume that individuals tend to further their own
interests when making decisions: that is, they consider their private rates of return
rather than returns to the wider society. This often leads to socially sub-optimal
decisions.
Private IRRs are incentives to behaviour, as are social norms (taking certain actions
leads to approbation), laws, and the rules and policies within an organisation. To an
economist, understanding incentives is critical, and expecting people will behave in
ways contrary to their own perceived best interests is incentive incompatible. If we
wish individuals to make socially optimal decisions, the surest way is to align their
incentive structures to make such decisions incentive compatible.60
Consider a common situation. A mine action operator approaches a mine-contaminated
community and asks residents if they want their lands to be cleared, with no charge.
How many communities will refuse the offer? What does their response tell us about
whether landmines are a major constraint to the communitys well-being? The private
IRRs to the residents are extremely high because the clearance costs they bear are
negligible; perhaps only the inconvenience of hosting a clearance team for a few weeks.
NGOs and other development organisations are well aware that this is not a good
start to a development project. Typically, they will ask the community to contribute
60 Like most social scientists, economists are always trying to comprehend people through the use of
incomprehensible language.
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something of value to any project so the community feels ownership over whatever
the project produces because, in a sense, they have purchased it. Often, the community
contributes labour and materials that can be obtained locally.61 This will raise private
costs, bringing private IRRs somewhat closer to the social IRR.
Many NGOs and development organisations in general are now using more
sophisticated participatory approaches to community development projects. These
entail having the community decide its own priorities, with the understanding it will
receive some (often modest) assistance in meeting priorities that are technically and
economically feasible. This is akin to giving the community a budget and letting it
then decide what to spend it on (from a limited set of options). In economic logic, this
involves a transfer of resources to the community (no economic cost to society as a
whole) and then having the community decide how to allocate those resources for
maximum benefit. This fully aligns the communitys IRR with the social IRR,62 resulting
in a socially optimal decision.63
Such approaches hold great promise for mine clearance. Imagine a community is given
a budget from which it can choose to purchase mine clearance, potable water, a culvert
to prevent their road from washing-out, a community grain bank to reduce storage
losses,64 or other common things that would improve residents well-being. If it chooses
to spend all or part on mine clearance, there is no further need to justify mine clearance
as a top priority for that village.65 Conversely, if the community chooses another mix
of development projects, then mine clearance resources are freed to meet the needs
elsewhere. In any case, one would know the community values what it has chosen,
and is likely to use and maintain what is left behind.
Mine and unexploded ordnance awareness
Evaluating the cost effectiveness of risk reduction
The sections above evaluate mine clearance in Lao PDR and Mozambique and the
costs apportioned to these programmes. Figure 13 depicts all costs  clearance plus
risk reduction with the projected benefits from clearance in Lao PDR.66 The IRR
(evaluating from 1995 to 2015) is minus 2.34 per cent using the baseline assumptions,
or minus 1.72 per cent if the estimated costs of tied aid are charged against donors
rather than UXO LAO. Extending the analysis to 2015 improves these IRRs to 3.72 per
cent and (with the tied-aid adjustment) 4.18 per cent, which is still hard to justify on
purely economic grounds. Treating capacity-building and start-up expenses as sunk
61 UXO LAO and its implementing partners ask communities to cut vegetation in advance of the clearance
operation, after first instructing them on safe cutting methods! Action contre la Faim in Lao PDR uses
good approaches in having villages provide all the unskilled labour and the cement for community potable
water projects.
62 At least with respect to the community development options the NGO can offer.
63 Assuming the decision reflects the collective interests of all members of the community. Much of the
art in participatory approaches lies in ensuring the voices of women, poor households and other
commonly disenfranchised groups are heard.
64 Cutting storage losses in half could yield very high dividends by (1) making more grain available for
sale and, more importantly, (2) allowing grain to be stored until prices are higher.
65 This also is the surest way to incorporate the value placed on risk reduction into the analysis.
Communities will certainly weigh their added security from mine clearance against other improvements
they might achieve in their communitys economic and social well-being.
66 See the Lao PDR Case Study in Appendix 2 of this document.
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costs gives IRRs for future operations (2000-2015) of 13.85 per cent and (with the tied-
aid adjustment) 15.08 per cent. However, this does not give an assessment of those
expenditures made on risk reduction, as all the economic benefits stem from land
clearance. Can one make an economic evaluation of risk reduction?
67 No estimate is available for Lao PDR, but those from other countries suggest a figure of US$550 per
year per victim (cited in Harris, 2000a:221).
68 See Hallam (1998) for a thorough treatment of this topic in the context of humanitarian assistance.
69 Put another way, cost-effectiveness analysis measures the internal efficiency of a programme or
organisation, or the ratio of inputs used to outputs or outcomes produced (in this case, deaths/injuries
averted). It does not attempt an explicit assessment of the external efficiency  the impact or value of
the outcome produced to the wider society.
Formal cost-benefit analysis is not particularly illuminating for assessing the benefits
accruing from risk-reduction measures instituted in poor countries. Reducing the
deaths and injuries from UXO accidents does free medical resources for other public
health tasks. However, the medical costs of treating UXO victims is minuscule
compared to the risk-reduction expenditures of UXO LAO,67 so a cost-benefit case
cannot be made unless monetary values are placed on human life and suffering. Cost-
effectiveness analysis68 is a useful tool in such situations. For example, one can compare
the average cost of saving one life through a mine/UXO programme and compare
this to the cost of saving one life through, say, malaria control or training programmes
for traditional birth attendants.69
Unfortunately, we have no accurate count of the number of lives saved and injuries
avoided in Lao PDR due to UXO awareness activities, roving clearance, etc. However,
even very rough calculations demonstrate that UXO/mine awareness and roving
clearance are relatively expensive in terms of lives saved and injuries avoided relative
to various other public health and safety programmes in Lao PDR. Deaths from UXO
accidents seem to have averaged 240 per year in the decade before the Socio-Economic
Survey, and may be averaging fewer than 200 per year since 1997. About half the
accidents are fatal, so there are 40-50 fewer deaths per year from UXO accidents, with
a similar reduction in injuries. The UXO LAO cost capture study (unpublished)
Figure 13: Clearance Costs and Risk-Reduction Costs (baseline case)
A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action70
estimated the costs of community awareness activities at about US$700,000 in 1999,
with roving accounting for another US$860,000. Even with the implausible assumption
that all accident reduction has been due to community awareness and roving, the cost
per death/injury avoided is over US$15,000.70 Meanwhile, public expenditure on health
amounts to only US$5 per year per person, and annually there are 1.4 million cases
and 14,000 deaths from malaria, which can be combated through inexpensive
insecticide-treated bed-nets. Put another way, if a socio-economic case can be made
for risk reduction, the same economic case for other public health measures in Lao
PDR would be many times stronger.
Roving clearance certainly provides some purely economic benefits in addition to
risk reduction. By removing surface UXO from communities and paths, it allows freer
access for people to go about their business. In some cases, it will allow infrastructure
such as schools and health clinics to be used instead of lying idle. Also, there are likely
to be reasonably strong complementarities between roving and UXO clearance. Roving
teams can survey possible sites for clearance, provide job rotation opportunities to
relieve deminers from the drudgery of clearance, and can operate when weather makes
clearance difficult. However, it is difficult to see how such benefits might be quantified.
On balance, the benefits accruing from risk reduction seem modest, both in cost-benefit
terms and by cost-effectiveness comparison with the potential to save lives and well-
being through other public health measures. A certain amount of roving is probably a
useful adjunct to full clearance operations, but the continued shift of resources from
roving to clearance certainly seems warranted. Regarding UXO awareness, there is a
strong moral case that members of the international community bear most
responsibility for the UXO problem in Lao PDR, and they should provide financial
and technical assistance for the establishment of the appropriate public safety
programmes. Still, it is necessary to design these programmes to be cost effective and
financially sustainable in the long run, as the UXO problem in Lao PDR will be
enduring. Low-cost programmes through mass media (e.g., radio) and existing
institutional channels (e.g., the school system) seem to offer more long-term promise
than continued visits of community awareness teams to individual communities.
70 Including salaries of international personnel would raise these costs to about US$1,750,000 and




This chapter outlines some of the main factors that underlie the establishment of priorities
and which should be reflected in the decision-making criteria used by the mine action
community.
The basic approach
Setting priorities is a rational process that entails some reckoning of the costs and
expected benefits of alternative actions to target available resources for maximum
benefit. When costs and benefits can be quantified, those tasks offering the best ratio
of benefits to costs are given priority;1 in other cases, tasks that meet a set of criteria
are undertaken.
Calculating costs is reasonably clear-cut, but estimating expected benefits is often
fraught with complications. As a result, priority setting is not necessarily a rigorous,
quantitative exercise, although it should be systematic in judging each alternative
against the same criteria. Formal cost-benefit analysis can identify the solutions in
reasonably straightforward cases (see Chapter 3 above), and can provide at least partial
answers in most other situations. But human judgement is required to weigh the
relative values of different benefits, estimate the likelihood that these benefits will be
achieved and sustained, and decide among alternative actions. Because of this
irreplaceable human factor, the decision-making process itself influences the quality
of the choices made and the degree these are acceptable to those with a stake in the
decision (see Box 7).
1 In theory, the benefit-cost ratio could serve as a single criterion for ranking priorities.  In practice, other
criteria are used to ensure both technical and institutional feasibility and to screen out actions that would
cause serious damage to the environment, or an ethnic group, etc.
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Box 7: The Decision-Making Process
The decision-making process itself influences the choices made. Factors include:
Who makes the decision? The decision to undertake specific mine action activities
can be made by different development actors  each with distinct motivations 
including:
Ø Mine action managers;
Ø Managers of internationally-supported programmes/projects (reconstruction,
peace-building, resettlement, development) by commissioning or hiring mine
action personnel;
Ø Governmental, including local, authorities; or,
Ø Private individuals or firms.
Who has input into the decision? Decisions will be more informed if stakeholders
(i.e., those with an interest in the decision, including funders, national authorities, and
affected communities) are allowed to participate. But participation entails costs, and
there is a point at which the extra costs exceed the benefits.
To whom is the decision-maker accountable? All decision-makers should give a
periodic accounting of what has been achieved with the resources entrusted to him
or her. Is an accounting given only to the funding agency, or also to the national mine
centre? Provincial and local authorities? The ultimate beneficiaries in mine-affected
communities? More accountability is better, but reporting costs time and money and
mechanisms are needed to resolve conflicts.
What alternatives are available for consideration? The alternatives available to
any decision-maker are bounded by constraints imposed by authority (resources,
geographic responsibility, functional responsibility), data, and, roughly, the capacity
to analyse the data to compare among alternatives. The analytic capacity is in turn
determined by knowledge (training and experience), time available, and tools
available. Systematic data collection reduces data constraints, training can
compensate for lack of experience, and the provision of specialised staff and computer
support can allow more analysis within the same period of time.
What decision-making rules are used? Decision-makers can try to optimise (i.e.,
rank every alternative then work from top to bottom as resources permit) or to seek
simply satisfactory results (i.e., accept an alternative if it meets certain criteria or rules
of thumb). Optimisation requires far more data and processing, and increases the risk
that the decision model will be mis-specified (i.e., does not reflect reality well), leading
to systematically incorrect decisions.
Are alternatives considered simultaneously, or sequentially? Ideally, alternatives
should be assessed and ranked by priority using the same data at the same time. This
may be impossible due to limitations in data (e.g., before a national survey has been
completed) or computational capacity. Therefore, alternatives are considered
sequentially, either individually or in manageable groups. In such cases, some sort of
satisfying decision rules must be applied.
Are decisions made in stages? A two-stage decision-making process would assign
preliminary rankings to alternative activities, and confirm specific commitments after a
further review, either after more information was collected (e.g., a technical survey) or
by another person or committee (which would also bring additional information to
bear).
For example, the Landmine Impact Survey (see Chapter 2: Impact of Mine
Contamination) is a decision-making process that seeks optimal rankings by
simultaneously calculating mine impact scores for all communities.  In a typical case,
decisions are made by mine action programme managers, generally in conjunction
with government authorities. Others, including the affected communities, generally
provide data but do not otherwise have input into the decision. Decision-makers
typically are accountable to national authorities and to an international accreditation
centre, but not to local authorities or the intended beneficiaries.  The limited ability of
surveyors to collect standardised data from all communities on items such as the
quality or quantity of land contaminated restricts alternatives to a weak metric
with significant weighting on recent accidents. While not perfect, the limitations inherent
in Landmine Impact Surveys are not fatal because a survey forms part of a two-stage
decision-making process (i.e., high mine impact scores lead to rapid deployment of
technical survey teams before a final decision on what mine action is required).
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Contextual factors
The major contextual factors  the social and economic features of the country and
its communities; the undertakings of other development actors; progress or regress
along the conflict-peace continuum  can be thought of as important facets of the
real world. Changes in these factors clearly will influence mine action priorities
because, as the real world changes in important ways, so do the opportunities and
constraints facing those in mine-affected communities and the costs of addressing
constraints and capitalising on opportunities. Therefore, benefit-cost ratios will change,
sometimes dramatically. Most obviously, in areas still affected by conflict, survival
dominates the concerns of civilians. As conflict abates, refugees return, and normal
life resumes, peoples priorities shift increasingly from survival to creating independent
livelihoods and achieving prosperity. Things that are unimportant while conflict
prevails  such as safe pasturage after all livestock has been stolen by warring factions
 loom increasingly large.
Taking risk reduction as a further example, the dangers posed by mine contamination
in a community will depend in part on the social and economic features of that
community. These dangers will:
Ø Increase with the extent of economic specialisation, which stimulates trade and
the movement of people;
Ø Be lower if people have access to alternative resources (e.g., uncontaminated land);
Ø Increase with the extent of absolute poverty, as the poor often are forced to engage
in risky behaviour;
Ø Be different for men and women because of the different gender roles in society.
Because of differences in these and other social and economic factors, two communities
confronted with the same physical pattern of mine and UXO contamination will, in
fact, face different risk patterns. Mine action priorities may well be different in the
two communities. Further, the risks posed to a community can be magnified by
renewed conflict, which will:
Ø Increase movement as people seek refuge;
Ø Reduce access to alternative resources;
Ø Increase poverty; and,
Ø Destroy the social fabric (e.g., by causing men to flee to avoid conscription),
changing the gender pattern of risks.
Similarly, the activities of other development actors in and around a community can
dramatically enlarge the size of potential benefits from certain kinds of mine action
and increase the likelihood that this potential will be realised. This too should alter
priorities.
Accumulating information
As the social and economic features of the real world change, so do the patterns of
costs and potential benefits and, hence, priorities. But there is another important source
of change over the course of a mine action programme that affects how we set priorities:
we acquire more information. In fact, the real world is so complicated we can never
understand it fully. Our knowledge of a country and its people is limited by the amount
of data we have and our ability to make sense of this data. Even if conditions in the
real world are relatively stable, our understanding of it will change as we acquire
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more and different types of data, and learn how to convert this into useful
information.2 As our understanding changes, so will our priorities.
To illustrate, a new mine action programme typically concentrates on risk reduction,
ostensibly for three reasons. First, donors and mine action personnel are motivated
by the desire to reduce human suffering. The removal or marking of landmines posing
clear and present dangers, the delivery of mine awareness training, and efforts to
assist victims are concrete steps to promote this worthy goal on which all can agree.
Second, there are reasons to assume that, on average, the landmines posing the greatest
risks to people also impose significant constraints to socio-economic development.
Given the same level of contamination, more accidents will occur on land used more
intensively, and land used more intensively is generally more valuable. Therefore,
the location of accidents provides a reasonably good indicator of socio-economic
potential, and removing landmines in these locations will deliver significant social
and economic benefits in addition to risk reduction.3 Third, new mine action
programmes typically do not have enough information to assess a wide range of socio-
economic factors. Therefore, in the early days of a mine action programme,
compassion rules when setting priorities.
This straightforward approach to setting priorities evolves over time even in countries
where the broad contextual factors  socio-economic features, conflict, development
activities  are relatively stable. As more and better information is obtained, increased
emphasis can be given to economic potential and other factors that might improve
peoples livelihoods.4
Supply versus demand considerations
In mine action as in other humanitarian and development programmes, donors
naturally like to raise their nations flag by contributing goods made in their country,
often via national champion NGOs and firms. Similarly, most organisations and
people like to do what they are good at doing. This often leads to supply-led
development in which priorities are set principally on the basis of the type of resources
on offer and the skills and aptitudes of those in charge of the programmes. At its
worst, this can result in the delivery of unsuitable equipment via tied-aid schemes,
and the mobilisation of experts with preconceived notions of what needs be done.
Even when such problems are avoided, there remains the danger that tasks will be
undertaken to make efficient use of a programmes assets rather than to address the
priorities of mine-affected communities.
In mine action and other development programmes, objectives are more likely to be
achieved and sustained if the intended beneficiaries feel the objectives reflect their
own priorities. Demand-led approaches emphasise local ownership and focus on
effectiveness  doing the right job  before efficiency. Efficiency remains, of
course, a worthy goal, but the efficient completion of a worthless task is a waste of
resources.
2 Information is useful and usable data  the right data delivered in the proper format to the right person
at the right time.
3 This is the logic underlying the use of the concept of essential livelihood space in Kosovo.
4 This does not imply that priorities become less compassionate. For example, in most mine-contaminated
countries, many more people die from malnutrition and preventable diseases than from landmines. Mine
action to promote food security and the delivery of primary health services will often score higher in a
compassion calculus than targeting sites of recent accidents.
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Analysis versus responsiveness
Mine action planners and managers should strive for efficiency but must first and
foremost be concerned with effectiveness  the impact of their programme in the real
world. But impact is a complex, multi-dimensional concept  the effect (of a
programme) on its surroundings in terms of technical, economic, socio-cultural,
institutional and environmental factors.5 How can planners and managers get a better
understanding of the likely impacts of their decisions? Two broad strategies can be
employed. The first is analytic; roughly, using more data and more processing. The
second is responsive; adopting the priorities identified by government officials,
community representatives, and other development actors. Both approaches have merit
and should be seen as complements rather than alternatives.
The advantage of responsive approaches is that they tap into the information and
expertise of others, who often are far more knowledgeable than mine action personnel
on problems and opportunities at the community, district, sectoral, and national levels.
Responding to the priorities identified by local people also increases their sense of
ownership, while responding to those of other humanitarian and development
organisations increases goodwill and the likelihood that their co-operation will be
forthcoming in the future.
The danger with responsive approaches is that government, community, or aid agency
officials may, through ignorance or wilfulness, represent their private or institutional
interests over those of the people in mine affected-communities. Mine action
organisations cannot afford to abandon analytic approaches entirely because they must
be in a position to determine whether the priorities identified by others are reasonable
and are likely to represent public rather than private interests.6
Responding to community needs: Direct participation
or representation?
Information concerning priorities can and should be obtained from mine-affected
communities. Mine action organisations can garner this information in a number of
ways. They can:
Ø Conduct participatory consultations directly with affected communities;
Ø Work with international NGOs doing community development work using
participatory approaches;
Ø Work with local NGOs doing community development work using participatory
approaches;
Ø Ask local, district, and provincial officials who themselves obtain bottom-up
information from the communities they represent.
The first three are participatory approaches, while the last takes advantage of official
representatives. The cost of obtaining this information falls sharply as one goes down
the list of options. More importantly, the sustainability of the information system
increases sharply as one goes down the list. Finally, the likelihood that bottom-up
information can be combined with top-down and horizontal information about
5 From the terminology agreed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Expert Group on Aid Evaluation, quoted in Hallam (1998:18).
6 This is one of the functions fulfilled by monitoring, which is covered in the next chapter.
A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action76
other relevant plans and developments (e.g., new roads, government health,
education, and extension services, sectoral and macro-economic policies, etc.)
increases as one works down the list.
There are indeed countries with serious political shortcomings in which official or
traditional authorities are unlikely to represent the interests of a community.7 In such
cases, a mine action organisation should experiment with participatory approaches,
either directly or  usually better  in conjunction with a development NGO.
However, where State authorities are, broadly, concerned with the developmental
needs of the communities they represent, it normally is preferable to work with those
authorities. If the political system also has mechanisms that effectively channel
bottom-up community priorities to district and provincial headquarters, mine action
operators could simply look to district and provincial officials to establish their
priorities. In many poor countries however, provincial and district governments may
be well motivated but have no budgetary and human resources to remain in touch
with some communities and so lack the detailed knowledge necessary for setting the
correct priorities. In such cases, a mine action organisation might support government
to undertake its own participatory appraisals of community needs, and so develop
skills to continue such work after the demining organisation ceases to operate in that
area.8 This will support the role of the State, be less costly, and carry the added benefit
that these same skills can also be applied outside the mine action field.9
Responding to national government priorities
The nation State is far and away the most potent force for development of a country.
Rapid and widespread development can only occur when the State through policies,
the maintenance of public security and the rule of law, and its mobilisation of resources
for investment and public services  is reasonably effective. Where there is an effective
developmental State, donor countries, international agencies and NGOs can help
accelerate development by providing complementary assistance, but they cannot
achieve widespread development in the absence of such a State. The policy and
investment choices of a developmental State will be the most important factor in
determining which sectors and regions of a country will grow in a dynamic fashion.
Normally, these sectors and regions will offer greater pay-offs, in terms of socio-
economic development, from mine action. Where there is a developmental State, it is
important for the mine action community to understand and respond to its national
development priorities.
Clearly the mine action community cannot remain passive and await direction from
senior government officials, even in heavily contaminated countries. Landmines were
not even mentioned in government-written submissions and verbal presentations to
the latest Consultative Group10 meeting for Mozambique. Similarly, the problems of
7 In complex emergencies stemming from failed states (e.g., Sierra Leone, Somalia) there is no effective
government apparatus. In other cases such as Afghanistan, the de facto authorities are not recognised by
the international community.
8 Similar reasoning applies where cultural norms exclude certain groups (e.g., women, pastoralists, etc.)
from access to officials.
9 The Government of Mozambique has signalled its willingness to work with NGOs in this manner.
Their close links give NGOs and religious confessions a comparative advantage in the conception and
implementation of specific programmes to fight poverty. They can act as intermediaries between the
Government and communities. (Government of Mozambique, 1999:52)
10 These are the principal aid and policy co-ordination meetings between the government and the donor
community.
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UXO contamination have received barely a mention in the main Lao PDR economic
and development documents. Heads of national mine action centres often have
difficulty getting sustained attention from senior government decision-makers. Mine
action personnel should assume the onus is on them to seek information on government
policies and programmes that is relevant for setting mine action priorities.
Responding to priorities set by other development
actors
The same rule applies for obtaining relevant information from other key development
actors, such as international organisations (World Bank, the regional development
banks, United Nations agencies), bilateral donors, and development NGOs. One can
hope these organisations will keep the mine action community apprised of plans and
programmes that could influence mine action priorities, but it is unsafe to assume this
will happen. Experience in Kosovo and most mine-contaminated countries suggests
that few development agencies formulate their plans with sufficient spatial information
to assist mine action personnel in setting priorities. Even if these agencies have the
data in the necessary format, time pressures and inter-agency rivalries mean this is
not often provided to mine action managers.
The solution to this problem is not to ignore it and set mine action priorities without
considering other rehabilitation and development projects at the community, regional,
or sectoral levels. Neither is the answer for mine action organisations to build sufficient
expertise in the various social science and development disciplines so they can come
to their own conclusions about what sectoral and area development priorities should
be. Instead, the mine action community in a country needs to reach out to key
government departments and other development actors. Mine action programmes
need to have sufficient expertise to know what organisations have the information
needed for establishing priorities, and invest sufficient time to meet representatives
from those organisations to obtain that information. Mine action organisations also
need to adapt their own planning calendars and procedures to those used by other
key development actors, so it is easy for other organisations to provide the necessary
input. Finally, mine action personnel must be willing to invest time in helping other
organisations plan their work programmes and show how mine action can help these
organisations achieve their objectives. These are outreach, networking, and
information brokering functions. To discharge these effectively, a core socio-
economic research capacity is required, but large research units are probably
unwarranted. The IMADS initiative being piloted in Mozambique (see Box 8) is an
example of what might be both useful and affordable.
Concluding remarks
There is no single set of criteria that all mine action programmes should use in
deciding priorities...
Instead, the appropriate criteria will differ for labour surplus countries relative to
land-abundant ones, or for largely subsistence economies relative to those where most
people specialise in producing a small range of goods and obtain their other
requirements from the market. Some mine-contaminated countries remain embroiled
in conflict while others have secured lasting peace. Governments in some countries
are effective in promoting development, while others prey on their own citizens. These
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and many other differences across countries are profound, and there is no magic
list of criteria suitable for all.
 but there is a core set of issues that should be reflected
in the criteria used by all programmes.
These are accidents (pattern over time, age and gender breakdown, mine versus UXO,
etc.), demographic (numbers at risk, plus their distribution), vulnerability (location,
extent, and nature of the contamination, the coping capacity of those at risk,
entitlements to assistance should accidents occur), development potential (potential
for economic growth and for the alleviation of poverty and inequality), and costs
(productivity; cost structure).  In countries still in or recently emerged from conflict,
the criteria should also reflect political issues central to peace-making and peace-
building.
Box 8: Integrated Mine Action Development Strategy (IMADS)a
IMADS is a capacity-building tool designed to enhance the ability of post-conflict
societies to link mine action into long-term national development planning. IMADS aims
to have national authorities gain greater  and more rapid  ownership over mine
action programmes by building sustainable research and analysis capacity through
the Mine Action Centre (MAC).
Building on outputs generated by the Global Landmine Impact Survey and
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and drawing
information from sectors such as health, agriculture, and education, will ensure that
mine action has a greater and more lasting inter-sectoral impact. Cross-cutting
development reports based on combined development and mine action research
and analysis will inform national, provincial, and district level planning.
A multi-sectoral and multi-level approach to mine action means bringing in new
stakeholders to planning, decision-making and problem-solving processes. This will mean
new networks that bring together members of different stakeholder groups to work on
mine-related problems. For example, the potential roster would include the MAC, the
government, communities, mine action operators, the academic community, funding
agencies, and the private sector. Flexible, ad hoc focus groups will centre on the mine
action requirements for a broad range of development needs, from community goals
to larger-scale infrastructure rehabilitation and investment initiatives.
The basis of IMADS is the establishment of a multi-disciplinary research and policy
unit at a National Mine Action Centre (MAC), or other appropriate body. This unit will
be responsible for generating mine action data and analysis on how best to establish
criteria, indicators, priorities, and benchmarks for success in a given national
development context. In an effort to promote local responses to local problems, the
IMADS Unit will comprise nationally-trained professional staff.
A key IMADS strategy will be to link staff from the MAC and/or Landmine Impact
Survey/IMSMA teams and local social scientists with backgrounds in development who
are skilled in working with existing primary and secondary data and building sound
social and developmental analyses and policy frameworks. It will also attempt to raise
the political profile of the MAC by helping to create an inter-ministerial steering
committee process, elevating the importance of the MAC and providing a forum for
the interchange of ideas and information across different government sectors.
The scarcity of data in many mine-affected countries is exacerbated by the scarcity
of people/institutions capable of working with complex data. IMADS will bring in a wider
network of thinkers and trainers to make sure the data generated by the Landmine
Impact Survey/IMSMA projects is fed into sustainable and useful policy and programming
structures.
IMADS is designed to support the pre-existing Global Landmine Impact Survey/IMSMA
data collection efforts. IMADS does not seek to replicate these initiatives, rather it casts
its objectives further afield and will draw on this information as only one component of
its support to the MAC in its effort to support knowledge creation and capacity-building.
a Information provided by the IDRC office in Johannesburg.
79Setting Priorities
The relative weighting given to different criteria will change over the life of a
programme...
Needs evolve as countries move from open conflict to secure peace, and will continue
to change as the country progresses on the path of development. Opportunities also
change as development projects and other investments are completed, or when national
development strategies are rethought. Even when the set of criteria remains constant,
the relative weights accorded to each should vary as the society and economy evolves.
 but there are consistent patterns to how the relative importance
of criteria will evolve.
Heavy weighting should be given to criteria reflecting risk-reduction objectives while
large numbers of people face highly uncertain risks from landmines and UXO (i.e.,
while conflict continues and in the aftermath, when many displaced people return to
their communities). This weighting should decline over time as the affected population
learns more about the hazards faced. Conversely, criteria reflecting development
potential should receive less weight until peace is well established, as new mine laying
or renewed conflict could quickly destroy the potential economic benefit accruing
from mine clearance.11 Risk-reduction criteria should also receive more weight during
the initial period of a mine action programme, as it takes longer to acquire and interpret
data on complex social and economic features than data on accidents and the location
of mines/UXO.
The information required to properly set priorities expands over the life of a
programme ...
During its initial period, a mine action programme can use the Landmine Impact
Survey or a similar system based heavily on recent accidents to establish clear priority
rankings. As noted in Chapter 2: Impact of Mine Contamination, experience suggests
the mine impact scores will be heavily left-skewed, with a few communities scoring
highly and the majority falling around or below the median. Priorities stand out clearly,
and a weak metric suffices.12 More and finer information, reflecting a broader range
of social and economic features, is required to differentiate between communities that
score similarly according to a small number of criteria.
 but in many cases other development actors can supply most
of the additional information required.
Other development agencies can advise about national, sectoral, and district
development strategies, issues, and priorities. International and local NGOs can often
provide detailed information about community development priorities. In countries
blessed with reasonably effective governments, national, provincial, and local
government representatives can also give much of the information required to set
mine action priorities. Obtaining this information may require diplomacy and an
outreach effort, but success will allow mine action organisations to concentrate their
efforts where they have their greatest comparative advantage  dealing with mine
contamination.
11 In modern internal conflicts, some part of a country may be secure for extended periods while other
parts are visited repeatedly by conflict.
12 As repeated accidents are likely to occur only on valuable, heavily-used land, clearing land on which
repeated accidents have occurred is likely to yield other significant social and economic benefits. In other
words, communities that are very heavily impacted according to one criterion are likely to be significantly
impacted according to several others.





As mine action programmes become integrated into national socio-economic development
systems, so they must adopt the development community's approaches to monitoring and
evaluation  both to verify that they have achieved their objectives and to satisfy their
donors, governments and other clients. This chapter discusses how the efficiency and
effectiveness of mine action programmes can be assessed and proposes some basic criteria
for selecting performance indicators.
Introduction
Monitoring and evaluation are different but related functions. Monitoring refers to
activities undertaken during the life of a project or programme to track whether
progress toward agreed objectives is being achieved as planned. Evaluation is a broader
function: an assessment  of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy,
its design, implementation and results and is intended, in part, to improve future
aid policy, programmes and projects through feedback of lessons learned (OECD,
1991:5). Both monitoring and evaluation also promote accountability: have those
entrusted with public resources used these as approved to achieve reasonable results?
An examination of results is central to both monitoring and evaluation. Results arise
at many levels.1 In a well conceived and managed project in which the critical
underlying assumptions hold true, a set of planned outputs are used by the intended
beneficiaries to produce desired outcomes, or short- to medium-term changes in the
external environment. Further, a set of planned outcomes may eventually lead to the
intended impacts, or long-term, sustained changes in the external environment. This
hierarchy of results can be combined with the programme logic chain into a results-
based logical framework analysis, as described on page 17.
Four additional points need be made. First, it should be clear that the results achieved
at one level are means to an end (i.e., achieving results at a higher level). It surely is
1 See also the section Programme context in Chapter 1, Introduction.
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good to destroy landmines and to clear land, but what is really valued is the food
grown on that land and, even more so, the enduring livelihoods the people create for
themselves on that land. Landmine removal and destruction are simply means to an
end.
Second, mine action organisations have progressively less control over the results
achieved at higher levels in the results chain. Most mine action organisations can,
with fair confidence, clear a given area of land or provide mine awareness training to
a specified number of people. They are less certain that people will plant crops on the
land in the coming season or use their mine awareness to stop risky behaviour.
Achieving these planned outcomes depends not only on the outputs delivered, but
also on the target beneficiaries using the outputs as intended.  Mine action organisations
have even less control over the long-term impacts of their actions on society, as these
impacts are affected by many other influences over time. Mine action may be necessary
if a contaminated community is to prosper, but it is not sufficient to ensure
development will occur.
Third, it is straightforward to collect and report evidence about outputs: how many
mines were destroyed and hectares cleared? It is more difficult to collect and report
evidence on outcomes. Follow-up visits may be required, and safeguards put in place
to ensure we actually are measuring what we think we are (e.g., are the farmers on the
cleared land the intended beneficiaries, or has the land been taken over by the local
elite?). Documenting long-term impact is even more problematic. It may not be possible
to assess this impact for five years or more, and it often is unclear how to measure
something as complex as prosperity or security.2
Finally, there is the issue of attribution  is an outcome or impact the result of the
project or of other changes?  As discussed in Chapter 3: Socio-Economic Analysis of
Mine Action, this is a particularly vexing problem when assessing mine awareness.
Do changes in observed accident rates stem from mine awareness training or from
local people learning to avoid minefields in their vicinity?  Or from declines in refugee
migrations?  Or from mine clearance?  Or from changes in the statistical coverage?  As
yet no evaluation of a mine awareness programme has overcome the attribution
problem.
Provisions for monitoring and evaluation should be incorporated from the start, when
a project is being designed. The pre-existing situation or baseline has to be
documented if we are to assess whether, and how much, progress has been achieved.
We also need some idea of how we are to measure progress and achievements. The
pieces of information needed to monitor progress and evaluate achievements are
termed performance indicators. Project managers also use process indicators to monitor
whether agreed policies and procedures are being followed, for example, to ensure
safety or provide for adequate local participation.3
2 While there are a number of reports documenting the impact of landmine contamination, the first real
attempt at an impact evaluation of mine action was the 1998/99 Socio-Economic Impact Study of Landmines
and Mine Action Operations in Afghanistan (MCPA, 1999). A follow-on study using a more rigorous cost-
benefit approach has been commissioned by the World Bank and UNDP, and was due to be completed in
February 2001.
3 The validity of assumptions should also be monitored because the logic of a project, hence its likelihood
of success, is based on those assumptions. If the assumptions prove not to hold true, the project should be
redesigned or abandoned. For example, land might be cleared on the assumption that peasants will grow
food. If the military appropriates the land, or if the peasants use it to grow opium poppy, the project will
not be able to achieve its objectives or will result in unintended, harmful impacts. It should then be halted
or redesigned.
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Using indicators in emergency and development
operations: Examples
In emergency and development operations alike, the international community has
devoted extensive time and effort to identifying relevant indicators by which its efforts
may be judged. In the emergency context, the Sphere Project4 a collaboration among
humanitarian agencies  has led to the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards
in Disaster Response. This seeks to improve the quality of assistance provided to people
affected by disasters and to enhance the accountability of the humanitarian system in
disaster response.
The Minimum Standards were developed using broad networks of experts
representing five sectors: water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and
site planning, and health services.5 There are indicators corresponding to each of the
standards (see Box 9). Most of the standards, and the indicators that accompany them,
are not new, but consolidate and adapt existing knowledge and practice.
Box 9:  Sphere Project Standard for Food Aid Requirements
and Related Indicators
Requirements standard for food aid: The food basket and rations are designed to bridge
the gap between the affected populations requirements and their own food sources.
Key indicators
1. Requirements are based on the following World Health Organization (WHO) initial
planning estimates:
w 2,100 kcals per person per day,
w 10-12% of total energy is provided by proteins,
w 17% of total energy is provided from fat,
w Adequate micronutrient intake through fresh or fortified foods.
2. Estimates of peoples food and income sources include consideration of:
w Market and income opportunities,
w Foraging and wild food potential,
w Agricultural seasons and access to productive assets,
w Sources of income and coping strategies.
3. Ration scales include consideration of:
w General nutritional requirements,
w Specific needs of vulnerable groups,
w Access to alternative sources of food and/or income.
4. Commodity selection includes consideration of:
w Local availability and market impact,
w Local acceptability and preparation,
w Fitness and nutritional composition,
w Fuel requirements for cooking.
To judge the success of development programmes, a variety of indicators exist at
macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the International Development Goals6 set
4 The Sphere Project is a programme of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response and InterAction
with Voice, ICRC and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). The project was launched
in 1997 to develop a set of universal minimum standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance.
5 For a copy of the Sphere Handbook see <http://www.sphereproject.org>.
6 These initially were established by the OECD's DAC, which comprises the major donor nations. The
World Bank and the United Nations have since adopted these goals as well.
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developmental targets in the following seven areas to be achieved by the year 2015:
Ø Reducing extreme poverty;
Ø Universal primary education;
Ø Gender equality;
Ø Reducing infant and child mortality;
Ø Reducing maternal mortality;
Ø Reproductive health; and
Ø Environment.
A series of performance targets and indicators, such as those shown below for the
goal Reducing extreme poverty, accompany these goals to provide yardsticks by
which progress within a country, and comparisons across countries, can be judged.7
Indicators
Goal: Reducing extreme poverty 1. Incidence of extreme poverty: Population
below US$1 per day
Target: The proportion of people living in 2. Poverty gap ratio: Incidence times depth
extreme poverty in developing countries of poverty
should be reduced by at least one-half 3. Inequality: Poorest fifths share of national
by 2015. consumption
4. Child malnutrition: Prevalence of
underweight under-5s
Measuring results in mine action programmes
Introduction
Mine action organisations have so far been reticent to embrace developmental
approaches to monitoring and evaluation, concentrating for the most part on counting
outputs such as the numbers of mines destroyed and hectares cleared. Yet, recognition
is growing that this will no longer satisfy stakeholders in mine action. Donors and
developing country officials now want to know the outcomes achieved  the number
of beneficiaries and the extent and nature of the benefits they receive. Officials soon
will want assessments of the long-term impacts of mine action  have people been
able to create sustainable livelihoods due to mine action and complementary
development investments?
The chief outputs of mine action are means to a greater end. Cleared land and
infrastructure create opportunities for, but not the assurance of, reduced human
suffering and accelerated development. We assume the local people and organisations
providing development assistance will then take advantage of these opportunities to
build sustainable livelihoods and improve well-being of the intended beneficiaries.
But we may be wrong. We may not understand the socio-cultural complexities of
local communities that leave cleared land in the hands of the élite rather than the
needy. We may be unaware that other material constraints, such as the absence of
seeds for planting, mean returnees cannot sustain themselves in spite of the removal
of mine contamination. We may lack the data that shows people have learned to avoid
minefields and that UXO presents a greater hazard. We may continue to clear
agricultural land that women have no time to farm because of the hours they spend
collecting water each day. We need to confirm our assumptions are true and verify
7 See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/indicators>.
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that the outputs from mine action programmes are leading to the intended outcomes
and desired impacts. In doing so, our purpose is not to draw attention to failures and
mistakes, but rather to learn what works and how to improve.
Choosing performance indicators
Performance indicators measure progress toward an objective. The direct outputs of
mine action, including clearance and destruction of landmines, mine awareness
training sessions, and prostheses fitted to victims, are means to achieve broader goals
such as greater security, prosperity, and dignity. Accordingly, we need indicators not
only to document our efficiency in converting inputs into outputs (see Box 10), but
also to inform us whether these lead to the broader socio-economic goals. The relative
importance of these potential benefits will vary across countries and over time within
individual countries as they move from conflict to autonomous development.
Therefore, there cannot be a single set of indicators; each mine action programme
needs to select indicators suitable for its specific time, place, and objectives.
Box 10: Measuring the Efficiency of Mine Action
Efficiency is the ratio of work performed to the resources used or, in the terminology
used by the development community, the ratio of outputs to inputs. The ratio can be
denominated in physical units (e.g., hours of labour, kilograms of explosives), which is
also be termed productivity, or in financial terms, termed cost efficiency.
Mine action organisations typically track and report a variety of efficiency measures:
numbers of mines destroyed, areas of land cleared, numbers of people receiving mine
awareness training, numbers of prostheses fitted, etc. Such efficiency measures need
to be supplemented by indicators reflecting developmental or socio-economic goals
if we are to understand whether programmes are effective. However, it is essential that
efforts to document efficiency not only continue but also expand and become more
systematic. Such measures are needed to compare different techniques to achieve
the same output (e.g., manual versus mechanical clearance), compare the productivity
of different units and organisations, track safety over time, and assess whether accident
rates fall among populations receiving mine awareness. Efficiency measures are the
staples in a good project managers diet of information.
While mine action organisations report a welter of efficiency measures, many, and
perhaps most, still fail to report the most revealing cost efficiency figures  total unit
costsa of clearing land, delivering mine awareness, and assisting victims. It is these figures
that would allow preliminary cost efficiency comparisons across programmes,
organisations, and managers. By not reporting these, mine action organisations fail to
meet standards of accountability and transparency that both donors and other
stakeholders should demand. More damaging still, some organisations do not even
collect and analyse these figures. In failing to do so, mine action organisations are
denying their own personnel some of the most powerful weapons in a project managers
arsenal.
The findings of this study suggest most mine action programmes would improve with
a better grasp of socio-economic approaches to mine action. Most would similarly
improve by adding cost/managerial accountants to their rosters.
a Total costs include those for capital equipment, international staff, and allocations to
cover headquarters expenses and other common services.
The core of this report has provided not a blueprint but rather general approaches to
illustrate how some of mine actions broader contributions to development 
particularly agricultural production  might be measured. A fuller assessment will
eventually require indicators for measuring progress toward more abstract socio-
economic goals, such as peace-building, social reconciliation, enhancing social capital,
and reinforcing local governance. Guides for developing such indicators do exist (see
Box 11), but a useful first step would be for mine action managers to clarify which of
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the broader development objectives they seek to further, then identify the indicators
needed to assess their achievements vis-à-vis these specific objectives. The concluding
section of this chapter provides a short example of how to approach this task.
Box 11: Criteria for Assessing Performance Indicators
Development agencies have compiled guides for selecting and using indicators.
One of the best is the series from USAID, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS
from which this is drawn.
1. Direct: A performance indicator should match as closely as possible the result it is
intended to measure. It should not be pegged at a higher or lower level than the result
being measured. For example, contraceptive prevalence rate is a direct measure of
the result  increased use of family planning methods. But number of service providers
trained would NOT be a direct measure of the result improved service delivery. Just
because people are trained does not necessarily mean they will deliver services better.
If using a direct measure is not possible, one or more proxy indicators might be
appropriate. Proxies are indirect measures that are linked to the result by one or more
assumptions. For example, in rural areas of Africa it is often very difficult to measure
income levels directly. Measures such as percentage of village households with tin roofs
may be a useful, if somewhat rough, proxy. The assumption is that when villagers have
higher income they tend to purchase certain goods. If convincing evidence exists that
the assumption is sound, then the proxy may be an adequate indicator, albeit second-
best to a direct measure.
2. Objective: There should be no ambiguity about what is being measured. That is,
there is general agreement over interpretation of the results. An objective indicator is
both unidimensional and operationally precise. Unidimensional means that it measures
only one phenomenon at a time. Avoid trying to combine too much in one indicator
(e.g., measuring both access and use). Operational precision means no ambiguity over
what kind of data would be collected for an indicator. For example, while number of
successful export firms is ambiguous, number of export firms experiencing an annual
increase in revenues of at least 5 per cent is precise.
3. Adequate: Taken as a group, a performance indicator and its companion
indicators should adequately measure the result in question. How many indicators should
be used to measure any given result? The answer depends on a) the complexity of the
result being measured, b) the level of resources available for monitoring performance,
and c) the amount of information needed to make reasonably confident decisions. For
some results that are straightforward and have tried and true measures, one
performance indicator may be enough. For example, if the intended result is increased
traditional exports, the indicator dollar value of traditional exports per year is probably
sufficient. Where no single indicator is sufficient, or where there are benefits to be
gained by triangulation  then two or more indicators may be needed. However,
avoid using too many indicators. Try to strike a balance between resources available
for measuring performance and the amount of information managers need to make
reasonably well-informed decisions.
4. Quantitative, where possible: Quantitative indicators are numerical. Qualitative
indicators are descriptive observations (an expert opinion of institutional strength, or a
description of behaviour). While quantitative indicators are not necessarily more
objective, their numerical precision leads to more agreement on interpretation of results
data. However, even when effective quantitative indicators are being used, qualitative
indicators can supplement with richer information to bring a programmes results to life.
5. Disaggregated, where appropriate: Disaggregating programme results by gender,
age, location, or some other dimension is often important from a management or
reporting point of view. Experience shows that development activities often require
different approaches for different groups and affect those groups in different ways.
Disaggregated data help track whether or not specific groups participate in and benefit
from activities intended to include them.
6. Practical: An indicator is practical if data can be obtained in a timely way and at
a reasonable cost. A rule of thumb is to plan on allocating 3 to 10 per cent of total
programme resources for performance monitoring and evaluation.
7. Reliable: Can data of sufficiently reliable quality for confident decision-making
be obtained? The data that a programme manager needs to make reasonably
confident decisions is not necessarily the same standard a social scientist requires. For
example, a low cost mini-survey may be good enough.
Summarised from <http://www.dec.org/usaid_eval/#004>
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An illustration of setting objectives
One of the International Development Goals adopted by OECD's Development
Assistance Committee, the World Bank, and UNDP is Reducing infant and child
mortality, with a target of a two-thirds reduction from the 1990 level of infant mortality
by 2015. An African country wishes to achieve this goal, and establishes an
interdepartmental committee to work with donors on a strategy and a new generation
of programmes and projects. It analyses the problem and develops a problem analysis
tree relating to child malnutrition, one of the chief contributors to its high child
mortality rate.
Reducing Child Malnutrition - Problem Analysis
Lack of tools Recurrent
drought
Women have no











The working group then sets general objectives for each of the problems, and lists the
programmes and projects needed to promote these objectives. A sample of this work
is illustrated below. Multidisciplinary teams begin working on the specific project
designs, including one for potable water, which aims to promote two important
objectives: (1) reduce household food insecurity (by reducing the amount of time
women spent collecting water, leaving more time for tending crops) and (2) reducing
the incidence of diarrhoea.8





























The team working on potable water designs a Potable Water Project with four main
components: the construction of (1) new gravity-fed systems and (2) new bore hole
8 Some LFA purists would not approve of a single project having two broad objectives, but in fact the
supply of basic needs such as water generally advances multiple objectives.
Reducing Child Malnutrition - Problem Analysis
Reducing Child Malnutrition - Objectives Analyses
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systems to villages, (3) the rehabilitation of existing village water points, and (4)
institutional development. The latter component includes the creation of a village
water supply unit within the Ministry for Rural Development, plus pilot projects to
create village water committees, in part to mobilise village contributions of labour
and local materials for the water systems.
The Ministry for Rural Development initiates a preliminary survey to confirm the
extent of the needs and collect baseline data. During the survey, the ministry discovers
that 5 per cent of all the villages surveyed have problems with landmines, with twice
that number suffering from UXO contamination. In some districts of the country, up
to 40 per cent of the villages are affected in some way.
The project design team approaches the national MAC to discuss how this problem
could be addressed. Discussions raise the following points:
Ø The MAC had completed a national Landmine Impact Survey, with the data
contained in a GIS database that the Ministry for Rural Development could access;
Ø Communities had been priority ranked based on a Mine Impact Score derived
from the survey data. A high percentage of those target communities for the
potable water project that were contaminated by landmines also were MAC
priorities for technical survey, but few villages with just UXO contamination
were MAC priorities;
Ø MAC implementing partners were organised principally to clear minefields, and
did not have adequate staff trained in Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) for
quick response to clear UXO.
The MAC agrees that the mine action programme will respond with high priority to
those villages involved in the potable water project that were landmine contaminated.
In return, the donors for the potable water initiative agree to fund a special project to
train and equip three rapid response UXO clearance teams to address UXO
contamination. These teams work as part of the national mine action programme, but
give first priority to villages scheduled for work under the potable water project. To
obtain the funds, one of the MAC implementation partners has to submit a standard
project proposal complete with Logical Framework and a monitoring and evaluation
plan with performance targets and indicators.
After consultations with the Potable Water Project design team and the MAC, the
implementation partner develops the project proposal, which is summarised in the




Results-Based Logical Framework Analysis  Project: UXO Clearance for Potable Water
Logic chain Results chain Progress indicators Source of indicator data
Goal: Impacts: Goal/Impact indicators: Baseline data collected by
Reduce childhood malnutrition in 1. Increase agricultural production 1. Prevalence of underweight Potable Water Project (PWP).
target villages by half the baseline in target villages by 10%. childrena 1. Ministry of Health Survey Unit
 rate. 2. Reduce incidence of diarrhoea in  2. Maize production per household. 2. Agricultural Statistics Unit
infants by 25%. 3. Cassava production per household. 3. Agricultural Statistics Unit
4. Incidence of infant diarrhoea. 4. Ministry of Health Survey Unit
Purpose: Outcomes: Purpose/Outcome indicators: Baseline data collected by
Each project year to: In target villages, to: 1. Number of rehabilitated water Potable  Water Project (PWP).
1. Rehabilitate 30 village water points. 1. Reduce the average time women points. 1. PWP Monitoring Unit
2. Construct new borehole potable spend on collecting water to 1 hour 2. Number of new borehole systems. 2. PWP Monitoring Unit
water systems in 30 villages.  per day. 3. Number of new gravity-feed systems 3. PWP Monitoring Unit
3. Construct new gravity-feed potable 2. Provide potable water in 70 villages. 4. Time utilisation studies. 4. Ministry of Rural Development
 water systems in 10 villages. for at least 7000 people per year. 5. Village population statistics. Survey Unit
5. National Statistical Centre
Inputs: Outputs: Output indicators: 1 & 2 - Site completion reports.
1.Three 12-person UXO clearance 1. 50 villages cleared of surface UXO 1. Number of villages cleared of 3 & 4 - Technical survey reports;
teams, with safety equipment. per year. surface UXO. UXO
2. Three EOD technical advisors. 2. Water sites in 20 villages cleared 2. Number of water sites cleared of Clearance team weekly reports.
3. Three trucks and land cruisers. of surface and buried UXO per year. surface and buried UXO. 5  8 - Monthly cost accounting
4. Explosive. 3. Area cleared of surface UXO.  reports.
Etc. 4. Area cleared of surface & buried 9 & 10 MAC Quality Assurance
UXO. Unit
5. Cost/ha of surface clearance.
6. Cost/ha of surface & sub-surface
clearance.
7. Team hours/ha surface clearance.
 8. Team hours/ha surface and sub-
surface clearance.
 9. Team incidents.
10. Team incidents/ha cleared
a Prevalence of underweight children measures the proportion of underweight children under-five as a percentage of child population under-five. A child is
considered to be underweight if his or her weight-for-age ratio is more than two standard deviations below the median weight for the healthy reference population.




This Chapter addresses how new information technology, especially Geographic Information
Systems, offers important possibilities for improving not only mine action but also development
planning and management more widely.
Geographic Information Systems
A Geographic Information System (GIS) is a database system that allows the user to
capture, view, manipulate, analyse and model spatially referenced data. The interest
in GIS lies in the technologys use as a spatial database system for assisting in surveys
of mine affected areas and its potential for co-ordinating demining efforts at national
and international scales. A less frequent, but nonetheless very important, potential
application of geomatics technology involves its use in multi-sensor detection systems.
While the technologys application in humanitarian demining may be in its infancy,
the growing interest in GIS is evident from special sessions on the subject at recent
demining conferences. The burgeoning of GIS systems offered by companies and
agencies in the last few years is further evidence of the growing importance of this
technology in humanitarian demining (Mather, 2000:2).
The Kosovo case study sheds light on the potential for GIS and related tools to bring
about significant improvements in the way in which humanitarian and development
programmes are planned and managed. The MACC was able to quickly establish a
GIS and make it available to sectoral agencies to assist their programming. It is clear
from the case study that the mine action community is running ahead of the pack in
the use of GIS-based approaches.1 The following analysis goes beyond the limited
experience garnered to date in Kosovo, Mozambique, and Lao PDR and explores the
possibilities that GIS approaches will contribute at least partial solutions to
1 This also seems to be the case in Lao PDR and Mozambique. The socio-economic survey conducted by
Handicap International (HI) in Lao PDR produced a standard GIS for that country, while the Landmine
Impact Survey and aerial mapping currently underway in Mozambique will do the same for that country.
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longstanding co-ordination problems that bedevil the practice of international
development.2
Two types of co-ordination problems
Virtually all problems in development can be seen as co-ordination issues, which
typically are more difficult to solve in developing countries than in wealthier ones.
For an obvious example, all households in a poor community may want a secure
supply of potable water close at hand, but lack a means of organising to obtain it.3
Even if the community could obtain the water supply, maintaining it through the
years is likely to prove a more difficult problem.
In a slightly more complicated case, various members of a community might be
considering small investments that would mutually reinforce on another.  For example:
Ø One grain farmer wants to invest in better agricultural inputs to produce and sell
a surplus of grain;
Ø A widow is considering a small bakery to raise school fees for her children; and
Ø An older farmer would like to retire from manual labour and sell fertiliser he can
obtain from a relative in the provincial capital.
If all proceed, the grain farmer will benefit from the available fertiliser and from the
baker who would buy the surplus grain. The baker would have a ready supply of
grain and a likely market in the fertiliser dealer who no longer produces his own
food. The fertiliser dealer can easily buy prepared food and has a market in the grain
farmer. By going forward with their plans, each benefits the others, and total welfare
in the community is likely to grow because specialisation allows greater productivity.
However, it may be that none of the investments is feasible unless all three proceed.
Even with such a simple example, the three potential entrepreneurs may not be able
to co-ordinate their investments.
The water supply case illustrates a public goods4 problem, while the second example
is a co-ordination failure5 in the provision of normal, private goods and services.
In terms less specific to economists, we will refer to the first type as a vertical co-
ordination problem requiring a method of arranging inputs (pipes, pumps, labour,
etc.) to be combined to produce (and often maintain) a desired output. By contrast,
the second type is a horizontal co-ordination problem, where outputs from diverse
2 For examples of recent GIS-based approaches to geographic targeting for poverty programmes  a
similar problem in priority setting, see also Bigman and Fofack (2000); Hentschel et al. (2000); Bigman et
al. (2000); and Fofack (2000).
3 Conceivably, this could be done through the market (one household constructs the water system and
charges others for use), through a local government (using local taxes) or community-based organisation
(e.g., a co-operative), or by convincing a higher level of government to provide it.
4 A public good exists when (1) it costs little or nothing to have an extra person benefit from it and (2)
it is difficult to exclude someone from benefiting from it. A classic example is national defence. Once an
army is in place to protect one million citizens, it costs no more when another child is born, and that child
will receive the same security as other citizens. Together these conditions imply the private sector will
not provide such goods in socially-optimal quantities, as there is no means of collecting payment from
the beneficiaries or from preventing non-payees from benefiting. However, the state can tax the population
to pay for the public goods.
5 In economics, the term co-ordination failure refers to situations where individuals are unable to co-
ordinate their choices to achieve a state of affairs that would be preferred by all over the existing state of
affairs.
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projects must occur at the right time, place, and sequence for any of the individual
projects to be justified.6
In the 1950s, early theories in development economics focused principally on horizontal
co-ordination issues. These theories recognised that pay-offs to individual projects
are modest in a poor economy precisely because of the poverty (i.e., lack of demand
and buying power). As such, ways had to be devised to undertake multiple diverse
investments more-or-less simultaneously, so the pay-offs from each would be enhanced
by spill-over benefits from other investments, and vice versa. This type of development
economics theory was abandoned, for two reasons.
First, such issues are complicated and economists of the day could not develop models
to rigorously study the implications of the theories in a truly useful manner, so
development economics lost much of its appeal to new generations of economists
(Krugman, 1995). In practice, real life complexities overwhelmed the capacity of
economists and planners to manage economic growth via five-year development
plans.
Second, it became apparent that, in developing countries, one could not assume that
individual investment projects would be implemented properly or, if implemented,
maintained.7  Simple vertical co-ordination problems abounded. Development
practitioners turned their attention to these and developed programme logic models
as tools. Over the past quarter-century, the planning and management of development
programmes and projects has become dominated by programme logic models.
Programme logic models are reasonably good for managing vertical co-ordination
issues by focusing resources and attention on the intended objective. But this benefit
comes with a price: a narrow focus means broader implications may be overlooked
and the project will have unintended consequences, for better or worse. Over the past
25 years, certain types of problems have emerged sufficiently often that the
development community has taken remedial action. This typically starts with the
addition of an extra specialist to the project team to identify and monitor, say, gender
or ecological issues. With time and experience, some of these issues become sufficiently
familiar to development practitioners that they no longer treated as add-ons and
instead are mainstreamed  part and parcel of the planning of virtually all
development projects.  Slowly, progress is being made in learning how to cope with
disparate issues while retaining focus on the principal objective.
Far less progress has been made in learning how to deal with horizontal co-ordination
issues. In the 1980s for example, there was a rash of Integrated Rural Development
6 In economic reasoning, each project creates benefits for the other projects, but entrepreneur One has no
means to get the other two to pay for the benefits they receive. Receiving no payment for these spill-over
benefits, he does not value them when deciding whether to proceed with the investment. He will not
proceed if his costs exceed his private benefits, even though total benefits  including those received by
the other two entrepreneurs  may exceed costs. The spill-over benefits are termed positive externalities.
Pollution is a common example of a negative externality, where the polluter often cannot be made to
pay for the damages his actions inflict on others.
7 After the Second World War, the US instituted the Marshall Plan to finance reconstruction in Western
Europe. These countries already had professional and technical workers, and the institutions needed to
plan, manage, and maintain investment projects  all they needed was money. When similar approaches
were tried in developing countries, many investment projects failed due to a lack of trained and experienced
personnel and weak institutions. Much development effort is now spent on capacity-building to develop
institutions, organisations, and human resources.
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programmes to address the multidimensional nature of rural poverty. Such projects
generally performed poorly because top-down planning and management approaches
could not co-ordinate the activities of many specialised agencies and personnel working
on different aspects of rural development: agriculture, feeder roads, extension, inputs,
product markets, non-farm employment, etc. (World Bank, 1997). The development
community understands the need to cope with such co-ordination issues, and new
approaches are being tested,8 but few expect quick solutions.
Underdevelopment traps
Unfortunately, as the first generation of development economists well understood,
horizontal co-ordination is the key to lifting poor countries, regions, and communities
from their low-income traps.9 This is because one investment has spill-over benefits
for other possible investments. Some provide forwardlinkages for other investments
by, say, making intermediate products (inputs) such as fertiliser and agricultural
implements less expensive and more readily available. Others provide backward
linkages by expanding the market for a product. Each investment may be economically
justifiable if other investments go forward, but not if considered on its own.
For example, the economic justification for clearing mines from agricultural land
depends principally on the benefits accruing from future agricultural production on
that land and on the clearance costs. Benefits are typically meagre in poor countries
because agricultural productivity is low, while clearance costs can be very high because
of logistical problems. So mine clearance in, say, a remote community in Mozambique
may not be justified on purely economic grounds because costs are high and benefits
low. However, if a feeder road is built to the community, it will cost less to get the
mine clearance team to the village. If private traders then arrive to buy grain and sell
fertiliser, local farmers may buy the fertiliser to produce more grain for sale, thus
boosting agricultural productivity. If government extension agents then begin visiting
to advise farmers on better agricultural practices, productivity will grow further. If
the government has invested in agricultural research, extension agents can also bring
improved seeds, boosting productivity even more. Over time, farmers will earn enough
cash to buy cattle for animal traction, again raising agricultural productivity. Traders
will come more regularly to buy grain, reducing on-farm storage losses, lowering
transportation costs, and creating pressure on the government to maintain the road.
A virtuous circle is built raising the community from its poverty trap to comparative
prosperity.
The only question: how to create the virtuous circle? Because the community is so
poor, perhaps none of the individual investments  by public works (feeder roads),
traders (travel expense, maintaining the inventory of fertiliser, purchasing the truck),
or farmers (buying fertiliser, enhanced seeds, and cattle, building storage bins, learning
new practices)  is worthwhile on its own. Extension agents will not visit a village
that is hard to get to and does not produce agricultural surplus. The government may
not want to support research for a stagnant agricultural sector. The community remains
trapped in poverty.
8 The current favourite is the Sector Wide Approach to Programming (SWAP).
9 For economists, a trap exists when there are two or more equilibria  say one at low income levels
and a second at much higher levels  and no tendency for market forces to lead from the worse to the
better.
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A mine clearance task that might have a zero rate of return for a stagnant rural economy
could have a annual return of 20 per cent if it is assumed the various complementary
investments are made to lift the community from its poverty trap. Development
experience to date suggests this would not be a safe assumption.
A way forward?
One of the reasons why horizontal co-ordination problems are so intractable in
development management is that many different professions are involved, each with
their own perspectives, methods, priorities, data requirements, and technical language.
Typically, they also work for different agencies. Sometimes even communication across
these professions and among the agencies seems too great a problem to overcome.
Part of the appeal of programme logic models and logical frameworks is that, because
they are straightforward, they establish a common focus and facilitate communication
at a fairly basic level to solve vertical co-ordination problems. GIS promise similar
benefits for addressing certain types of horizontal  co-ordination  those involving
spatial co-ordination, such as rural development.  Why?
First, GIS offers a means for organising the storage and collection of huge amounts of
varied data that shares one common characteristic: they exist (at least for a time) in
some specific geographic space. The basis for organising this data is clear and readily
grasped, regardless of ones technical background. Data can also be summarised and
presented in a highly useful format  maps  with which virtually all are
familiar. The results of data analysis can also be reported on maps; an excellent
means for communicating even complex ideas. GIS and the related data analysis and
mapping programmes represent a powerful set of tools that most development
professions will be eager to employ. As this happens, they also become a common set
of tools, and a basis for cutting across conceptual divides within the development
community. In turn, this will make the planning and management of spatial co-
ordination far easier.
This has already happened to a degree within the mine action community. People
with very different backgrounds and perspectives have learned to work reasonably
well together in the space of a few years. Mine action personnel are more familiar
than most in the development community with using these new tools to integrate
knowledge across technical fields. In a number of cases, mine action centres are
producing maps for other development programmes and government departments.
In some countries, mine action programmes developed the first national GIS system,
which has led to common standards, simplifying data exchange in the future. In
Kosovo, the MACC compiled the first district-level population estimates and
distributed these to all development organisations. In Lao PDR, UXO LAO is now
trying to obtain access to agricultural census data, which will vastly increase its capacity
for socio-economic analysis. With this, UXO LAO will be able to analyse the size of
agricultural holdings, average productivity, the percentage of households marketing
rice, numbers of households with landholdings below a size threshold, and many
other factors that might bear on clearance decisions, for all communities
simultaneously. It will be able to search systematically for specific negative impacts
associated with, and perhaps caused by, UXO contamination in severely affected
communities. Future censuses will allow systematic comparisons of changes that have
occurred in communities receiving mine action assistance, relative to others that have
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not. Such evidence will vastly increase our understanding of the socio-economic
impacts of mine action.
GIS systems also promise potent network economies.10 As more government
agencies, NGOs, and businesses employ such systems, increasing amounts of
information will be available to all with GIS capacities, typically at very low cost. For
example, a mine action centre might be able to access the plans of all development
NGOs to see what communities they are planning to work with, and when, greatly
simplifying inter-agency co-ordination.
No one is certain where this will lead, but mine action professionals will benefit the
development community greatly if they can capitalise on these opportunities to develop
new analysis, planning, and management tools for spatial co-ordination.
10 A positive network externality occurs whenever a new individual joins a network, because all existing
members benefit. For example, in the early days of telephone, few people had them so a subscriber could
not reach many businesses or friends. As more subscribed, those already on the network benefitted by being
able to reach more people and businesses. The Internet provides similarly powerful network externalities.
The MACC experience in Kosovo, where its eagerness to collaborate with other agencies has been frustrated
because most sector planning does not seem to have used any spatial or service area analysis is a good
example of the situation prevailing before network economies kick in.
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Background on Kosovo
Although Kosovo has a rich mineral and natural resource base and fertile  agricultural
land, it is generally agreed that the province needs substantial rehabilitation and
modernisation. As a result of the spring 1999 conflict, industrial output collapsed and
agriculture production plummeted, with livestock herds lost or killed and the planting
season missed (IOM, 2000:1). In addition to repairing conflict-related damage, the
effects of a decade of neglect have to be dealt with, and effective sectoral institutions
and policies have to be developed (EU and World Bank, 1999:19).
Transition in Kosovo has to take place against the background of not only the legacy
of Yugoslav-style planning and social ownership but also the constitutional
peculiarities and political uncertainties of the present (World Bank, 1999a:3).
Constitutionally, Kosovo remains within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but
following the end of the war between the regime in Belgrade and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations, through the aegis of the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), has become the de facto government of the
province.
A study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) found that half the
total post-war population of Kosovo is under 25 years age, with 32 per cent younger
than 16 years (IOM, 2000:16). Unemployment in the province is 50 per cent, with 57
per cent of the unemployed living in rural areas. The most common sectors of activity
among those employed are agriculture, education, industry and mining, public
administration, and trade (IOM, 2000:53). Illiteracy among those 10 years and older is
6 per cent, of whom 83 per cent are women. A total of 71 per cent of persons older than
14 years have completed elementary and high school; only 9 per cent have completed
higher education (IOM, 2000:16).
International organisations (World Bank, 2000a; UNMIK, 2000) have identified three
main challenges for Kosovo:
Ø To develop a thriving, open and transparent market economy, which can quickly
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provide jobs to a large part of the population of Kosovo; this requires restarting
the rural economy, encouraging the development of the private sector, and
addressing the issues of public enterprises;
Ø To restart public administration and establish transparent, effective and sustainable
institutions, with particular focus on setting up the central institutions that are
key for economic recovery, developing municipal governance, and restoring law
and order through an effective police and judiciary; and
Ø To mitigate the impact of the conflict and to start addressing the legacy of the
1990s, with a focus on restoring adequate living conditions (and in particular
housing repair, local infrastructure rehabilitation, and landmine clearance),
rehabilitating the infrastructure networks needed for economic development
(telecommunications, energy, transport), and upgrading social service delivery
(both education and health).
As IOM has noted: Reliable demographic indicators are scarce in Kosovo. The absence
of reliable demographic and health indicators hampers the rehabilitation efforts being
undertaken by the international community in Kosovo. All agencies, institutions and
organisations involved in humanitarian aid and development programs are
experiencing difficulties in setting priorities and planning for the evaluation of their
programmes. Furthermore, it is difficult to track population mobility as Kosovo slowly
recovers from the very difficult period of the war (IOM, 2000:1).
History of mine and unexploded ordnance
contamination
In most mine-affected countries, the mine and UXO threat has been caused by years
of warfare, resulting in an indigenous body of knowledge of the general location of
minefields and their impact. In Kosovo, however, the overwhelming majority of the
mine and UXO contamination occurred over a period of only a few months with most
of the population displaced, either internally within the province or across
neighbouring international borders. As a result, the principal source for information
on mines and mine impact shifted from local inhabitants to external actors, especially
NATO and mine action organisations and bodies.
In Kosovo, the mine and UXO threat comprises blast anti-tank mines, blast, bounding,
directional and fragmentation anti-personnel mines, cluster bomb munitions (CBU),
and other unexploded ordnance. By 2000, seven varieties of anti-personnel mines and
eight types of anti-tank mines had been identified. A number of locally-fabricated
explosive items combining mines or ignition systems with conventionally-configured
explosive charges were also discovered.
The landmine threat comes largely from minefields laid by the Yugoslav Army,
Yugoslav Police, and other paramilitary forces. Minefields were typically laid as
border minefields, as large defensive minefields in the interior of Kosovo, and around
avenues of approach (roads, trails). The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) also laid
minefields. Nuisance mines or improvised explosive devices were also laid in and
around houses, schools, villages, paths, and the like. There were two incidents where
new mines were laid against members of the Serb community in villages outside
Pristina. Three people were killed in these incidents.
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The bulk of the UXO threat to civilians results from unexploded NATO cluster
bomblets. Three different types have been found in the province. CBU strikes were
typically targeted against military units and encampments, facilities and
strategic infrastructure. There is also a significant number of other conventional UXO
ranging from small arms ammunition and grenades to mortar and artillery shells and
bombs.
History of mine action in Kosovo
The speed and size of the deployment of a wide range of mine action resources to the
province of Kosovo are unprecedented in the history of humanitarian demining. In
contrast to many other mine-affected regions, where years of mine laying and UXO
contamination demand the commitment of mine action resources for decades, it is
believed that only a few years will be needed to clear Kosovo of its mine and UXO
threat.
Following the end of NATO bombardments and the United Nationss entry into the
province, massive amounts of mine action capacity flowed into the region. Initially,
this came in the form of military engineer and EOD units but was soon followed by a
wide array of commercial and NGO mine action organisations. The ratio of clearance
resources to contamination is probably greater in Kosovo than in any other mine-
affected region in the world.
With the United Nations operating as the de facto government of the province, the
MACC, located within UNMIK, has atypical powers over the operation of mine action
in the province. This means that some of the lessons learned from the Kosovo experience
may not be easily transposable to other mine action contexts.
Mine survey
The extent of the mine/UXO threat in Kosovo is relatively well known. In fact, the
planning and analysis process suffers from an information glut but its use is hampered
by the quality of the data and the resulting impact on its analysis. As a consequence,
mine action faces two distinct yet interrelated challenges. First, detailed local surveys
need to be undertaken to eliminate false, duplicate and overlapping records from the
system: the MACC estimates that between 30 and 50 per cent of all the IMSMA database
entries fall into one of these three categories. Second, all records must be prioritised in
terms of clearance and mine awareness education. It was decided by the MACC that
a Landmine Impact Survey was not appropriate in Kosovo owing to the huge
concentration of resources within the province and the relatively short time needed to
clear mines and UXO. However, the MACC identified the need to base their future
plans on more than just mine location data, and as a result approved the concept of
the modified Landmine Impact Survey as outlined by the SAC.
For Kosovo, IMSMA imported all records of minefields, UXO and CBU strikes as
danger areas.1 Each record was automatically assigned a number, based on its date of
1 Under normal procedures of a sequential Landmine Impact Survey, (Level Two) Technical Survey and
(Level Three) Clearance Certification, suspected mined areas would be entered as mined areas. Danger
areas were intended to denote other dangers such as collapsed bridges, banditry, ambush sites, etc. The
standard Landmine Impact Survey ties mined areas to villages and towns surveyed. Without the town/
village survey, there was no way of entering the records as mined areas and so all records were entered
as danger areas.
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entry into the IMSMA. Upwards of seven separate data sets were combined to form
the IMSMA danger area data set. The data for these records came from multiple sources
and the approximately 4,000 records are of varying reliability.
Yugoslav Army records are the most accurate of available data sources, however the
physical representation of these records is based on arbitrary safety buffers or polygons
generally reflecting a grouping of smaller minefields. These records consist of paper
drawings of minefield plans completed by the Yugoslav Army mine laying unit and
which were handed over to the United Nations Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) in
accordance with the Military Technical Agreement. KFOR also provided GIS layers
of polygons and map points based on the co-ordinates of the centre of mass of the
minefield. These two types of documents, though, do not always coincide. In addition,
some rather less accurate maps were provided of minefields laid by the Yugoslav
Police, paramilitary forces and reservists. Although a large number of these records
have been entered into the IMSMA, the process is time consuming.
NATO records imported from KFOR include two main types  cluster bomb strikes
and all others:
Ø Cluster bomb data is based on point target data (i.e., the intended target) and not
the actual point of impact. The actual pattern of contamination is dependent on
factors such as altitude of the drop, speed of the aircraft and the vector or direction of
attack. The pattern of contamination should generally be an ellipse 300m wide by
500m long, and oriented to the direction of travel of the aircraft. NATO has only released
the number of CBUs dropped and the targeting co-ordinates.2 Hence data in IMSMA
does not necessarily represent the actual contaminated area on the ground. The official
estimated failure rate for the bomblets varies from 5 to 10 per cent depending on the
source. Clearance of cluster strike areas involves locating and destroying in situ the
unexploded sub-munitions. Minefield clearance assets are not used for CBU clearance,
which is achieved through battlefield area clearance (BAC) for items of surface and
sub-surface UXO.
Ø All other NATO records include minefield, UXO and other reports that were collected
by NATO or reported to it in June and July 1999 prior to the MACC taking over
management of the IMSMA database. In January 2000, when the case study was
originally drafted, KFOR was entering its third troop rotation. The resulting loss of
institutional memory between rotations has made it more difficult to find out why certain
records were originally entered as well as to determine the status of areas reported
cleared. Also problematic is the limited reporting of independent clearance by KFOR
contingents. In many cases, KFOR troops have cleared areas independent of a tasking
by the MACC, resulting in many danger area records remaining in the system even
though the areas are in fact clear.
2 After the original submission of the case study, NATO provided additional information regarding the
use of cluster bombs and the location of cluster bomblets.
The HALO Trust, a British mine clearance NGO, undertook a rapid survey of mine
and UXO contamination in June and July 1999, using portions of the IMSMA Landmine
Impact Survey format. These records were entered into IMSMA without cross
verification with other records. The limited socio-economic data collected was of
negligible value. This was due to the fact that many refugees were still in the process
of returning at that time and so the information was too incomplete to provide a sound
basis for planning.
Other reports include information provided by NGOs, returning civilians, and older
records from the 1998-1999 Kosovo Verification Mission/Kosovo Disengagement
Observer Mission. Few, if any, of these records were verified prior to entry into the
IMSMA database. It was completely impractical to do this given the emergency nature
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of the programme, and a conscious decision was made to err on the side of caution,
rather than withhold information that could potentially save peoples lives.
Most of the above-mentioned records were imported wholesale into IMSMA in July
and August 1999. Others were progressively consolidated into IMSMA from August
to November 1999. A difficulty faced when entering and/or verifying records has
been the imprecision in recording danger areas. Reasons range from a standard Global
Positioning System (GPS) error of ±100m to individual map reading errors by the
observer/recorder. IMSMA plots each entry as a separate record, yielding a GIS layer
of multiple overlapping contaminated zones. It is suspected that many of these records
are duplicates or false reports (MACC estimates these to be 30-50 per cent of the total),
and they are often referring to the same area but are offset by 10-100 metres dependent
on observer position reporting error.3 Using GIS functions the SAC estimated the total
mine/UXO contamination problem in Kosovo as covering some 360.97 square
kilometres. On the basis of a 30-50 per cent rate of duplication and false records,
particularly cluster strike areas which heavily overlap, the physical area within Kosovo
to be cleared will be substantially lower than the estimated composite contaminated
area.
Mine marking and fencing
International mine clearance NGOs and companies began minefield and UXO fencing
and marking during the second half of 1999, while KFOR concentrated on the fencing
and marking of CBU strike areas. KFOR has also been a principal procurer of marking
and fencing stores received and managed by the MACC.
Most of the larger NGOs have their own marking stores and signs and limited marking
and fencing maintenance occurred over the winter of 1999-2000. Since colours and
patterns vary quite widely, samples are collected for distribution to mine awareness
educators. Initial problems were encountered with mine signs being removed or
defaced due to the use of Cyrillic Serb lettering. An attempt was made to correct this
during the winter 1999-2000 with the procurement of signs using English, Albanian
and romanised Serbian. But as of February 2000 not all the signs had been removed,
although some ethnic Albanian mine awareness teams were crossing out the Serb
phrases and words.
Mine clearance
As mentioned above, the total estimated contaminated area in Kosovo is some 361
square kilometres. This represents 3.32 per cent of the total landmass of the province.
Clearance figures (as reported to the MACC) for the seven months to the beginning of
the 2000 operating season are summarised in Tables 1 and 2.
The clearance season in Kosovo runs from March to November. Freezing weather,
limited daylight, snow and ice all make sustained clearance during the winter
impractical. At the end of 1999 the MACC had accredited 17 mine/UXO clearance
organisations, including both humanitarian NGOs and commercial companies.  These
organisations have recruited and trained a total of 600 local deminers. The MACC
3 For example, some areas were cleared based on a tasking from the MACC of a specific record number.
The clearance report submitted to the MACC, which delineates the physical area cleared, does not
physically correspond to the co-ordinates of the suspected area record.
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expected the number of clearance organisations to reach 16 for the 2000 clearance
season. Mine clearance in Kosovo is undertaken by manual and mechanical means,
and by explosive detection dogs.
Table 2: Land cleared in square kilometres (does not include nuisance mines)
Estimated area Sq. Km. Per cent of total area
Total contaminated landa 361 100
Area physically clearedb 2.3 0.6
Area cleared by
  reconnaissancec 2.2 0.6
Area left to clear 355.5 98.8
a Includes estimated safety buffer zones.
b Does not include safety buffer zones.
c Includes estimated safety buffer zones.
Source: UNMIK-MACC, 2000a. These figures do not include clearance by KFOR.
4 A total of 16,111 as at February 2000.
Table 1: Explosive items cleared as at 1 February 2000
UXO Cluster Anti-personnel Anti-tank
bomblets mines mines
8,475 2,743 2,430 2,319
Source: UNMIK-MACC, 2000a. These figures do not include clearance by
KFOR.
While 1999 clearance progress was slow, the MACC expected to make significant
progress in 2000. It is expected that very significant gains will take place through a
concentrated survey effort aimed at eliminating false and duplicate records. Indeed,
it is conceivable that the estimated composite contaminated area of 361 square
kilometres could be reduced to an area of not more than 240 square kilometres once
these records have been eliminated. Thus, with a sustained commitment of resources,
the MACC believes that Kosovo can be cleared within two to three years.
During the chaotic period following the international communitys entry into Kosovo,
mine/UXO clearance efforts focused mainly on responding to requests from relief
and reconstruction agencies and the civilian population. This approach was not the
best application of resources from a strictly mine clearance perspective, but proved to
be the only option given the high visibility of large concurrent relief and resettlement
activities and the mine action communitys lack of a definitive provincial workplan
prioritising danger areas for clearance.
The largest of these requests involved surveying and clearing 776 schools for the United
Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) and the ongoing clearance of access routes for the
repair of electrical power distribution pylons for donor-funded contract firms. Many
additional tasks resulted from requests from civilians to clear suspected mines/UXO
from more than 16,000 houses and gardens.4 In fact, these additional tasks, which
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were not linked to a specific danger area, often did not require actual clearance (other
than of a few items of UXO) and served more as a confidence-building measure. These
requests can, in part at least, be attributed to improved public knowledge by the mine
awareness programmes in the refugee camps prior to return.
NATO military resources have also contributed to clearance efforts. Although KFOR
is officially mandated only to clear those mines and UXO that obstruct its mission,
KFOR EOD personnel also responded to requests for the clearance of other mines and
UXO. From June to December 1999 KFOR cleared most primary and secondary roads
as part of their mission; additional road clearance was undertaken as required.
Initially, a critical constraint on the clearance effort was the lack of available explosives
to destroy the mines and UXO. Mine/UXO clearance organisations were prevented
from procuring or transporting explosives into Kosovo. Some organisations resorted
to dismantling mines for the explosives. After much hesitation and donor government
negotiation, some KFOR contingents agreed to store and sell explosives to MACC
accredited mine/UXO clearance organisations.
A second major constraint on mine clearance was the lack of sufficient quality assurance
capacity. Recognised as a MACC function, the funding and contracting arrangements
took some time to arrange and a fully-functioning quality assurance capacity was not
due to be deployed until March 2000. This does not include post-clearance verification
of land use.
The Yugoslav Army has committed to provide mine clearance assets under the
supervision of KFOR to clear those areas they had previously identified. Under the
Military Technical Agreement signed with NATO, KLA certified by memorandum
that they had cleared their minefields. No records were provided by the KLA
regarding the actual locations, hence neither confirmation nor quality assurance was
possible.
A number of individuals have also cleared mines and UXO. The more successful of
these confirm that they have turned over the removed ordnance and mines to KFOR.
The less successful have probably contributed to the large number of casualties in the
category of males aged 15 to 24. Mine awareness education programmes have included
the message that any discovered mine or UXO be reported to KFOR, mine clearance
organisations or to the KFOR Civil Military Cooperation Center.
Mine victim assistance
Between June 1999 and January 2000 there were some 235 mine/UXO incidents in
which 92 persons died and others sustained injuries ranging from minor wounds to
traumatic loss of limbs. Table 3 below shows the monthly counts of incidents. Victim
assistance is tracked through two complementary processes. The IMSMA includes a
comprehensive victim and incident recording system that allows such data to be
overlaid on maps showing geographic features and contaminated areas. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) assists the MACC in this process.
The ICRC has made a conscious effort to track down all surviving victims and families.
the World Health Organization (WHO), ICRC and health NGOs also maintain a
casualty surveillance system based on reporting from health facilities.
Appendixes106
There are, however, a number of remaining gaps in the data set with many victim
records devoid of any clarifying details.5 Concerns have also been expressed as to the
quality of the data gathering and entry process. The US Centers for Disease Control
have provided assistance to WHO and ICRC on improving the data collection and
analysis process. About the only conclusion that could be drawn for the available
data was that males between the ages of 15 and 24 appeared to have the highest
frequency of being involved in a mine/UXO incident. Analysis performed by the SAC
using GIS algorithms and statistical regression drew a positive and significant
correlation between the frequency of victims and the overall contamination rate of
the district in which the incident occurred. Table 3 shows the absolute number of
incidents by month of occurrence and qualified by the time frames for major population
movement.
Table 3: Recorded Mine Incidents (1999-2000)
Refugees returned June 87
July 69







The victim assistance community in Kosovo acknowledges the near complete lack of
social and health support service for victims and their families. The lead agency for
victim assistance is WHO. Along with the ICRC and a number of NGO partners such
as Handicap International and the Mother Theresa Society, WHO is developing the
means to provide comprehensive medical and rehabilitation care to mine victims.
However this will take some time, as much of the public health system and services
had deteriorated over a number of years and will require considerable effort to be
upgraded.
In order to address these shortfalls, Handicap International has established a prosthetic
production facility. KFOR provides evacuation by ambulance and helicopter to
facilities in Kosovo or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as body
recovery. In addition, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) has
embarked on victim assistance programmes aiming to provide psycho-social services
to help victims and family members identify needs and seek additional help. The
programme also assists in the reintegration of victims into educational and economic
activities. The MACC has recognised its own need for victim assistance analysis and
co-ordination capacity.
Mine awareness education
ICRC, UNICEF and MAG undertook mine awareness education in refugee camps in
Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The efforts resulted in people being aware of
the danger posed by mines and UXO in areas to which they would be returning. This
5 A complete survey of mine victims has now been completed for the MACC by VVAF to address concerns
surrounding victim data.
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was borne out by the heavy demand on house clearance by returning Kosovo
Albanians, whether or not there was actually any danger present.
In 2000 mine awareness education in Kosovo was carried out by 17 organisations as
well as KFOR. There is some overlap between mine clearance and mine awareness
organisations. The MACC co-ordinates and accredits organisations to work in Kosovo
and exercises a mandatory review and certification of all MAE materials to be used.
The main mine awareness programmes that are being implemented are community-
based activities which include the Safer Village6 concept and the child-to-child
programme, which is supported by an EOD team to undertake immediate UXO
clearance tasks along with the identification and marking of child safe areas. The
Safer Village concept looks at the specific needs of a village and tries to provide an
alternative solution to risk-taking behaviour. The child-to-child programme (at least
as it is implemented in Kosovo) focuses on the child as a trainer of other children and
parents in the home using traditional games and activities. Already there have been
occasions when children have used the information passed to them during the child-
to-child training to report cluster bombs and UXO to a responsible adult/community
member or KFOR representative.
Summary of future mine action needs in Kosovo
In its 1999 Donor Conference report, the MACC identified the need for specific
resources for the calendar year 2000. These include an Impact Survey and Technical
Survey capacity; responsive and programmed mine clearance capacity; cluster-
strike marking, survey and clearance; and EOD and mine awareness education
teams.
In addition to the benefits of area reduction as a precursor to mine clearance activities,
a Technical Survey capacity is an essential component of any mine action programme.
Invariably, a number of mined areas are not deemed to be an immediate priority for
clearance, yet still require some action to be taken. Presently there are approximately
2,000 reports of such areas within Kosovo. As an absolute minimum, mine awareness
education should be provided to the local community in these areas; a preferred option,
though, is to conduct a Technical Survey as well, which may or may not incorporate
area reduction. Technical Surveys have been used extensively in 2000 by teams
contracted by the MACC and have targeted small mined areas that do not warrant
deployment of full mine clearance teams.
The MACC objective to clear unexploded cluster bombs from the province as soon as
possible will continue during 2000. In April 2000, the approach to remove the threat
by destroying both the surface and sub-surface UXO in the priority areas was changed
to focus on instrument-assisted surface clearance in the first instance, with sub-surface
undertaken at a later date. The rationale behind this change was to quickly remove
the immediate hazards that were easily accessible to the local population. The exception
to this approach is when the land is to be used for agricultural purposes and is to be
ploughed  a sub-surface search is conducted in the first instance. Teams have been
identified to quickly follow on from KFOR survey and marking teams to ensure that
strike areas in close proximity to local populations are cleared expeditiously. Clearance
6 Safer Village is an ICRC term. However its general principles are replicated in the overall community
mine awareness programmes.
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teams tasked to clear CBUs are also capable of other types of BAC, which may be
necessary in some areas (e.g., around defensive positions where fighting took place).
Individual items of UXO such as bombs and grenades will continue to be discovered
throughout Kosovo for some time to come. As these items are reported, a responsive
EOD capability is required in order to maintain confidence and minimise risk to the
local population.  In some cases the EOD teams may form part of the integral capability
of mine or cluster clearance teams.  It is expected that EOD activities will continue in
Kosovo long after most traditional demining and battlefield area clearance has been
completed.
Actual areas of contamination as confirmed by reconnaissance or Technical Survey
require marking and fencing. As surveys further refine the actual areas contaminated,
marking and fencing will take on greater importance. To some extent, area reduction
and clearance will occur simultaneously.
In terms of victim assistance, it will be important to bolster the existing prosthetic
support capability and to introduce a basic psycho-social and advocacy support
network to assist with the reintegration of mine/UXO victims in the workforce or
school system. This should be co-ordinated through WHO, ICRC and various NGO
partners, in conjunction with the MACC.
Human, social, economic and environmental impact
and indicators
Overview of needs assessments
With the return of the international community to Kosovo in June 1999, most United
Nations agencies and NGOs began to carry out needs assessments. However, none of
these assessments directly addressed the impact of mines and UXO. In the light of the
wealth of information available, the SAC and the MACC agreed that there should be
a way to integrate these sector assessments with the MACCs abundant mine/UXO
data. The methodology used to accomplish this task is described later.
Analysis of the use of socio-economic indicators
The basis for the prioritisation methodology used by the SAC and the MACC links a
public safety/hazard analysis and Landmine Impact Survey based on geographically-
defined areas. It was reasoned that civilian populations go about their social and
economic activities in a geographic space. When parts of these socio-economic spaces
are denied, due to contamination by mines/UXO, normal activity exposes the
population to greater risk of death or injury. By selecting certain activities and defining
the physical boundaries as essential livelihood space it is then possible to identify
those contaminated areas that pose the greatest threat.
After generating a GIS model of the essential livelihood space it is possible to attach
values based on social and economic assistance programme priorities. International
relief and reconstruction assistance programmes determine project priorities based
on sector-specific criteria. Depending upon the focus of the given programme, these
sector priorities are usually assigned by town/village, municipality or geographic
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region. By compiling the sector priorities for relief and reconstruction resource
allocation, it would be possible to identify the relative geographic concentration of
such resources across all of Kosovo. It was reasoned that towns and villages in areas
with a heavy concentration of relief and reconstruction activities would have a higher
demand on mine action services.
Analysis of the views of the local population
Limited sampling of the views of the local population has occurred. Their concerns
are most visible in the self-reporting of suspect contaminated areas to KFOR and
requests for house clearance. The extensive mine awareness efforts have sensitised a
significant portion of the population to the danger presented by mines and UXO.
Agricultural assistance NGOs have also reported that many of their beneficiaries are
concerned about the potential contamination of their land, especially considering that
the policy was not to give resources to farmers with contaminated land. The local
population suspects areas to be contaminated if it was known that a Yugoslav military,
police or paramilitary force had been in the area.
Existing criteria for the prioritisation of mine action
Concept
The MACC required the ability to prioritise the handling of each danger area record
as well as establishing a relative impact measurement based on a social/administrative
unit. To accomplish this the MACC has addressed mine/UXO-contaminated areas
(IMSMA Danger Areas) in two separate ways. First, each record in IMSMA was given
a priority score for further survey and/or clearance. Hence, the prioritisation
mechanism would guide the reconnaissance process and the clearance process. Second,
in order to develop a relative measure of impact, total suspected contaminated land
needed to be estimated in a way that eliminated the double counting of duplicate and
overlapping areas. The process did not have to account for false and duplicate records
because the MACC was undertaking a deliberate confirmatory reconnaissance process
to eliminate these records and define what was actually contaminated. This process
would result in a cleaned data set of minefields under the IMSMA Technical Survey
format. The new data set would then provide the basis for 2001 work plans.
Drawing on interviews with MACC staff, other mine action organizations,
humanitarian NGOs and other United Nations agencies, SAC defined a concept of
essential livelihood space, where most social and economic activities would take
place. This same space would also be the location of most point-of-service specific
relief and reconstruction projects. As defined, the essential livelihood space comprised
the area within a 500-metre radius of a settlement and 200 metres either side of a road.
Added to this area analysis were agricultural land and wood foraging areas.
Agricultural land was drawn by hand in the GIS using satellite imagery. Wood foraging
areas were defined as those areas of dense vegetation that intersected the social space
buffer. As a total measure, the essential livelihood space equated to roughly 40 per
cent of the total landmass of Kosovo. It was initially envisaged that the sector priorities
would be spatially assigned to various nodes in this network. However, such priorities
had yet to be established by the responsible international authorities prior to the
completion of the analysis.
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Considerations
All minefields, cluster bomb strikes and other mine/UXO-contaminated areas were
imported into IMSMA using the danger area field. The danger area field was not
intended for the purpose of managing minefield/UXO clearance. In this regard,
IMSMA-managed danger area files only discriminate between cluster bomb strikes
and all others. MACC understands that all others includes false records, UXO and
mined areas. However, pending reconnaissance, no reliable information exists to
further break down the all other category. Dangerous area size data is generally not
reliable prior to confirmatory reconnaissance because polygons and circles were
assigned arbitrarily.7 Many records, notably cluster strikes,8 are overlapping and a
number of seemingly distinct records may actually relate to the same areas.
The first step in the process was to select only those records that fell within the borders
of Kosovo. Excluded records from the previous 12 months included those in Albania,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
areas of Serbia and Montenegro. This process yielded 518 CBU strikes and 1,408
minefield and UXO areas.
The second step in the process was to give an area to cluster strikes, which had only
been recorded as points. Given the lack of data the contaminated area required an
estimate. The IMSMA database had initially been set to give the CBU strike an area
based on a 300-metre radius circle. SAC considered this estimate inadequate given
the potential physical dimensions of the footprint and increased the area to a circle of
500-metre radius.
Similarly, incident reports and particularly data on incident locations were deemed
unreliable because they were incomplete or very imprecise. Population data is
available, but had to be patched together from different sources, and does not include
the numbers of internally displaced persons. These factors make for high levels of
statistical noise. It is expected that the validation of any scoring model will be weak
before the confirmatory reconnaissance process has been completed and has been
translated into IMSMA.
The priority scale
Based on data analysis, and discussions with MACC staff, mine/UXO clearance
organizations and mine/UXO awareness organisations, a scale was established. The
resulting scale used for scoring dangerous areas is a proximity scale modified with
land use variables. An additive form was chosen because the danger areas can overlap
a combination of the various elements  town buffer, road buffer, agricultural land,
wood foraging. Table 4 shows the arguments that enter into the score classification,
while Table 5 shows the resulting classification brackets.
Not all of the values are used for individual dangerous areas.  It should be noted that
zero does not mean free from contamination. Zero stands for a dangerous area
entirely contained in marginal land, notably mountains and forests outside agricultural
land.
7 In some cases the discovery of unexploded mortar rounds prompted the original collector to place a
300-metre radius circle as the danger area.
8 A notable example is the map depiction of a single cluster strike symbol, which when queried through
the GIS pulls up 15 separate strike records.
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Given the way the bounds were set, a dangerous area cannot become high priority
unless it intersects with a town buffer,9 and it cannot be medium priority unless it
intersects with a road buffer. The consequence is that dangerous areas in agricultural
land but not touching any buffer are all set to low priority. Given that the agricultural
land layer includes both cultivated land and pastureland, those danger areas
intersecting solely the agricultural land feature are most likely in remote pasturage.
The agricultural and wood foraging scores contribute to making finer graduations
within a priority group.
The scale was validated against two external criteria: potential to reduce incidents,
and priorities set by others. The latter relies on the siting of community mine/UXO
awareness education as decided by other organisations and their local staff. The scale
performs well on both.
Estimating district impact
The traditional Landmine Impact Survey uses the community as the unit of analysis.
However, community level data in Kosovo existed at less than 50 per cent coverage.
The next meaningful level where population data could be compiled for a near 100
per cent coverage was the district. Smaller than the municipality, the district provided
a useful administrative and geographic unit for comparative analysis.
SAC estimated the total contaminated area as a means of defining the Kosovo-wide
problem and as a tool for estimating relative levels of contamination among
municipality and district administrative units. The bases of the SAC summary were
the IMSMA tables for CBU strikes and danger areas that were completed on 28
November 1999. These tables are known as cluster and non-cluster respectively.
The ranking maps districts using the simple percentage of total area contaminated.
This measure was highly predictive for potential incidents. Categories could be formed
using different bounds. SAC chose to use a simple scheme based on the median value.
The median value identifies the middle value in a list of values. In this way the
gradations are not influenced by the extremes of high and low values. The median
value of contamination for 327 districts in Kosovo was 1.3 per cent. The proposed
scale is shown in Table 6.
Table 4: Weights for Danger Area Prioritisation
Argument Points added
Dangerous area intersects
  with town buffer 10.0
Intersects with road buffer 5.0
Intersects with agricultural land 2.0
Intersects with wood foraging area 1.5
Maximum 18.5
Table 5: Priority Score Brackets
Priority Score bracket
Low 0 - 3.5
Medium 3.6  9.9
High 10 - 18.5
9 According to the SAC, the term town and village are used interchangeably with regard to the prioritisation
process.
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The resulting ranking of districts by mine impact severity, or mine hazard strength,
while immediately useful for prioritising mine/UXO awareness activities is of limited
practical use as a tool for mine/UXO clearance. If sector rehabilitation plans become
firmer and more clearly defined in spatial terms, closer integration can be achieved
by means of the district classification.
Assessment of the role of socio-economic indicators
in planning
Data collection, reliability, availability, suitability and completeness are major
constraints. Many data sets collected by outside institutions, including other United
Nations agencies, were available but not easily joined on a common reference. These
problems required significant manual manipulation of spreadsheet-formatted data
sets. To this end the MACC initiated a number of inter-agency meetings aimed at
rectifying data standards. It was foreseen that a survey relying on other organizations
data would increase the vulnerability of the analysis to the failure or tardiness of
others to produce basic data. Indeed, securing the basic data was an effort requiring
much persuasive diplomacy. Once acquired, the data underwent significant cleaning
and rearranging and processed through advanced linking, querying and analysis
outside of IMSMA using GIS algorithms. But as a result of the various constraints, the
analysis was greatly reduced in scale using fewer variables.
Although the methodology described above provided for the incorporation of socio-
economic data, such provision was premised on the reconstruction and development
community having well-defined and geographically-prioritised programmes. At the
time SAC was developing the methodology, neither the lead sector agencies, nor the
European Commission, nor UNMIKs Civil Administration had developed such
priorities. Of the main social and economic reconstruction sectors (health, education,
agriculture, water, public utilities and resettlement), only agriculture had come close
to a priority scheme.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) set the initial agricultural assistance
priorities based on a relative ranking of municipalities using the 1999 harvest as a
percentage of the 1997 harvest. However, with one sector available, incorporating
only the agricultural priorities would have skewed the overall mine/UXO clearance
Table 6: Scale of district contamination impact
Degree of Definition Number of districts District area as
contamination per cent of total
Kosovo area
No contamination Zero, for no
contamination 99 25.01
Low Up to the median
(0-1.3%) 65 23.14
Medium Between 1 and 5
medians (1.3%-6.5%) 92 31.28
High Greater than 5
medians (6.5%-29.8%) 71 20.49
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prioritisation towards agricultural needs only. As the MACC planning process was
drawing to an end, the FAO brought in a consultant to undertake a more in-depth
socio-economic impact study of the agricultural sector. The MACC provided FAO
copies of the GIS map layers of composite contaminated land, agricultural land use as
well as the district administrative units with population estimates. With these tools, it
is hoped that FAOs new priorities will be easily joined with mine impact area analysis
for establishing priorities.
Although the education and health sectors had maintained master lists of facilities by
location, these lists were not prioritised for funding but simply maintained for would-
be donors on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, the locations of the facilities were rife with
spelling errors and freely used either Albanian or Serbian names. Sorting out these
lists would have taken a significant amount of time and effort. Public utilities planning
was even more haphazard. Projects were initiated with little or no notice and tended
to depend on donor government decisions on funding. As an example, MACC support
for clearing access to electrical power transmission pylons and sub-stations was
conducted without a master plan ever being assembled by the co-ordinating bodies.
Consequently, some mine clearance actions were not matched by the appropriate inputs
from other sectors and overall rehabilitative efforts were not achieved or were delayed.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had
promoted a logical system of positional codes for populated places in Kosovo. KFOR,
the World Food Programme (WFP), FAO, UNMIK civilian police, and the MACC
adopted the system. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe had
also adopted the system and were looking to expand the detail coverage to be sufficient
for civil registration and elections planning. Of particular note, there was little to no
inter-agency sharing of critical population information. Indeed, a local population
estimate at a level below the municipality only existed as a result of the SAC manually
compiling population estimates from WFP, UNHCR, and the European Commission
International Monitoring Group. SAC distributed the products of its analysis, including
the only GIS map of agricultural land, to all organisations. By distributing this data
the SAC sought to encourage other sectors to use the smaller and more useful
geographic unit as the basis for planning and prioritisation.
Without the relevant sector rehabilitation priorities the prioritisation analysis is
essentially an accident hazard analysis, not a socio-economic impact analysis. If sector
rehabilitation plans become firmer and spatially more clearly defined, district
classification can be used to bring about greater integration with those efforts. If this
occurs, the concept of the essential livelihood space, and the ranking of districts by
degree of buffer contamination, will also become more relevant. Since SAC made the
district GIS files and population tables available to other lead sector agencies, such an
outcome may not be too far off.
Existing criteria for measuring the benefits of
mine action
The immediate objectives of mine action are to save lives and restore livelihoods. In
this regard, the dramatic drop in mine incidents from June1999 to January 2000 can in
part be attributed to effective mine awareness education in refugee camps and through
a learning function taking place in communities of refugees repatriated to Kosovo. It
may also be attributable in part to the onset of winter. If, as seems to happen, incidents
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rise along with warmer weather, then these incidents should be analysed separately
from the 1999 caseload for risky behaviour patterns. The priority clearance plan
incorporates the public safety/hazard reduction concept.
By prioritising clearance areas close to essential livelihood space, it is hoped that
measuring the areas cleared will have a direct relationship to removing barriers to
economic and social development. Also, such work can be used to establish links to
other rehabilitative activities to ensure that all required inputs are available to support
land once it has been cleared. Integration allows for prioritisation and synchronisation
of inputs, leading to overall cost savings and optimum outputs.
Other than these factors, the major objective of mine action programmes for 2000 is to
reduce suspected areas of contamination into a discreet set of known contaminated
areas, then mark and fence them.
The funding picture
It appears that donors committed more than US$28 million in 1999, with another US$32
million or more in 2000. These figures do not reflect the very significant contributions
made to mine clearance and mine awareness activities by various contingents within
KFOR (e.g., clearance of major and secondary roads). KFOR will continue to assist,
including surveying and marking of cluster bomb sites and monitoring the clearance,
by the Yugoslav army, of the minefields they laid.
The funds provided and committed appear to meet, or perhaps exceed, MACCs
estimate of US$30 million required from January 2000 to December 200110 (plus US$4.5
million for operating expenditures, apparently to cover local expenses for the Kosovo
Protection Corps, the local organisation that will assume responsibility for mine
action).11
Existing integration within development initiatives
The Kosovo Provincial Works Plan allows for integration with development work.
However, at the time of plan formulation no development or reconstruction sectors
had a well-defined prioritisation plan. When such plans become available, the MACC
will be able to integrate these priorities into the mine/UXO clearance priority scheme.
The structure established for mine action prioritisation is based on a strong spatial
analysis. Given that relief, reconstruction and development programmes physically
locate their project activities in a known location, the system can accommodate these
priorities and perhaps anticipate them.
Except for the agricultural sector, no sector had a spatially-defined mechanism for
establishing programme priorities. Although the United Nations Humanitarian
Community Information Center had been funded and provided with GIS software
and computer equipment, this resource was not used to its full potential. Many agencies
acknowledge that spatial planning units exist, such as health facility catchment areas
and school districts. But most sector planning does not seem to have used any spatial
10 EU and  World Bank, 1999:94.
11 UNMIK, 1999:9. The total budget for the Corps in 2000 is DEM 20.7, with about 52 per cent going to
wages and the rest to goods and services.
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Table 7. Funding for Demining in Kosovo 1999-2000a (in US dollars)
Mine Action Function/ 1999 2000
Organisation Amount Funding agency Amount Funding agency
CLEARANCEb (FIRMS)
 BacTec 1,129,034 UK  1,936,000 UK
 Defense Systems Limited  2,206,601 UK 4,307,782 UK
 EMERCOM Demining ? Switzerland ? Switzerland
 European Landmine Solutions ? ?  3,520,000 UK
 Gerbera ? ? ? ?
 Greenfields  1,601,227 UK ? ?
 International Demining
 Alliance Canada  $868,170 Canada  1,884,400 Canada
 MECHEM ? ? ? ?
 Mine Clear ? ? ? EU
 MineTech 201,900 Canada ? ?
? UNHCR, EU, Belgium ? ?
 RONCO ? US ? US
Wolfs Flat/CIDC 355,344 Canada ? ?
CLEARANCEb  (NGOS)
 HALO Trust 2,986,080 UK 889,020 Denmark
350,000 Switzerland  800,000 UK
185,000 Germany  350,000 Switzerland
460,000 Ireland ? Ireland
460,000 Netherlands, AAR ? AAR (Japan), Czech
? (Japan), Pro Victimis, Republic, US
Czech Republic, US
 Handicap International  500,000 Switzerland  133,300 Switzerland
160,000 France  50,000 Luxembourg
240,000 EU (ECHO) 460,000 EU (ECHO)
 HELP UDT  240,000 Germany  300,000 Germany
? US ? US
 InterSOS ? Italy 360,000 EU (ECHO)
 Mines Advisory Group  554,852 UK  413,585 UK
? World Vision $350,000 EU (ECHO), World
Vision
 Norwegian Peoples Aid  3,125,000 Norway  2,272,727 Norway
1,800,000 Finland  1,200,000 Finland
 Potsdam Kommunikation  360,000 Germany  300,000 Germany
 Swiss Fed for Mine Clearance ? ?  387,000 Switzerland
CLEARANCE  OTHER
 UNHCR  1,500,000 Japan ? ?
 To various recipients  7,102,250 US
 UNMAS/KMACC/ITFSC  5,270,431 Belgium, Canada, 4,630,229 Australia, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, New
Germany, Luxembourg, Zealand,  San Marino,





and Relief Agency ? ? ? ?
 Aid Without Borders ? ? ? ?
 Balkan Sunflowers ? ? ? ?
 CARITAS ? ? ? ?
 Danish Church Aid  1,511,346  Denmark  697,085  Denmark
 International Committee of
the Red Cross ? ? ? ?
 Islamic Relief World Wide ? EU ? EU
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Mine Action Function/ 1999 2000
Organisation Amount Funding agency Amount Funding agency
 Mines Awareness Trust ? ? ? ?
 Save the Children ? UNICEF ? UNICEF
 UNICEF ? ? ? ?
 Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation (VVAF) ? EU ? EU
VICTIM ASSISTANCE
 Association to Aid Refugees
(AAR-Japan)  383,333 Japan ? ?
 Queens University  $336,500 Canada ? ?
 WHO ? ? ? ?
 To various recipients 1,000,000 US
GRANT TOTALd (of which) More than 28 million More than 32.3
million
UNMAS-MACC-ITF 5.27 million 4.63 million
CLEARANCEb More than $19.3 million More than $27
million
MINE AWARENESS More than $2.65 million $700,000
VICTIM ASSISTANCE More than $720,000 ?
a Funds shown are commitments and do not necessarily reflect final expenditures incurred in the
year.
b Clearance includes integrated mine action and therefore may include some mine awareness
and victim assistance.
c There may be some double counting of funds going first through trust funds and then to a mine
action operator.
d Not including significant clearance and mine awareness activities undertaken by various
contingents of KFOR.
Sources: Mine Action Investments Database (<http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/mai/frameset.asp>);
ICBL, 2000.
or service area analysis. Estimating relative access to services and projecting future
needs would seem to be the most logical approach to allocating limited resources.
Requests by the MACC to have access to such information for incorporation into the
mine action planning process did not generate a useful level of data.
Recommendations
1. Relief, development and reconstruction programmes need to make a greater effort
at deliberate planning. Where possible these should include spatial measurements
for allocation of resources.
Mine/UXO clearance is a slow process at best. Concentrated reconstruction
requirements create competing political demands on priority of service. In Kosovo
little to no deliberate planning has occurred among development and reconstruction
organisations regarding defining sector problems and sequencing planned
interventions. More thorough inter-agency planning, which accounts for constraints
and sequencing requirements, can improve integration of mine action with
programmes addressing socio-economic factors.
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2. Common survey requirements should be consolidated in an inter-agency process to
reduce duplication of effort and promote a common data standard.
Socio-economic mine action analysis shares with other relief and development activities
a common requirement for good data. Current practice is for each organisation to
undertake its own surveys and analyses, frequently duplicating what other
organisations may have already collected. In a shift from this cycle, the MACC and
SAC showed that an information-sharing regime could work and deliver reliable
analysis.
3. Efforts should be made during emergency operations to look beyond narrow
organisational mandates and give attention to establishing and sharing data and
GIS resources useable to all.
Programmes in the relief and reconstruction environment do not operate in a vacuum.
All programmes, regardless of degree of specialisation are inter-dependent.
Understanding, acting on and integrating the explicit and implicit requirements
resulting from this interdependence can lead to greater programme coherence, inter-
agency co-operation and economies of scale.
4. Using information technology as a planning and management tool reaches well
beyond the mine action community.
The Kosovo Provincial Mine Action Works Plan demonstrated that IMSMA-based
analysis is a highly relevant tool for planning and co-ordinating mine action and that
an investment in information and analysis could make a major contribution to
coherence and credibility of operational programmes. A precedent has also been set
in using information technology to outline and predict how resources can be better
applied in mine action programmes.
5. Mine clearance tasks should be co-ordinated with other sector activities to ensure
that cleared land is put back to use.
It does no good to clear land that also requires other inputs such as seeds and tools,
building materials or power poles if such items are not available. Limited clearance
resources could be better employed until such time as all inputs are on hand. To do
this requires close co-ordination between agencies, an open sharing of data, and a
change of culture regarding the value of information.
6. Establishment of a clearing house for map and imagery products, as well as a
standard set of formats for sharing data, would be a resource valuable across sectors
and could lead to major improvements in synchronisation and co-ordination of relief/
rehabilitative activities.
The optimum allocation of mine action resources and greatest socio-economic benefits
from mine action will only occur when such activities are integrated with and maximise
the inputs provided by other rehabilitative activities. Such co-ordination is only
possible when there is some standard medium for communication of needs,
objectives and analysis. GIS technology, if applied correctly and appropriately
supported by a major institution such as the European Union, the United Nations, or
the World Bank, could form this medium. Ensuring that all agencies in any country
are working from the same map sets, data transfer standards, and imagery is a vital
first step.
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Appendix 2
Case study of the Lao
Peoples Democratic
Republic
Background on the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic
Bordered by Thailand, Myanmar, China, Vietnam and Cambodia, the Lao Peoples
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) is a landlocked country, 236,800 square kilometres in
size (slightly larger than Great Britain), and sparsely populated (5 million inhabitants,
or 21 per square kilometre). Most people reside in the Mekong River floodplain in the
west. Its eastern border with Vietnam is dominated by the Annam mountain chain
through which crossed the road network known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, made
famous during the Vietnam conflict as the route taken by North Vietnamese troops
into South Vietnam, and the site of saturation bombing by the United States of America
(US).
Lao PDR is classified as one of the least developed countries, with an average Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of about US$280 in 1999.1 In 1993, 46 per cent of the population
fell below the national poverty line, even though Lao PDR is reasonably egalitarian.2
In regional terms, the remote north and south-eastern parts of the country are poorest,
in part because infrastructure and public services are even more rudimentary than
elsewhere. In 1997 Lao PDR received US$71 per capita in official development
assistance, equivalent to 19.5 per cent of GNP.3
Public expenditure of social services is extremely modest: 1.3 per cent of GNP on
public health and 1.9 per cent of GNP on public education in 1996. This, coupled with
the countrys low-income level, is reflected in key social statistics. The average life
expectancy is a mere 51 years. Infant mortality stood at 98 per 1,000 live births in 1997,
while maternal mortality averaged 660 per 100,000 live births from 1990-97. Only 51
per cent of people have access to safe drinking water. Net enrolment rates in 1996
were only 18 per cent for secondary school and 72 per cent at the primary level, with
many students dropping out before they attain even basic literacy or numeracy.
1 In Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms it was about US$1,725.
2 In 1992 its Gini index (a measure of inequality) was 30.4  about the same as Canadas.
3 In addition, remittances from abroad amount to 11 per cent of average household income (Government
of Lao PDR, 1999c).
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Key social and economic features4
Poverty and the rice economy
Lao PDR is an extremely poor country. Malnutrition is prevalent, with 10 per cent of
the population acutely, and 47 per cent chronically, malnourished. The vast majority
of Lao households (88 per cent) engage in agriculture, and fully 77 per cent of all
households grow rice (Government of Lao PDR, 2000:2) far and away the most
important crop and food source.5 With an average per capita consumption of 582
grams per day, rice accounts for 25 per cent of household consumption by value, and
almost half of all food consumption (Government of Lao PDR, 1999a:3-4, 13).6 Lao
PDR truly has a rice economy.
Land tenure and holdings
Almost 97 per cent of agricultural lands are under owner-like tenure, giving most
households secure access to land (Government of Lao PDR,  2000:4). Land distribution
is reasonably equitable, but the average size of land holding is only 1.62 hectares,
including fallow and non-agricultural land (ibid.:3). Only a quarter of farmers use
chemical fertiliser or improved seeds, and only 20 per cent of land is irrigated, which
means yields per hectare are low (for rice, averaging 2.9 tons per hectare in 1998).
Many agricultural holdings are therefore too small to support the average household
of 6.5 persons or 5 consumption units.7 Almost half of all Lao households cite lack
of land or water control (irrigation for second cropping plus protection from drought
and flooding) as the main obstacles to earning higher incomes. 8 Accordingly, Lao
farmers spend about half their working hours on non-agricultural pursuits (hunting/
fishing, part-time employment, handicraft) to supplement incomes and consumption
(Government of Lao PDR, 1999b:24).
Ethnicity
Lao PDR is an ethnically diverse society, with the government recognizing 65 distinct
ethnic groups. Roughly 60 per cent are ethnic Lao: either Lau Loum (lowland Lao) or
Lao Thai, who retain more traditional culture. Some 34 per cent  mainly in the north
 are Lao Theung (upland Lao), who practise swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture
and hunting. The remainder are Lao Sung (high Lao) hill tribes, the largest of which
are the Hmong, some of whom were trained by the Central Intelligence Agency during
the Vietnam War. There are also significant numbers of ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese.
4 This section uses statistics from a variety of sources, including: Government of Lao PDR, 2000;
Government of Lao PDR (1999b); Government of Lao PDR (1999a and 1999b); and WFP (1999).
5 In Lao, the same word is used for food as for rice.
6 Lao households produce much of what they consume  94 per cent of agricultural households produce
mainly for their own consumption (Government of Lao PDR, 2000:3) Therefore expenditure data 
capturing only what is purchased  do not give a clear picture of well-being. The Lao expenditure and
consumption survey therefore uses the concept of consumption, valuing household production for own
consumption in the same way as if this had been purchased (Government of Lao PDR, 1999a:4)
7 Household numbers are converted to consumption units thus: First adult=1, other adults=0.9, children
7-15=0.7, children under 7=0.4.  This reflects that members share some expenses and that children need
less food than adults (Government of Lao PDR, 1999a: 40).
8 Only 3 per cent cited a shortage of jobs as their main obstacle (Government of Lao PDR, 1999a:36, Table
32).
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Tensions do exist among the various ethnic groups.9
Politics and decentralisation
The Pathet Lao (Land of Laos) resistance organisation was formed in 1950 to fight the
French colonial government. Following full independence in 1954, it formed the Lao
Peoples Revolutionary Party (LPRP) as its political arm, which briefly entered a
coalition government prior to a military coup in 1959. Armed struggle between the
Pathet Lao  based principally in the north-east bordering North Vietnam and the
government continued throughout the period of the Vietnam War, until in late-1975
the Pathet Lao assumed power and declared the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic.
Following a period of harsh accelerated socialism when many thousands were
imprisoned or sent to re-education camps, a series of economic and political reforms
started in 1979. The present constitution, passed in 1991, drew a distinction between
the LPRP and the government, and strengthened the role of the National Assembly.
However, almost all government members and senior public servants are members
of the LPRP. The military remains influential within the party and, through its Bolisat
Phatthana Khet Phoudoi  Import-Export Company, is active in the economy.
Central control over the provinces has traditionally been weak, owing in part to poor
transportation and communications links. Provincial administrations had almost
complete fiscal autonomy until a 1991 decree that all public revenues must be collected
by the national government and that provincial expenditures would be specified in
the national budget. Recent economic reforms may be working against centralisation.
The economic gap between the capital, Vientiane, and the provinces has grown because
most foreign investment has gone to the capital and, as international trade increases,
regions are becoming more integrated with China (north), Thailand (centre and south),
or Vietnam (north-east and west).
Lao PDR is not a signatory to the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel
Mines (otherwise known as the Ottawa Treaty), although the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs is co-ordinating a review of this position.
Development priorities
Economic reform
Initially the LPRP government introduced a centrally-planned economy, including
agricultural collectivisation, which was strongly opposed and resulted in stagnation
of the key agricultural sector. Tentative reforms were introduced in 1979, followed by
a shift to a market-oriented economy in late 1986 with the introduction of the New
Economic Mechanism. This featured a phased abandonment of collectivisation, coupled
with privatisation, fiscal and monetary reform, and liberalisation of both trade and
foreign investment. In July 1997 Lao PDR joined the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area, suggesting that further
strengthening of international links  both political and economic  is anticipated.
From the start of economic reform until the 1998 Asian financial crisis, economic growth
9 Many Hmong emigrated to the US following the 1975 takeover by the Pathet Lao. There are about
50,000 Hmong in the US, with perhaps 200,000 in Lao PDR.
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was strong (averaging 7 per cent from 1992-97) but volatile, due mainly to periodic
droughts affecting the dominant rice sector.
The impact of the Asian crisis
Growth in 1998 fell to 4 per cent, but this was buoyed by the huge subsistence
agricultural sector, which, lying outside the market economy, is only indirectly affected
by financial crisis. Annual inflation accelerated markedly to about 100 per cent in
1998, and may have reached 140 per cent in 1999. The fiscal deficit widened, forcing
the government to cut its investment programme. Lao PDR has failed to rebound
from the crisis as quickly as its neighbours, and both economic growth and government
finances remain weak. Because of difficulties raising tax revenues, the government
has resorted to financing some investment projects off budget by granting timber
concessions to parastatals. These are expected to provide US$30 million for public
investment projects in 1999-2000  equivalent to almost 60 per cent of total domestic
financing for public investment and nearly 20 per cent of government revenue from
other sources.
Current development priorities
In 1996 the National Assembly set eight priorities for development:
Ø Infrastructure development,
Ø Rural development,
Ø Increase of food production,
Ø Promotion of production of commodities,
Ø Reduction of slash and burn agricultural practices,
Ø Human resource development,
Ø Promotion of foreign economic relations,
Ø Development of services.
In practice, public investment expenditure has concentrated on economic infrastructure
 particularly road construction , which has absorbed perhaps half of all public
investment in recent years. This directly addresses the governments first development
priority, but is also critical for rural development and to increase food production by
allowing farmers better access to markets for their production and agricultural input
requirements (seeds, fertiliser, etc.), and to the incentive goods needed to attract
subsistence farmers into the market economy.
The government recently launched two major new investment programmes to promote
rural development and food production, and to reduce environmentally destructive
slash-and-burn agriculture. One is an expanded irrigation programme, for which it
has purchased thousands of pumps from neighbouring countries and India. Second is
a new rural development strategy based on larger focal centres, where it plans to
supply health clinics, schools, transportation, electricity and other public services in
sufficient quantity to attract voluntary resettlement by households now practising
slash-and-burn agriculture in communities too small and remote to warrant such public
services. Both programmes have attracted controversy. In the past, public-sponsored
irrigation schemes have suffered from lack of maintenance by government or water
users.10 Resettlement programmes are viewed with suspicion by donors and some
10 The importation of thousands of pumps also depleted scarce foreign exchange reserves.
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ethnic groups because of earlier forced resettlement measures, thought to be motivated
by politics or the desire for access to timber concessions in addition to the official
concern over environmentally-harmful agricultural practices.
Future prospects
The government has set an overall goal of graduating from the ranks of the least-
developed countries by 2020, and expects most growth to come from the market
economy. This could increase inequality. Accordingly, the new five-year development
plan for 2001-2006 is expected to focus significant public investment on poverty
reduction, including rural infrastructure investments to expand the reach of the market
economy and allow provision of basic public services beyond the Mekong corridor.
To grow fast enough to achieve this target within a generation, Lao PDR must attract
significant foreign finance from official and private sources. This in turn depends on
restoration of macro-economic stability. While the manufacturing and services sectors
can be expected to grow fastest, the vast majority of Lao PDR will continue to depend
on agriculture for the foreseeable future. Performance of the rice economy is therefore
critical for both food security and raising rural incomes sufficiently so farmers can
buy manufactured goods produced in the cities. Increased agricultural income is also
necessary to slow rural-urban migration, which could overwhelm the growth capacity
of the urban areas. Rural households therefore need access to more land or to improved
inputs (irrigation, fertiliser, high-yielding seeds, tractors, credit)or bothto increase
their production and incomes.
For the coming decade, the government foresees a dual agricultural economy
(Government of Lao PDR, 1999b). Farmers in the east-central part of the country, better
served by roads and with access to urban markets and Thailand, will increasingly
enter the market economy. They will use modern inputs to increase productivity per
hectare, then sell to the urban markets. Farmers in more remote regions, lacking ready
access to markets or modern inputs, will continue low-yield subsistence agricultural
practices. For them, enhanced well-being will chiefly depend on having access to
sufficient land to feed the household.
History of mine and unexploded ordnance
contamination
The independence war for Lao PDR began during the French colonial era, continued
against the Japanese during the Second World War and, subsequently, against the
French when they attempted to re-establish control over Indochina. Following the
defeat of the French in 1954, fighting continued between the Pathet Lao, based in the
north-eastern provinces of Phongsali and Houaphan, and the US-backed Royal Lao
government. The principal contested provincesLuang Phrabang bordering
Phongsali, and Xieng Khouang bordering Houaphanare heavily contaminated by
UXO and, in some areas, landmines.
Lao PDR was also drawn into the wider Indochina conflict between the US and North
Vietnam. The US had heavily fortified the demilitarized zone dividing North and
South Vietnam, so the North Vietnamese Army developed a network of paths and
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roads through eastern and southern Lao PDR,11 allowing troops and supplies to skirt
the demilitarized zone. Starting in 1964, the US responded by saturation bombing of
this supply route, which it called the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This bombing, which continued
until 1973, was the most intense in history, reaching 900 sorties per day and averaging
the equivalent of one mission every eight minutes for nine years.12 Over two million
tons of ordnance was dropped on Lao PDR  equal to the combined total dropped by
all combatants during the Second World War. Some 10-30 per cent of this ordnance,
including millions of bomblets or bombies from cluster bombs, did not explode. In
addition, the North Vietnamese Army established munitions depots along the Ho
Chi Minh Trail, some of which were partially detonated by air strikes.
US and South Vietnamese troops also invaded eastern Lao PDR to block the Trail. The
largest battle (called Lam Seun 719, in Savannakhet) reportedly involved 60,000 South
Vietnamese against 100,000 North Vietnamese Army troops, and lasted 42 days
before the South Vietnamese withdrew. Significant land battles also took place
between Pathet Lao and Royal Lao forces in the Southern provinces of Champassak
and Attapeu.
In addition to bombs, the US also dropped massive quantities of defoliants and
herbicides, including Agent Orange. Studies have confirmed that the use of these
chemicals resulted in significant dioxin contamination in nearby western Vietnam,
but a study for Lao PDR is only in the planning stages (Hatfield Consultants, 2000).
Impacts13
The civilian population
The civilian population, and particularly those living in the north-east, east, central,
and south-east regions, was profoundly affected by the prolonged conflict. In addition
to those killed, thousands abandoned their villages and farms in the war zones 
some to live in caves for protection. Combatants also resettled communities by force.
Following the Pathet Lao victory in 1975, hundreds of thousands of Lao who were
affiliated with the Royal Lao government or directly with the US fled the country for
refugee camps in Thailand or permanent residency abroad, mainly in the US. However,
most of those internally displaced by the war returned to re-establish their farms and
communities, and encountered massive UXO contamination. There is no clear
documentation concerning casualties and adaptive measures taken during this initial
period of spontaneous resettlement. It was not until June 1996  21 years after
hostilities ended  that HI undertook a broad survey of the impact of UXO
contamination on behalf of UXO LAO, the government agency established to co-
ordinate mine and UXO programmes. In brief, the surveys findings were:
Ø Over 2,800 villages, or 25 per cent of all communities in 15 of the 18 provinces/
special zones in Lao PDR, reported the continued presence of UXO, while 214
villages reported landmines;
Ø Almost 1,325 villages reported UXO in the village or along roads or paths to fields
or other communities;
11 From north to south, the Trail ran through Bolikhamsai, Khammuane, Savannakhet, Saravane, Sekong,
and Attapeu provinces.
12 The US flew 580,344 bombing missions over Lao PDR between 1964 and 1973.
13 This section draws on HI (1997a).
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Ø Almost 12,000 UXO-related accidents were reported, with accident rates peaking
at about 1,400/year in 1974 as people returned to their homes and fields. Casualty
rates fell to an average of 360 per year from 1977-1986, then 240 per year for the
following decade;
Ø Slightly more than half the victims died, with most others suffering amputation
(31 per cent), paralysis (6 per cent), or blindness (4 per cent);
Ø 31 per cent of all victims were children (mostly boys);
Ø Almost one third of accidents occurred within the village, with a similar number
occurring in rice fields;
Ø A significant, but falling, percentage of accidents arose when men were purposely
handling UXO, often attempting to dismantle them for scrap metal (for sale to
Vietnamese metal traders) or explosives (for use in fishing or clearing stumps);
Ø Accidents peak at the end of the dry season (March-May) when farmers are
ploughing lowland rice fields or, in upland areas, clearing new fields by slash-
and-burn.14
The overall picture is a familiar one, with a high rate of casualties during the initial
return to villages abandoned during the conflict, followed by a slow decline in accidents
as those in affected communities adapt to the contamination. Risk-taking behaviour,
as extremely poor people attempt to capitalise on the UXO resource, also resulted
in many casualties in the early years of contamination. A significant number of villages
have had to relocate due to mine contamination.
Community adaptations to UXO contamination involve difficult choices between
curtailing economic or social activities and risking death or injury from UXO. In Lao
PDR, many households could mobilise sufficient labour to expand their rice fields,
but choose not to do so because clearing new land is too dangerous. Swidden farmers
also reduce the land used because of fear of contamination. This implies a change in
cropping patterns, returning to use lands after, say, five years fallow rather than ten,
and thus reduced yields as the land would not have regained full fertility. In Lao
PDR, such adaptations would mean that some households would accept seasonal or
chronic malnutrition as the cost of reducing risks associated with UXO.
Those in affected communities would still experience heightened insecurity. Building
a cooking fire while working rice fields could cause buried UXO to explode. Accidents
still take place while hunting, fishing, herding livestock, or simply visiting the
neighbouring community. More than 100 UXO accidents are still reported to authorities
each year, implying a continuing rate of perhaps 200 accidents a year because many
remote communities do not report.
Environmental impact
The most obvious environmental issue relates to the reduction in land used by swidden
farming households in contaminated areas. This could either reduce or increase the
environmental harm caused by extensive slash-and-burn practices. The total area
exploited by slash-and-burn would be reduced, but the land used would be subject to
more intense exploitation. Whether more or less harm is done would depend on the
14 More accidents have been reported in upland farms than in the lowland areas. Upland farmers burn
their fields before planting, sometimes causing ordnance to explode from the fire.
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micro-climatic, soil, and vegetation conditions, and whether land constraints cause
swidden farmers to convert more quickly to permanent cultivation.
Recent studies in Western Vietnam have found high levels of dioxina potent
carcinogenin areas sprayed with Agent Orange during the Vietnam War (Hatfield
Consultants, 2000). There have been unusually high rates of birth defects and wasting
diseases in the affected communities, and epidemiological studies are trying to confirm
whether these are the result of dioxin contamination. The researchers have also found
high levels of dioxin in the food chain; particularly duck liver and fish raised by
aquaculture. Agent Orange was also sprayed extensively in parts of eastern Lao PDR,
but similar studies have not yet started.
Explosives from harvested UXO are used for fishing, causing significant damage.
Public investments/Development projects
Many rural development projects have been adversely affected by UXO contamination,
including those supported by international NGOs. Problems with UXO led to the
initial humanitarian demining programme in Lao PDR, established in Xieng Khouang
in 1994 by the Mennonite Central Committee and MAG. Action contre la Faim has
reported numerous problems with UXO in the villages it works with in Sekong and
Champassak. Oxfam has reportedly paid for villages to hire bulldozers from
commercial firms to clear new fields for cultivation in Saravane.
The major aid agencies are aware of the UXO contamination and, in general terms,
recognise it as a broad development problem.15 Some larger aid-financed infrastructure
projects (road and bridge construction, dams for hydro-electricity) have been affected
by UXO contamination. In some cases, explicit provision for UXO/mine clearance
has been made during the planning phase of the project, while in others UXO was
discovered only during the construction phase. The study team did not hear any cases
in which donor-financed projects were cancelled because UXO contamination would
increase costs enough to make the project non-viable.16 However, some government-
financed projects have, reportedly, been cancelled or delayed due to high costs of
UXO clearance.
Broader impact
There has been very little mention of UXO as a general problem in official development
planning or strategy documents. There is no mention in the current five-year
development plan, adopted in 1996. The 1999-2000 Socio-Economic Plan, approved in
October 1999, has but one sentence (on the need to train UXO personnel) in 34 pages
of text. Given the scale of UXO contamination, this omission seems curious.
15 The World Bank has noted that UXO contamination adversely affects all rural development projects in
at least two ways. First, it means that potentially rich agricultural land is unexploited, reducing rural
prosperity and, thereby, the potential benefits accruing from rural development projects such as irrigation
schemes and feeder roads. Second, UXO clearance and destruction raises the costs of rural infrastructure
projects (World Bank, 1997:8). The Bank has not, however, attempted to quantify these impacts in formal
cost-benefit terms.
16  However, budget provisions for UXO survey and clearance in some cases seemed low, with these costs
allocated to local financing (i.e., a Government of Lao PDR responsibility). This suggests the budgets
for UXO clearance are based on rather cursory analysis.
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History of mine action in Lao PDR
Immediate post-war period
During the war, the Lao army cleared roads destroyed by bombing to maintain vital
transportation routes. Following the war, the army and Vietnamese advisers continued
clearance of roads, plus schools, wats (temples), and sites for new public buildings,
irrigation works, etc. They also cleared a small number of villages, mainly in the north.
The Chinese army did clearance in support of a Chinese-funded road construction
project and, in 1979-80, a Russian aid programme cleared some farmland in Xieng
Khouang. The Lao army is still used for clearance on large aid projects, mainly bridge
and road construction, when such clearance is to be financed by the government rather
than the donor.
Commercial demining companies are also present in Lao PDR, working mainly for
mineral exploration companies, refugee resettlement organisations, and donor-funded
infrastructure projects (roads, hydro-electricity). Milsearch, from Australia, undertook
its first contract in 1992, and has since worked on over 30 assignments across eight
provinces.17 GERBERA, a German company, also takes commercial assignments, as
well as undertaking humanitarian demining on behalf of the German aid programme.
Other demining companies have had contracts in Lao PDR, but do not maintain
permanent offices in the country.
Humanitarian mine action
Initial phase (1994-97)
The Mennonite Central Committee first brought the UXO problem to international
attention. It also initiated a community awareness programme and contacted MAG to
assist with UXO activities in Xieng Khouang. MAG assumed responsibility for
community awareness in May 1994 and began training Lao deminers. It initiated
clearance work in October of that year.
Subsequent discussions among the government, UNDP, UNICEF, and MAG led to
the establishment of the Lao PDR UXO Trust Fund in late 1995, followed in February
1996 by a decree18 establishing the Trust Fund Steering Committee and the Lao National
UXO Programme. UXO LAO is a national public institution with autonomous financial
status within the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare with responsibility for:
1. Co-ordination of UXO-related activities within the country, including the UXO
work implemented by other agencies;
2. Preparation of annual work plans and reports;
3. Managing the Training Centre;
4. Setting national standards;
5. Assisting the Steering Committee in resource mobilization for the Trust Fund.
Its goals are to:
Ø Reduce the number of civilian UXO casualties; and
17 In Lao PDR, Milsearch operates under a joint venture with the major army company.
18 Prime Ministers Decree 49/M.
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Ø Increase the amount of land available for food production and other development
activities.
One of UXO LAOs initial actions was to issue a request for proposals for a nation-
wide socio-economic survey to quantify the extent of mine/UXO contamination and
to establish priorities for clearance. This contract was awarded to HI in May 1996, and
undertaken in three phases: Preparatory (develop questionnaire, mobilize staff); Phase
1 (data collection at provincial and district levels); and Phase 2 (village-level survey).
Handicap International engaged local staff used in the 1995 National Census and used
the coding system developed for that census by the National Statistical Centre to
identify provinces, districts and villages. In addition, UXO LAO commissioned the
Science, Technology, and Environment Ministry to undertake mapping and entering
digitised information on villages, roads, and rivers so the survey results could be
plotted on maps. This combined effort provided Lao PDR with its first full GIS  an
important by-product.
Given the significant decentralisation in Lao PDR, coupled with poor transportation
and communication links, the initial work plan provided for the establishment of small
co-ordination offices in each province affected by UXO. In 1996, offices were opened
in Xieng Khouang, Houaphan, and Savannakhet.
In May 1996, the US and Lao PDR signed a memorandum of understanding for US
training support and in-kind assistance (equipment, vehicles, and materials). At the
same time, UXO LAO obtained a residential training facility from the Ministry of
Agriculture, and minefield clearance courses began in July. Subsequently, courses
were organised for community awareness, medics, and provincial co-ordinators, plus
train-the-trainer programmes for a cadre of Lao trainers.
In August 1996 the Government of Lao PDR approved a UXO programme for
Houaphan, to be implemented by GERBERA and funded by German bilateral
assistance. Actual clearance operations began in November 1996.
UNICEF assumed the lead donor role with respect to community awareness.  Drawing
on the experience of Mennonite Central Committee and MAG, UNICEF and the new
community awareness section within UXO LAO developed a strategy to establish a
coherent national programme for UXO awareness. A community awareness Technical
Working Group was established, and in late 1996 it approved a strategy that articulated
a three-pronged approach:
Ø Community awareness teams under UXO LAO to visit affected communities;
Ø Liaison with the Ministry of Education to integrate community awareness
messages into the school curriculum;
Ø Development of non-formal education programming, via mass media (principally
radio), posters, etc.
Consortium (a consortium of three American NGOs) took the lead in working with
the Ministry of Education to develop a UXO awareness curriculum for primary
schools. This was tested in Xieng Khouang in 1996.19 It also assisted with the
production of posters to inform people of restrictions on the purchase, sale, and use of
war material.
19 The revised curriculum has since been adopted by the education authorities in four provinces.
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Drawing on lessons learned by MAG in Xieng Khouang, UXO LAO split deminers
into two types of units: roving teams (to destroy ordnance on the surface), and clearance
teams (to detect and destroy sub-surface ordnance). Roving teams allow for rapid
response to immediate dangers presented by UXO on the surface, including caches of
UXO moved by villagers from their fields, paths, etc. Clearance teams provided some
capacity for the far more time-consuming task of clearing land for agricultural or
development purposes.
Expansion phase (1997-1999)
The socio-economic survey was completed and published in October 1997. Even before
the final results were available, it was clear UXO contamination was so widespread
that programmes would be needed in the majority of provinces.20 UXO LAO pursued
a strategy of enlisting implementation partners to establish provincial operations. This
allowed for rapid expansion, and gave interested donors the option of contributing to
UXO LAO via the Trust Fund administered by UNDP or providing direct funding to
an international NGO or other donor-country organisation. Table 1 provides the
complete list of provincial operations. In addition, a number of countries provided
funding via the Trust Fund, some of which was earmarked for specific expenditures,
or provided direct, in-kind assistance to UXO LAO.
Table 1 - Provincial Mine Action Operations
  Province Implementing Partner Start-up Initial funding
Xieng Khouang Mines Advisory Group Oct-94 UK, Sweden, CIDSE
(direct)
Houaphan GERBERA Nov-96 Germany (direct)
Savannakhet Handicap International Apr-97 Belgium (via Trust
(Belgium) Fund)
Saravane Mines Advisory Group Jul-97 EU, UK (direct)
Champassak Belgian military Sep-97 Belgium (direct)
Sekong Norwegian Peoples Aid Oct-97 Norway (direct)
Attapeu Norwegian Peoples Aid Oct-97 Norway (direct)
Luang Prabang GERBERA Apr-98 Germany (direct)
Khammouane World Vision (Australia) Jan-99 Australia (via Trust
Fund)
From 1995 to the end of 1999, an estimated US$34 million in UXO expenditures had
been financed by donors, with the breakdowns as indicated in the following Chart 1.21
Clearly, most financing (71 per cent on average) has been channelled through the six
implementing partners rather than the UXO LAO Trust Fund. Trust Fund expenditures
as a percentage of the total peaked at 47 per cent in 1998 before falling back to about
20 The Socio-Economic Survey recommended that UXO operations be established in nine of the 17 provinces,
plus the Saysomboune special zone, which is under direct administration of the national government
because of ongoing military activity. UXO LAO has not set up in Saysomboune.
21 The expenditure breakdowns are study team estimates based on data supplied by UXO LAO and some
of the implementing partners. The analysis is complicated by incomplete reporting, because organisations
have different financial years and expenditure classifications, and because most of the funding flows
through more than one organisation before it is finally expended.
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one-quarter the following year.22 As well, an estimated 44 per cent of expenditures
from the Trust Fund were earmarked for specific purposes. Therefore, over the 1995-
99 period, about 83 per cent of total expenditures have been tied in some formeither
channelled through an NGO or private company, or earmarked for specific purposes.
The US has supplied about 28 per cent of the funds expended through 1999, followed
by Germany (12 per cent), Norway (11 per cent), Denmark (10 per cent), and the EU
(7 per cent). Except for about two-fifths of Norways monies, all funding from
the major five donors has been channelled through implementing partners or
earmarked for specific purposes. Much of this money has been to purchase equipment






The first of the implementing partners (MAG and GERBERA) engaged local staff
directly and were responsible for operations management in Xieng Khouang, Saravane,
and Houaphan. Since mid-1997, new implementing partners have operated principally
as advisors, responsible in the main for capacity building (including most equipment
22 In 1998, more than US$1 million of the US $1.7 million in core support from UNDP to UXO LAO was
expended.
Chart 1: Expenditures 1995-99 (estimates)
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acquisition). In such cases, Lao personnel were hired and trained by UXO LAO and
then assigned to provincial operations.23 From July 1999 to April 2000, UXO LAO
began assuming direct responsibility for managing the Houaphan, Saravane and,
finally, Xieng Khouang operations. Implementing partners retain their capacity-
building roles, and are expected to phase out of the programme over time.
The Lao government is clearly concerned at the expansion of the programme and its
capacity to maintain this scale of operations, should donors significantly reduce their
assistance. Accordingly, it has decided to halt further expansion, and will maintain a
staffing level of 1,100-1,200 personnel, of which approximately half (including section
leaders) are deminers. Also, in mid-1999 the government required UXO LAO to reduce
staff salaries by an average of 22 per cent.24
23 UXO LAOs policy is to engage staff from the districts in which it is operating, so long as the candidates
have the minimum qualifications. A number of staff have close relatives who were killed or injured by
UXO. A proportion are women, generally, but not invariably, assigned to the community awareness
teams.
24 Initially, salaries for deminers and community awareness personnel were based largely on the salaries
established by MAG for its locally-engaged staff, which were significantly higher than comparable public
service positions.
25 This section is based on Landmines Survivors Network (1998) and an interview with Thomas Keolker
of the Co-operative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE).
26 The decree establishing UXO LAO makes no mention of victim assistance.
Victim assistance25
The above figures do not include expenditures on victim assistance, as UXO LAO is
not involved in this area.26 The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) is responsible for
most aspects of victim assistance, including the National Rehabilitation Centre, which
operates in Vientiane and in six provincial prosthetic and orthotic centres. The Ministry
of Labour and Social Welfare (MLSW) includes the Department of War Veterans and
Social Welfare, which has a central prosthetic centre north of Vientiane plus a number
of disabled villages established for war veterans. There also is a Lao Disabled
Peoples Association and a National Committee for Handicapped Persons, which
serves principally as a communication link between the MoPH and MLSW. There is a
good orthopaedic and trauma surgery hospital in Vientiane supported by French
assistance.
Chart 3: Planned Expenditures 200-02
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A number of international NGOs have provided assistance for the disabled, including
Handicap International (prosthetics, physiotherapy), World Vision (prosthetics), World
Concern (community-based rehabilitation, including micro-credit), Consortium
(financial assistance to UXO victims), DED from Germany (physiotherapy), and
POWER (prosthetics). In 1998, POWER joined with other NGOs and relevant
government agencies to form Co-operative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE).
It supports the National Rehabilitation Centre with technical assistance, equipment
and training. The budget for the first phase (1998-2001) is approximately US$3.55
million, including US$866,000 (in-kind and funds) from the Lao government.
A mid-term evaluation of COPE indicated most of its services have been taken up by
men with below-the-knee amputations residing in the Vientiane region. Fewer services
have reached women and children, and those in remote areas. The board of COPE
therefore decided recently to expand the scope of rehabilitation available in Lao PDR,
adding occupational therapy, orthopaedic surgery, trauma therapy, and an athletics
programme, coupled with an assistance tracking system and, generally, a more
proactive approach. The budget for this programme is about US$5.5 million to March
2004, after which time expatriate assistance to COPE will phase out.27
The MLSW operates about 60 vocational training centres, but few of these have ever
taken disabled trainees. An order of nuns from Thailand hopes to establish a vocational
training centre for the disabled, and COPE plans to hire an officer to co-ordinate with
other vocational centres to better serve the disabled.
Very little of the available assistance is earmarked for UXO victims; rather, it supports
services and facilities for disabled people in general.
Approaches to setting priorities for humanitarian
demining
Initial phase (1994-97)
Initially, those engaged in humanitarian demining gave clear priority to risk reduction,
with broader socio-economic considerations secondary. MAG started work in 1994
with a community awareness programme. When it began clearance activities the
following year, it developed a strong focus on roving clearance to destroy UXO on
the surface and thus reduce this obvious accident risk. HIs Socio-Economic Survey also
reflected this focus on risk-reduction. This survey captured three main types of
community informationhistory, accidents, level and location of contamination
and ranked communities as follows:
Table 2 - Socio-economic survey ranking of affected communities
Level of contamination Characteristics
Severe Recent accident reported
High UXO in central village or major routes/paths
Moderate UXO in primary agricultural fields
Low UXO in grazing land
27 A number of Lao are receiving training abroad, and will return in 2003.
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Originally, attempts were made to develop a single quantitative score for each village
by statistical means, but subsequently this was abandoned as each communitys
classification was, effectively, determined by a single datum (i.e., an accident reported
or, where there was no accident, the location of the UXO). Analysis revealed that 40
per cent of reported accidents occurred within villages or along main thoroughfares,
and the location of UXO was a good indicator of accident risk, so the severe category
was dropped. The current classification is based entirely on the reported location of
UXO. Districts28 were then categorised using the same simple schema, based on the
numbers of UXO affected communities and their rankings. Finally, a provincial priority
ranking was established.
In establishing UXO programmes, agreements with implementing partners were made
by province. Each partner, together with UXO LAO, would then establish a provincial
headquarters with more-or-less distinct operating units in the most severely affected
districts. Thus, the district became the principal unit for work planning by provincial
operations. However, the decision-order was, first province, then district, and last,
task assignments to villages.
The following table and analysis gives some indication of how closely the timing and
sizes of the various provincial operations correspond to the Socio-Economic Surveys
priority rankings.
Table 3 - Correlation of provincial mine action operations
with socio-economic survey ranking
Province Priority rankings by:
Socio-economic Order of start Size of
survey dates      operationsa
Savannakhet 1 3 2
Xieng Khouang 2 1 1
Saravane 3 4 3
Khammouane 4 9 9
Sekong 5 6 5
Champassak 6 5 8
Houaphan 7 2 4
Attapeu 8 7 7
Luang Prabang 9 8 5
Correlation with survey ranking .50 .52
a Measured by number of Lao staff as of April 2000.
28 Districts are sub-provincial administrative units, headed by a district governor. There are 142 districts.
This indicates that the start-up order and current sizes of provincial operations correlate
only moderately with the priority rankings set in the survey, and suggests difficulties
in negotiating provincial agreements with multiple donors and implementing partners.
Once provincial and district operations were established, roving clearance teams were
assigned primarily to highly contaminated communities to remove UXO from village
centres and major paths. This approach served to reduce risks and would bring
significant benefit to social infrastructure (i.e., schools, clinics, wats, wells, etc. in
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villages) and to some aspects of economic activity  mainly small-scale commerce
such as village markets and marketing between communities, and to kitchen gardening.
However, it offered little direct benefit to economic production, which for most
communities is based on rice production.
Integration of priority-setting and work planning
(1998 to date)
Given the highly decentralised nature of Lao public administration, and the desire to
maintain overall coherence for a programme implemented in conjunction with six
international partners, UXO LAO headquarters devised a standard system of annual
work planning for all provincial operations, starting in mid-1998. The work planning
system has the following features:
1. All activities must correspond to the agreed priorities for UXO LAO and the Trust
Fund, namely:
 programmes shall be carried out for peaceful purposes only and according to the
following order of priority:
a. Humanitarian purposes;
b. Economic purposes, for the expansion for agriculture and rehabilitation,
reconstruction or development projects;
Further:
The Lao PDR Trust Fund may not be used to subsidise the cost of UXO clearance
for commercial projects . . . However, UXO LAO may provide services to private
natural or corporate persons or institutions and charge for the service.  The charges
shall not exceed the production costs.29 (UXO LAO, undated).
For clearance activities, the priorities enunciated for 2000 (UXO LAO, 2000) are:
Roving clearance: Area clearance:
 Emergency requests  where ongoing  Land to be cleared for agriculture
work is halted or daily life is affected due in high-risk areas, affecting large
to the presence of UXO. numbers of people in the
 Areas where people have already poorest villages.
found and marked ordnance.  Contaminated land where a
 Ordnance on the surface community structure such as a school,
 in the village or agricultural land. market, or clinic will be built.
 Land where funded development
projects are being delayed by
the presence of UXO.
2. Provincial Steering Committees (SC), chaired typically by the vice-governor, have
been established, with representatives from key ministries, the UXO LAO
provincial co-ordinator, and from all districts in which UXO LAO is operating.
3. Proposals for community awareness, roving, and clearance are solicited by the
SC and UXO LAO from each of the districts. These are vetted by the SC for
adherence with national priorities and combined with the provincial
administrations own priority task list. A detailed work plan is then prepared
29 UXO LAO has just commissioned a study to examine the feasibility of reimbursable demining.
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showing where each community awareness, roving, and clearance team will be
working for each week in the coming year. As there never are enough resources
to complete all tasks put forward by the district and provincial authorities, cuts to
the task list are made through an iterative process.
4. The draft work plan is then signed-off by the governor, the UXO LAO provincial
co-ordinator, and (regarding technical feasibility) a representative from the
implementing partner.
5. The signed work plan is then submitted to UXO LAO national headquarters where
it is vetted and approved by the national SC.
6. During the course of plan period, provincial and district personnel have the
flexibility to make minor adjustments to the schedule of community awarenss
and roving teams based on emerging priorities, weather conditions, etc. They
also are allowed to alter the schedule of UXO clearance activities without prior
approval from national headquarters. However, they are not allowed to add or
delete a UXO clearance task from the task list without prior approval from the
national level.
Clearly, this process is designed to establish good annual work plans and to do so in
a very transparent manner. The focus of attention is on clearance activities, which are
very expensive in terms of equipment and labour, and which also provide significant
economic benefit to agencies or individuals whose land is cleared. This is where strong
incentives exist to substitute private interests for national priorities.
The work planning process also represents a useful integration of top-down and
bottom-up planning. District authorities are asked to submit their lists of tasks,
which must adhere to national and provincial priorities.30 Requests from districts
strongly reflect economic priorities. Clearance of land for expanding rice paddies and
irrigation works are most common, followed by clearance for development projects
(public works, village potable water systems, resettlement schemes, etc.).
The following chart clearly indicates the apparent evolution in priorities. Community
awareness and roving clearance team visits to villages are levelling off, while demand
30 The latter generally are framed as development priorities; typically a sub-set of the eight national
development priorities, listed earlier.
Chart 4: Growth in UXO LAO Activities
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for clearance is increasing. In part this is due to the fact that most of the highly
contaminated villages have now been visited by community awareness and roving
teams, while the clearance task remains immense. While district authorities clearly
are happy that community awareness and roving work are under way, all districts
want more clearance teams to address land shortages and other economic constraints.
The annual work plan is important as well because it represents the principal
accountability framework extant.31 To this point in time, UXO LAO has not established
a national quality assurance system for field operations or training, and does not have
an internal audit unit. It is now completing a manual of standard operating procedures
to apply across all provincial operations, which will form a clear basis for management
and quality assurance audits.
Only two annual cycles of work planning have been completed. A good start has been
made but, understandably, there remains room for improvement. For example, the
resulting work plans remain only marginally useful for performance monitoring as
the annual targets (hectares of land cleared, amount of ordnance destroyed, etc.) agreed
to date have invariably been set low, and are easily attained. As well, UXO LAO
headquarters does not have the capacity to provide adequate logistical support
(including equipment repairs) to the provincial operations,32 which results in excessive
downtime for operational teams and makes it difficult to determine who should be
held responsible when there is poor productivity. UXO LAO recently commissioned
a study of its logistics operations and hopes to receive assistance from AusAID to
implement the recommendations.
Importantly, UXO LAO headquarters is continuing its efforts to enhance its database
to provide more intelligence for field operations. It updates village records based
on monthly or assignment completion reports from the roving, community awareness,
and clearance teams, and compiles a range of useful monthly reports tracking
operations and progress achieved. It has obtained detailed records on US air combat
activities, giving capacity to forecast which areas are likely to be contaminated.33 It
also is seeking to obtain community-level data from recent population and agricultural
censuses, which will vastly increase the scope and accuracy of demographic and
economic data available for work planning and priority setting.34
Other clearance
In addition to UXO LAO, at least two commercial firms (Milsearch and GERBERA)
and the Lao army remain active in mine/UXO clearance, for a variety of clients 
provincial authorities, private developers, mineral exploration firms, civil engineers
working on hydro-electric projects, and aid contractors building roads, bridges and
airports. The latter aid projects are too large for UXO LAO to consider. Often donor
31 Common reporting formats, made possible by standardised work plans, were established in January
1999.
32 This difficult task has been further complicated because most equipment has been procured through
tied-aid arrangements. Thus, there are too many different makes and models of equipment, which
complicates training of mechanics and stores operations. Also, much of the equipment is unsuitable for
Lao PDR.
33 Like IMSMA, UXO LAOs database contains records on communities (treated as points in a GIS
system) rather than minefields, battle sites, etc. (all treated as areas).
34 This is feasible because UXO LAO has worked closely with the National Statistical Centre and other
government and donor agencies, and a standard GIS system has evolved.
137Case Study of the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic
35 Commercial firms generally carry specialised  and hard to obtain  demining insurance coverage to
supplement site insurance carried by the prime contractors.
36 While the study team received excellent co-operation from UXO LAO and implementing partners, we
could not obtain a complete set of cost data. As well, various agencies report on different time periods,
use different expenditure classifications, and value in-kind aid differently. The usual caveats therefore
apply  (see Hallam, 1996:13-15).
37 At this level, expenditures should be approximately one-third personnel costs, one-third capital
equipment (repair and replacement), and one-third all other operating costs. This assumes a stock of






Chart 5: Purpose of Expenditures 1995-99
agencies will require the Lao government to assign the army for the expensive job of
clearance for road and bridge projects, but the donor or their prime contractor will
then hire a firm like Milsearch to do the initial surveys and provide quality assurance
and insurance coverage.35
While the study team could obtain only indicative data on current commercial and
military clearance activities, our impression is that UXO LAO represents perhaps half
the overall clearance capacity in the country.
Costs of mine action36
UXO LAO
Total costs
Annual expenditures have grown rapidly from perhaps US$1 million in 1995, and
should peak at a budgeted US$10.6 million this year. Expenditures are expected to
fall to US$8.3 million by 2002, by which time the reliance on international advisors
will reduce and the budget will likely be around US$6 million.37
Such an expenditure patternquickly rising as operations get established and
capacity-building takes place, then declining as international personnel are
withdrawnis typical when developing new capacity in a developing country. It
does, however, create problems for cost analysis. For example, if we want to know
how much, on average, it costs to clear a hectare of land, which costs should we
consider? Including salaries of international personnel and set-up costs to conduct
the socio-economic survey and to establish new facilities, management systems, and
training programmes would give an inflated picture of costs that will prevail once
UXO LAO staff can manage without continuing technical assistance. From the graph




Salaries and benefits for international staff have constituted perhaps one-third of the
estimated US$34 million in expenditures from 1995-99,38 with another 30 per cent going
to capital equipment (vehicles, mine detectors, computers, etc.). Salaries and benefits
for Lao personnel have accounted for perhaps 10 per cent of total expenditures, while
overhead payments to UNDP and the various implementing partners represent at
least three per cent. The remainder (approximately one-quarter) covers various
operating expenses: fuel, explosives, equipment maintenance, office rental, and so on.
The following graph is an attempt at separating continuing costs from various start-
up costs for UXO LAO. Continuing costs (i.e., those required for UXO LAO to maintain
its operations efficiently without continuing technical assistance) are estimated at US$6
million per annum from 2001, split equally between personnel costs, equipment
replacement and repair, and other operating costs. Reasonable estimates of local salaries
and benefits are available from the start of operations. Assuming an equal amount for
both equipment and other operating costs for each year gives the continuing cost
element for past years. All other recorded expenditures are assumed to be start-up
costs of various types. The following picture emerges.
While the assumptions used are far too heroic for this picture to be any more than
suggestive, start-up costs clearly are very significant, and could represent half the
total costs for 1995-2003, and 25 per cent of 2002 costs, after which international
personnel are scheduled to withdraw.
The costs of tied aid
A proportion of the equipment purchased or provided under tied-aid arrangements
has proven to be unsuitable. This has been particularly true of vehicles. Based on
estimated equipment purchases of US$16.65 million, perhaps US$3 million (18 per
cent) in equipment services were lost to UXO LAO and its implementing partners
because of tied aid.39  This figure could be far higher because the unsuitable equipment
is often out of use awaiting repair, which limits the mobility or effectiveness of UXO
LAO staff.
38 This includes a rough estimate for US Special Forces military personnel who delivered training. However,
no breakdown of the very significant training costs is available, so the estimate should be treated with
caution.
39 This estimate is based on a simulation model using UXO LAO records for vehicles and depreciation
schedules. Basically, unsuitable vehicles depreciate more rapidly, have to be replaced more quickly, are
more expensive to maintain, and are unavailable for longer periods because of more frequent breakdowns
and waits for spare parts. In UXO LAOs case, preferred vehicles are no more expensive to purchase.
Chart 6: Cost Breakdown 1995-2003
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In addition, most of the training has been provided by the US Special Forces, following
classic minefield clearance approaches.40 Graduates assigned to the provinces have
then been given additional training by implementing partners in battlefield clearance
techniques, which are more appropriate for UXO clearance.
Unit costs
UXO LAO recently commissioned a cost-capture study to develop unit cost estimates
(Fisher, 2000).  This treated international staff costs and the administrative expenses
of implementing partners as start-up costs, and arrived at the following estimates for
1999.
Table 4  - Selected Results of UXO LAOs Cost-Capture Study
Item Unit cost estimate
One deminer or community US$6,800 per staff per year
awareness staff
Clearing 1 hectare of land US$4,400 per hectarea
Cost per village - roving US$500 per village
Risk reduction via community US$4 per beneficiary
awareness
a The study used a figure of 578.6 hectares cleared in 1999. Subsequent
documents from UXO LAO report that 622 hectares were cleared, which
would reduce the average cost to under US$4,100 per hectare.
40 As well, early community awareness training was based on programmes developed in the US and not
fully adapted to Lao conditions.
41 Very roughly, plans for 2000 indicate a 75 per cent increase in hectares clearance compared to the figure
used in the cost-capture report, while local costs will increase perhaps 10-15 per cent in total. This suggests
an average cost per hectare in the range of US$3,000 in 2000. Meanwhile, private clearance firms operating
in Lao PDR indicated costs in the range of US$2,200 per hectare (and up, depending on the local conditions)
for UXO clearance.
The study found significant variation across provincial operations. For example,
clearance costs per hectare ranged from under US$4,000 for provinces with long-
established operations to more than US$20,000 for provinces in which clearance had
only recently started. This suggests significant productivity increases during the initial
years of operations. One would expect average costs to continue falling for some years
because of learning-by-doing. For land clearance, average costs should fall below
US$3,000 per hectare well before 2002.41
Victim assistance
No estimates are available for victim assistance costs. The relevant programmes serve
the disabled in general and expenditures on UXO victims are not reported separately.
Measuring benefits
Qualitative assessments
Until recently, few quantitative assessments were available concerning the benefits
accruing from the work of UXO LAO and its implementing partners. The number of
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accidents seems to have fallen from 240 per year (1987-96) to fewer than 200 per year
today, but this figure is only a rough estimate based on incomplete reporting. The
usual quantitative data are compiled (hectares cleared, ordnance destroyed, people
briefed, etc.), but these alone give little information about economic or social impacts.
As such, priorities have been set and assessments made based on qualitative indicators
of likely benefits. Provincial and district work plans are assessed according to their
adherence with national criteria coupled with local priorities and technical feasibility.
The expressed satisfaction of provincial and district authorities gives UXO LAO




While formal economic cost-benefit analysis of humanitarian programmes is fraught
with controversy, Lao PDR offers an unusually good opportunity to employ this tool,
for a number of reasons. Most fundamentally, sufficient time has passed since the war
for the economy to have stabilised. Second, Lao PDR remains a simple economy,
particularly in remote areas where most of UXO LAOs work takes place. For most
Lao, rice remains central to both production and consumption. Third, reasonably good
data are available.
The cost-capture study commissioned by UXO LAO included a discussion of how
benefits accruing from UXO activities might be measured, and generated preliminary
estimates for financial/economic benefits. Building largely on that work, the estimated
present value of clearing one hectare of wet season rice land (our baseline scenario)
is about US$3,540.43 This means that an expenditure today of up to US$3,540 to clear a
hectare of land would be justified on economic grounds alone. Given the average cost
of clearing one hectare has been estimated at US$4,000-4,400 in 1999, and this can
reasonably be projected to fall below US$3,000, future UXO clearance appears justified
on economic grounds alone in Lao PDR.44 The economic case is even stronger for
clearance of irrigated rice land, agricultural land for higher-value export crops, and
houses, markets and social infrastructure (schools, health clinics, etc.) in villages.
Finally, the economic case will strengthen over time as agricultural productivity and
rural prosperity grows in Lao PDR.
A number of critical caveats are necessary. First, the economic case for future clearance
will depend significantly on the long-term productivity of UXO LAO personnel after
the international advisors withdraw. If productivity falls significantly because of weak
management and supervision, poor maintenance of equipment, or major cuts to non-
wage operating costs without corresponding reductions in staffing levels, then unit
costs will rise  perhaps past the point where costs outweigh benefits.
42 This section summarises some of the key findings derived in the chapter on socio-economic analysis.
43 The remainder of this section focuses on UXO clearance. It is difficult to estimate economic benefits
accruing from risk-reduction activities such as community awareness and roving clearance. As well, the
results are always fraught with controversy. See Chapter 3: Socio-Economic Analysis of Mine Action on
economic analysis for some discussion.
44 We still can only state that clearance appears to be justified on economic rationale. A more definitive
conclusion would require an assessment of other possible uses of the resources expended in UXO clearance.
It may be that other development activities would provide even higher rates of return than UXO clearance.
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Second, the cost estimates do not include start-up and capacity-building expenditures
such as salaries and benefits for technical assistance personnel.45 Such costs clearly are
significant in the case of UXO LAO (as in most humanitarian demining programmes).
The economic benefit accruing to such start-up costs must ultimately be based on the
net economic benefit associated with continuing operations. Estimates of this type are
very sensitive to the assumptions used, but if UXO LAO can continue to reduce unit
costs through productivity increases, the programme should generate significant net
economic benefits from about 2002, eventually justifying the high start-up costs.46
The standard economic case for clearance does not depend as significantly on who
benefits  a ton of rice produced would net a wealthy person just as much as it would
a poor person, so the monetary measure of the economic activity remains the same.
However, a breakdown in the transparency of the annual work planning process, or
in the oversight to confirm exactly which land has been cleared, could leave the door
ajar for misuse of resources and jeopardise donor support to humanitarian clearance
in Lao PDR and perhaps elsewhere.
General observations
Ultimately, the economic benefit of UXO clearance is derived from the economic benefit
accruing to the underlying activity or project. For example, if an NGO potable water
project promises significant social and economic benefits in terms of time saved, better
health, etc., then modest expenditures on UXO clearance to enable its construction
will be justified on economic grounds. If land is cleared for agricultural purposes but
nothing is grown on it for a year or two,47 the economic benefits are greatly reduced.48
UXO clearance may make economic or other development activity possible, but it
does not guarantee that the activity will take place as planned. As such, co-ordination
with other agencies  and with the communities themselves  is important to increase
the likelihood that benefits will accrue as planned.
More generally, the future economic benefits realised from any development activity
depend significantly on the overall health of the countrys economy. This in turn
depends on government policies and expenditure patterns, the absence of natural
calamities such as drought, and whether households have sufficient confidence to
invest to improve agricultural productivity. For example, the baseline scenario for
wet-season rice assumes productivity growth (measured in yield per hectare) of 2 per
cent per annum.49 If productivity does not grow because farmers do not make
investments, the present value of future rice production falls by 7.8 per cent to just
over US$3,000.
45 For the baseline case, no adjustment has been made for the costs associated with tied-aid equipment
purchases and training services. Such an adjustment would strengthen the economic case for UXO
clearance, assuming such tied-aid practices will stop eventually.
46 See the section on Evaluating the Entire Clearance Programme in Chapter 3.
47 Such delays could occur for many reasons, including: the land is not allocated to a farm household;
critical inputs (e.g., credit to buy bullocks, seed) are not available at the right time; the government does
not complete planned resettlement in time; too much food aid is delivered, depressing local food prices
and making it unattractive to plant rice.
48 Using the example of wet season rice, delay of one year reduces the present value of benefits by over 10
per cent, to about US$3,155.
49 This was the average for 1985-1997. In India during the Green Revolution, productivity in yield per
hectare grew by 2.4 per cent per year for an extended period.
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Cost-effectiveness analysis of risk-reduction measures50
Formal cost-benefit analysis is not particularly illuminating for assessing the benefits
accruing from risk-reduction measures instituted in poor countries. It is difficult to
place a financial value on human life, and many people find even the concept
distasteful. Still, it is incumbent on all those entrusted with scarce aid resources to
understand the relationship between costs and performance, even when the benefits
of good performance cannot be reduced to monetary values. Cost-effectiveness analysis
can be a useful tool in such situations. For example, one can compare the average cost
of saving one life through a mine/UXO programme and compare this to the cost of
saving one life through, say, malaria control or training programmes for traditional
birth attendants. This does not require a monetary sum to be given for the value of a
life; only an assumption that a life saved through malaria control is equally precious
as a life saved through mine action.
Unfortunately, we have no accurate count of the number of lives saved and injuries
avoided in Lao PDR due to UXO awareness activities, roving clearance, etc. However,
even very rough calculations demonstrate that UXO/mine awareness and roving
clearance are relatively expensive in terms of lives saved and injuries avoided relative
to various other public health and safety programmes in Lao PDR. Deaths from UXO
accidents seem to have averaged 240 per year in the decade before the Socio-Economic
Survey, and may be averaging fewer than 200 per year since 1997. Assuming half the
accidents are fatal, then there are 40-50 fewer deaths per year from UXO accidents,
with a similar reduction in injuries. The cost-capture study estimated the costs of
community awareness activities at about US$700,000 in 1999, with roving clearance
accounting for another US$860,000. Even with the implausible assumption that all
accident reduction has been due to community awarensss and roving, the cost per
death/injury avoided is over US$15,000. Meanwhile, public expenditure on health
amounts to only US$5 per year per person, and there are 1.4 million cases and 14,000
deaths each year from malaria, which can be combated through inexpensive insecticide-
treated bed-nets.
Environment
Reduction of slash-and-burn agricultural practices is one of the governments eight
development priorities. It aims at reducing ecological degradation caused by
deforestation, particularly in the mountainous north and east where level land for
paddy rice cultivation is at a premium. UXO clearance can assist by opening new
land for rice paddies, and by clearance for irrigation to allow more intensive cultivation.
As with economic benefits, environmental outcomes will depend of the timeliness
and quality of other development services available to the households settling on the
cleared land. If agricultural extension services and critical inputs (seeds, credit) are
not provided, it is unlikely that swidden farmers will be able to make the transition to
paddy rice cultivation, and they will return by necessity to their former practices.
Food security
More than half the Lao population suffer from episodic or chronic malnutrition. Access
to sufficient land is one of the major constraints cited by Lao households to improved
well-being, as is water control. Obviously, UXO clearance can alleviate some of this
50 See Chapter 3 above and Hallam (1998) for further treatment of this topic.
143Case Study of the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic
poverty by making more land available and by clearing irrigation systems. Given
many Lao live outside the monetary economy, direct calculations of food security
benefits are a useful supplement to other forms of economic analysis. On average in
Lao PDR today, one hectare of flatland paddy can meet the rice requirements of just
over eight people.51 UXO LAO will clear over 500 hectares of agricultural land this
year, which in turn will provide sufficient food, year-after-year, for about 3,500 people.
Existing integration with development work
Local and micro levels
Through its work planning process, UXO LAO operations are becoming better
integrated at the district and micro (community, NGO, etc.) levels. Increasingly,
government agencies, NGOs, and managers of major aid projects are seeking assistance
from UXO LAO. Recent examples include requests for clearance from:
Ø International NGOs such as Oxfam and Action contre la Faim for community
development projects they are supporting;
Ø ACF for small scale gravity-feed potable water systems, which they are installing
as sub-contractors on the large Bolovens Plateau Rural Development Project,
financed by the French aid programme;
Ø The Mountainous Zone Development Project,52 which is building the first large
focal site for resettlement of up to 5,000 people (some threatened by a new
hydro-electric dam; others to reduce slash-and-burn) at Pa-am in Attapeu
Province.
At least the last of these requests comes close to encroaching on the unwritten
understanding that UXO LAO would not assist large-scale development projects
because of capacity constraints. Is there really a difference between assisting a
government agency building a new town, with the requisite infrastructure, and
assisting a donor-financed project constructing farm access roads on behalf of the
government?
National and provincial levels
UXO LAOs work programme also ties in closely with a number of the national
development priorities, as well as those in most provinces. However, there rarely is
any mention of the UXO problem or of UXO LAO in macro-economic and national
development documents.53 This seems a curious omission given the scale of UXO
contamination and the significant donor resources allocated to the problem.54
Two possible explanations come to mind. First, UXO contamination may not be
perceived as a priority to government officials  after all, Lao PDR is extremely poor
51 In countries receiving food aid, this figure can readily be converted into monetary terms by using the
per person cost of purchasing, shipping, and distributing food aid.
52 The MZDP is a new para-statal responsible for rural development in two mountainous districts of
Attapeu. It is financed off-budget by a concession to cut 30,000m3 of timber; expected to raise 40 billion
kip (about US$5 million).
53 While the study teams were unable to obtain provincial development plans, we understand that few of
these mention UXO.
54 Donor-financed expenditures by UXO LAO and its implementing partners represented about 6.5 per
cent of total aid grants recorded by the government in 1997-98. There may be some under-reporting of
grant aid by the government because of in-kind donations and funding through international NGOs.
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and faces many economic and social hurdles. Second, the country has lived with UXO
for 25 years without having the capacity to deal with the contamination. It may be
recognised as a significant problem, but in a similar way as the weather, and one
doesnt expect the government to change the weather. If the latter hypothesis is correct,
we would expect greater attention to be given to ordnance contamination as the UXO
programme gains experience and profile.
The latter hypothesis is plausible. The National Assembly passed the current national
development in 1996; before many would be aware that UXO clearance on a significant
scale might be feasible. UXO LAOs work planning process, which actively solicits
priorities from district and community levels, has only been through two annual cycles.
Indications are that demand for more and faster clearance is growing significantly.
Senior officials from provincial administrations and the State Planning Committee
informed the study team that they were aware of far greater demands for UXO
clearance.55 If so, we would expect greater mention of the UXO issue in future
development plans published by the national and provincial governments.
Some evidence consistent with this hypothesis is available. The Lao Expenditure and
Consumption Survey 1997/98 did include a question of whether mine/UXO
contamination was the main constraint on raising household incomes (Government
of Lao PDR, 1999a: 36, Table 32).  The responses by province were:








All others No statistically significant response
Xieng Khouang and Savannakhet were the first and third provinces, respectively, in
which UXO clearance started, and rank first and second in size of current operations.
The high percentages citing mines/bombs as their most significant problem might
reflect greater awareness among the populace and officials that something can be
done to address the problem, as well as the high level of contamination per se.
This scant evidence is far from persuasive, however, and it remains unclear whether
UXO clearance will be acknowledged as a national priority. It also is premature to
assume increased demands by provincial and local governments for UXO LAOs
services mean that UXO clearance is a top priority except in localised situations. From
the perspective of village, district, and provincial administrations, UXO LAO is
providing free resources  officials are not paying for the services either directly
from their budgets or indirectly by having to choose between UXO clearance and
some other service available via the national government or donor community. Because
they do not have to give up anything in exchange for more UXO resources, rational
officials will always ask for more UXO resources for their communities.
55  Of course, they may only have been being polite.
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Conclusions
UXO LAO is very much a story still being written. Still, there seems to be consensus
among those involved in UXO work on the following critical issues:
Ø National capacity must be developed to deal with a problem that will endure for
many decades;
Ø In this context, the proper role for implementing partners is capacity building
rather than direct management of UXO operations;
Ø The annual work planning process should continue, and additional measures
should be put in place to establish national standards and strengthen national
oversight over provincial operations;
Ø Resources should shift toward clearance activities while seeking more cost-
effective means for reducing the risks posed by UXO.56
In addition, the analysis done by UXO LAO and the study team indicates that well-
targeted clearance activities are likely to be justified on economic grounds alone, and
this case will get stronger over time if UXO LAO can continue to raise clearance
productivity and as agricultural productivity in Lao PDR increases.
A number of critical issues and questions remain unresolved, including:
Ø What is the true priority of UXO clearance vis-à-vis other development activities?
If donors provide funding for mine/UXO channels via special channels, Lao
authorities will not see any trade-off between aid for UXO and aid for other
development purposes.  The same logic applies throughout the decision-making
chain: provincial governments, district authorities, village chiefs. Observers are
unlikely to get a clear gauge of the relative priority of UXO contamination until
decision-makers must choose between allocating resources for UXO or for other
purposes.57
Ø When should implementing partners end their UXO activities?
Current plans call for a measurable phase-out after 2002. Although clear timetables
have yet to be established, UXO LAO hopes to shift international support from
individual provincial operations to regional centres (i.e., covering multiple
provinces).  It expects the presence of international advisors in both technical
and management capacities for another five years.
Ø Will UXO LAO be able to maintain efficient cost control and high productivity
once international staff depart?
The Lao government has made some important cost-control decisions, including
halting the increase in UXO LAO operations and reducing staff salaries by more
than 20 per cent. UXO LAO itself has instituted or plans a number of valuable
initiatives, including the cost-capture study and the review of its logistics
management. These augur well for cost control. Productivity or performance
management is, however, a more challenging task for managers and supervisors,
particularly in countries where social norms do not reinforce competitive
behaviour.58,59
56 An evaluation of the community awarensss programme has been commissioned by UNICEF.
57 In economic jargon, until they internalise the trade-offs.
58 The study team was informed there is a common Lao saying to the effect that: It is the nail sticking up
that gets hammered down.
59 This is not meant to extol competitive behaviour; rather, to point out that social norms which reinforce
such behaviour greatly simplify supervision and management.
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Ø Can UXO LAO establish the requisite monitoring and evaluation capacity to
ensure standards are maintained across provincial operations?
The annual work planning process forms a simple and useful framework for
UXO LAO provincial co-ordinators and implementing partners to give an
accounting for the resources entrusted to them. This can be improved by further
development of unit cost analysis. Such accountability structures create powerful
incentives for reports to reflect good performance, but these may have perverse
effects (e.g., false reporting) unless systems exist to ensure the information
reported is both accurate and standardised across all operations.
Ø If UXO LAO continues to demonstrate its ability to manage funds in an effective
and transparent manner, will major donors agree to shift funding from their
own NGOs and firms to the Trust Fund?
Channelling funds via intermediary organisations adds greatly to costs. Some of
the high costs for international salaries etc. are warranted for start-up and capacity
building purposes; others, such as tying funds to the purchase of unsuitable
equipment and services, are simply wasted. While a good case can be made for
the burden of proof to be on UXO LAO to demonstrate its performance and
probity, at some point donors need to acknowledge that their NGOs and firms
have, in fact, helped build the requisite local capacities.
Ø Will donor assistance be maintained at significant levels after most international
personnel depart?
Most donors recognise there is an international obligation to assist Lao PDR in
dealing with a massive UXO problem not of its own making. Understandably,
donors are also concerned that Lao PDR has not yet adhered to the Ottawa Treaty.
If the Lao government does not adhere in the coming years, will the former
outweigh the latter?
Ø If donor assistance declines, will the Lao government maintain the UXO LAO
programme?
It seems hard to believe the government will abandon its programme completely,
given that (1) UXO contamination clearly is a major problem in some areas, (2)
UXO clearance is in great demand, and (3) well-targeted clearance appears
justified in economic, environmental, and food security terms. However, a
significant danger is that, with the many and massive budgetary demands in the
country, the programme will be starved of funds, particularly for equipment
and supplies. This would quickly sap its effectiveness.
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Appendix 3
Case study of Mozambique
Background on Mozambique1
The signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome in 1992 led to democratic
parliamentary and presidential elections, which marked the beginning of a new era
for Mozambique  one of hope through peace and the opportunity to address the
issue of poverty eradication. The next five years saw Mozambique engaging in the
establishment of democratic institutions, and in the resettlement of nearly 5 million
displaced persons, including an estimated 1.7 million refugees. All this was done while
making the transition from complex emergency and humanitarian assistance
interventions towards the accelerated creation of an enabling environment for the
attainment of sustainable human development. In 1997, the population of Mozambique
was estimated at 18.5 million, with an annual growth rate of 2.8 per cent.
More than 60 per cent of the population lives in the rural areas in precarious conditions
that are much like those of the majority of people living in cities. Currently,
Mozambiques poverty level is characterised by the fact that nearly 60 per cent of the
population has an average yearly income of US$100; a life expectancy of 46 years;
infant and maternal mortality rates of 120 per 1,000 and 1,062 per 100,000, respectively,
and an adult literacy rate of 39.5 per cent. In the 1999 Human Development Report (UNDP,
1999), Mozambique was listed as one of the worlds 10 poorest countries, with a human
development index of 0.341, falling well below the 0.463 index for sub-Saharan Africa
and 0.430 for developing countries.
According to the national Poverty Reduction Strategy (1995), 60 per cent of the
population live below the food poverty line (defined as a daily ration of less than
80 per cent of 2,200 Kcal). The majority, considered to be absolutely poor, live in rural
areas, where agriculture is the main source of food and income. With the war ended,
one of the principal causes of absolute poverty was eliminated. However, as a result
of the war, rural areas now suffer from insufficient economic and social infrastructure,
vulnerability arising from adverse climatic conditions, as well as low productivity
1 This section is largely based on information contained in UNDPs First Country Co-operation Framework
for Mozambique (1998-2001), 1997.
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levels, which together explain the continuing prevalence of high indicators of absolute
poverty. The rapid growth of the urban population during the war was accompanied
by the degradation of existing infrastructure and the lack of resources to expand
capacity. In urban centres, the decline of purchasing power due to current economic
reform, limited employment opportunities, and the lack of social safety nets aggravated
the poverty situation.
Mozambique is endowed with a strong natural resource base that offers significant
opportunities for development. Almost 70 per cent of the land area, estimated at
800,000 km2, is covered by savanna and secondary forests, and 45 per cent of the total
land mass is arable. Its coastline, approximately 2,700 km long, offers a wealth of
marine resources for economic exploitation. Mineral resources, natural gas, and coal
represent investment opportunities. Recent strong economic performance has also
seen a positive shift in the perception of potential investors towards the country.
As a consequence of measures taken by the government for macro-economic
stabilisation and structural reform, favourable climatic conditions, and the cessation
of war, the economy has grown vigorously since 1993, except for a decline in 1995.
This progression has continued despite the severe flooding that Mozambique
experienced in early 2000. Indeed, in August 2000, the Economist Intelligence Unit
reported that the economic outlook in Mozambique remained favourable despite the
impact of the flooding. The Economic Intelligence Unit raised its forecast for real GDP
growth to 7.5 per cent for the year  one of the highest rates in the world and to 8.5
per cent in 2001. It affirmed that relief on debt service granted by official creditors in
response to the floods, combined with the debt reduction under the International
Monetary Fund/World Bank heavily indebted poor countries initiative, would
substantially reduce debt-service payments and improve the countrys debt profile.2
Positive economic growth has contributed to the recuperation of the agriculture sector,
whose growth potential is important in the governments programme for poverty
eradication. Agriculture contributes approximately 30 per cent of GNP and employs
an estimated 80 per cent of the work force. Nevertheless, the transformation of the
sector will require substantial investment. Notable improvement has also been
recorded in the industrial sector after a long period of stagnation. Benefiting from
structural reform measures introduced from 1987 onwards, and a strong privatisation
programme for state-run businesses and institutions, the industrial sector is beginning
to see a turn-around. Strong improvement in the performance of the manufacturing,
mining, energy and fisheries industries has been noted  to such an extent that 1996
saw an 11.6 per cent rise in industrial output.
History of mine and unexploded ordnance
contamination
The Mozambican landmine problem dates from the mid-1960s. The Portuguese were
the first to use landmines in Mozambique, in their battle against the liberation
movement FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) between 1964 and 1974. In 1975,
when Mozambique became independent; FRELIMO oriented itself towards Marxism
and soon after was challenged by RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) in a
brutal war (197792).
2 Mozambique: Floods fail to dampen economic prospects, United Nations Integrated Regional Information
Networks, Johannesburg, 3 August 2000.
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Most of the landmines in Mozambique were laid either by the FRELIMO government
forces or RENAMO opposition between 1978 and 1990. The government mainly used
landmines defensively to protect important infrastructure and strategic sites from
RENAMO forces: minefields were also laid along the borders with Malawi, South
Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. RENAMO, on the other hand, sought to weaken the
government by targeting the economy: in this strategy, landmines played an important
role in its attacks on major infrastructure, particularly the road system. Like the
FRELIMO government, RENAMO also used mines to protect its military bases as
well as villages under its control.
Both FRELIMO and RENAMO used mines randomly, and both have been accused of
using mines to terrorise civilians. The US-based NGO Human Rights Watch, for
example, has reported instances where the fear of landmines was exploited to terrorise
civilians  including people being told about the presence of landmines where there
were none. Landmines were used to cut off access to food  through the mining of
paths to fields, water sources and fishing points, or by hindering the delivery of food
aid (Roberts and Williams, 1995:211-212). RENAMO also used mines to prevent
displaced people from returning to their homes.
Mozambiques landmines were supplied mainly by the Soviet Union, but also by
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa. The insurgency forces in Mozambique
developed expertise in lifting and re-deploying mines from government minefields, a
practice that was popularly called fishing.
The war ended with the Rome Peace Agreement of October 1992, leading to multiparty
elections two years later. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ)
was set up to oversee the two-year transition period. By and large, since the end of the
war there have been few reports of new mines being laid in Mozambique (Human
Rights Watch, 1997:72) However, in the first few years after the Rome Agreement,
both parties to the conflict were accused of limited planting of new mines, at times
with the aim of slowing down the ongoing humanitarian demining process.
Early assessments of the landmine issue in Mozambique pointed to a massive problem;
as a consequence, the country was categorised  together with Afghanistan, Angola
and Cambodia  as one of the most severely mine-affected countries in the world.
Estimates of the scope of the problem have since been modified, and there is now
general agreement that the mine problem in Mozambique is far more manageable
than had been predicted in the first half of the 1990s. Accordingly, landmines no longer
figure at the top of the list of obstacles to the countrys reconstruction.
Table 1: Estimated Numbers of New Mine Victims (dead and
injured)  in Mozambique, 19951998
1995 600720 (rough estimate)
1996 126 (reports from 6 provinces)
1997 69 (from 7 provinces)
1998 83 (all 10 provinces)
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A frequently used indicator of national landmine impact has been accident statistics,
which capture one central component of the costs to the population. But although
accident rates may be a central issue at the emergency stage of reconstruction, they
are less helpful in the establishment of mid- and long-term priorities. Reports of mine
accidents from HI, and the national mine awareness programme that it co-ordinated,
suggest significant reductions in accidents from 1995 to 19983 (ICBL, 1999:61).  But the
figures are highly inaccurate, and victim rate is too narrow an indicator of the socio-
economic impact of mines. In addition, the most recent estimates show a continued
decline, with around half of all accidents caused by unexploded ordnance not mines.4
The accident data  as well as other more loosely founded assessments of the mine
problem in Mozambique  have led some analysts to conclude that the most pressing
mine problems in Mozambique will be effectively dealt with by the year 2005 to 2007
(Agenda, 1999:74).  Such a conclusion might appear overly optimistic given the number
of mined areas that remain in Mozambique. This does, though, indicate how the
landmine issue is undergoing redefinition, which has led to a lower ranking among
the countrys reconstruction challenges than was previously the case. This places
current operators in a delicate position  until now funding for mine action has been
relatively generous; however, as the landmine problem is redefined, operators may
run into severe funding problems given that operational costs will remain high.
Yet, landmines continue to pose a serious problem for many communities across
Mozambique and remain a problem for rebuilding or maintaining important
infrastructure. A substantial demining capacity will therefore be needed for many
years to come. However, the priorities will appear to be less pressing, and it will be
necessary to restructure organisational responses.
History of mine action in Mozambique
The 1992 Rome Peace Agreement referred to the importance of humanitarian assistance
as an integral part of peace-building, but made no specific reference to mine action as
such. However, there was already a certain awareness of the existence of a mine
problem in the country, although it proved difficult to qualify this assumption any
further at that stage.5 The United Nations  Secretary-General emphasised the integration
of all components of the Mozambican programme. This indirectly led to the
politicisation of demining decisions and delays in getting the programme off the
ground. In these early days, mine clearance was dealt with by the Cease-fire
Commission, which included representatives of both parties to the conflict  FRELIMO
and RENAMO (Eaton et al., 1997:11-12). This proved to be a major constraint to
clearance efforts, since both parties were hesitant to the idea of humanitarian demining.
A preliminary plan of action was developed as early as January 1993, although the
parties to the conflict did not approve it until November of that year. The priorities
3 It appears disputable whether demining should be credited for the reduction in accident rates. A 1998
IDRC consultant suggested that the main reasons were that there are no longer large population
movements, there is better knowledge of mined sites, and the mine awareness programmes are paying
off (Rebelo, 1998).
4 Information provided by HI to Ted Paterson.
5 When the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs asked the United Nations Special Co-
ordinator of Emergency Relief Operations in Mozambique for information about the landmines problem
in July 1992, the response was that precise information was impossible to gather before the cease-fire had
taken effect (Eaton et al., 1997:11).
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outlined in the first plan were to open roads  in order to facilitate the repatriation
of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as to make possible humanitarian
aid delivery (ICBL, 1999: 47) Due to its primary emphasis on supporting the UNOMOZ
peace mission, the plan has since been criticised for focusing on emergency-oriented
objectives (Eaton, 1997:14). Such a focus allegedly resulted in a failure to recognise the
need for long-term demining in the country. In addition, little attention was placed
on the needs for comprehensive data gathering and the establishment of sustainable
indigenous capacities.
Having addressed the most immediate problems with the political parties, the UN
faced another constraint from the donors side. The United Nations wanted to establish
an implementing unit of its own, to be converted into a national capacity at the
termination of the UNOMOZ mission. The United Nations proved unable to build
donors support for their plan, but was unwilling to compromise, convinced by its
initial assessment that the national body should have not only planning, but also
operational capacity. On the other hand, it was also a problem that several donors
were working to secure demining contracts for specific NGOs or commercial operators.
The 1996 United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) report
Mozambique: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities suggests that the lack
of ability of the UN and donors to reach a consensus was the major reason for the
failure to establish a functioning central co-ordinating mechanism (Eaton et al., 1997:
18-21).
The first organisation to establish a demining capacity was NPA. The first NPA
clearance team arrived in March 1993 and established itself in Tête province, from
where NPA was already running a development programme. NPA started actual
demining in August 1993. Operating in what was seen as an emergency context,
priorities were set by UNHCR, which was co-financing NPAs work during its first
year of operations. Areas for clearance were selected on the basis of expected refugee
return, but with insufficient attention to the constraints posed by NPAs limited
capacity (Hallam et al., 1997:80). NPA has since become one of the main mine action
operators in the country, being responsible for most of the demining in the central
and north-western provinces of Manica, Sofala and Tête.
The HALO Trust started a base in mid-1993, initially to carry out a national survey of
the mine situation under a contract for the UN Office for the Co-ordination of
Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC). The HALO Trust survey, commissioned by
UNOHAC, did not cover the whole country. In fact it only recorded 981 mined areas
of the 1,761 registered in the National Mine Clearance Commissions database by early
1999 (ICBL, 1999:53). The survey was completed by late 1994, and remains  in spite
of major criticisms  the only national level minefield registration to date. Perhaps its
most significant shortcoming is that it did not in any way address the socio-economic
impact of landmines in Mozambique. HALO Trust also started to establish itself as a
demining operator, carrying out  with funding from the British Overseas Development
Administration   clearance linked to the activities of three other British NGOs. HALO
Trust is the dominant operator in the north, where it covers the Niassa, Nampula,
Cabo Delgado and Zambezia provinces.
But while NPA and HALO Trust became operational, the United Nations was still
unable to get started. By mid-1993, the decision had been taken to invite tenders for a
US$12 million road clearance contract as a first step in the United Nations-facilitated
national plan. In July 1994, an international consortium consisting of Royal Ordnance
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(UK), Mechem (South Africa) and Lonrho (Mozambique) was given the task, after a
fine-tuning of the formalities within the United Nations system had caused substantial
delays (Eaton, 1997:20). The decision to award the contract to the consortium
attracted considerable criticism, not least due to the involvement of the South African
company Mechem, which was accused of double dipping on account of its
involvement in landmine development (Human Rights Watch, 1997:85). However,
thanks to Mechems unique vapour detection technology, the project succeeded in
clearing 2,051 kilometres of road by December 1994 (Harpviken, 1997:9293).
 It was only towards the end of 1994 that the United Nationss Accelerated Demining
Programme (ADP) commenced its activities in the southern provinces. Through ADP
a demining school was established, although by then the other agencies had already
established their own training facilities in the absence of a United Nations capacity.
ADP was originally criticised for concentrating on mine-dense fields at the exclusion
of examining socio-economic impact (Human Rights Watch, 1997:88). Moreover, early
tasks were in logistically favourable areas, in towns or close to Maputo.
The future of ADP was discussed in 1996, with alternatives being conversion either
into an NGO or into a government agency (Eaton et al., 1997:31-32). This controversy
 with donors and the government on opposite sides  has only recently been
resolved.6 As things stand, ADP retains a somewhat ambiguous status as a parastatal
organisation, though it operates with substantial UNDP support, and is effectively
under United Nations management.
When UNOMOZ withdrew in December 1994, there was no authority in place to take
over the co-ordination of the national mine action effort. The National Mine Clearance
Commission (NMCC)7 was established in May 1995. The mandate of the NMCC was,
among other things, to co-ordinate operations, maintain the national database, develop
strategic plans, as well as to set procedures for prioritisation. The new body included
the representatives of seven ministries, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-
operation as its President. In the long term, NMCC proved unable to develop the
capacity to set national priorities (Hallam et al., 1997:81).
More generally, the United Nations has been heavily criticised for its slow progress in
building up an effective demining capacity in Mozambique. It has been suggested
that strong central authority has been a major obstacle to getting operations off the
ground (Hallam, 1997:82) The establishment of relatively independent NGO capacities
in Mozambique, which persists today, can largely be seen as a reaction to the slow
United Nations response. The DHA report from 1997 points out that: The absence of
reliable data on high priority minefields, compounded by the absence of a central co-
ordination mechanism, is likely to result in many high-priority minefields not being
addressed in a timely manner and effort and resources being expended on areas that
are not mined (Eaton et al., 1997:23).
The National Mine Clearance Strategy Approach of November 1998 suggested that
the National Demining Institute (IND), a new para-statal institute, replace NMCC
(Government of Mozambique, 1998d). IND was to enjoy larger autonomy from
ministerial control and be closely linked with the establishment of a national demining
6 ADP will become an NGO, though the precise timing of the institutional transformation is not yet
known.
7 NMCC is also known under its Portuguese acronym: CND.
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Table 2 -  Main mine action operators in Mozambiquea
Operator Type Main tasks Start End Funds 1994 -
2001 (US$)
Gurkha Security Commercial Road clearance Jan 93 Feb 94
Guards (GSG) (British)
Handicap NGO (French) Mine awareness Proximity
International (HI)  demining  (from Feb 98) June 93 5,134,000
(5.5%)
Norwegian NGO Training area clearance July 93 20,100,000
Peoples Aid (Norwegian) Road clearance (21.5%)
(NPA)
Mine-Tech Commercial Road clearance Dec 93 1,952,000
(Zimbabwean) Power lines/Railway lines (2%)
Area clearance (with  GTZ
development programme)




RONCO Commercial Road clearance with dogs Jan 94 Jun 95 10,000,000
(USA) (transferred dogs, equipment (10.5%)
and personnel to NPA
upon completion)
Mechem Commercial Road clearance Feb 94 4,200,000
(South African) Area clearance (4.5%)
National Mine Government Data-collection & analysis May 95 Jun 99 10,207,000
Commission Clearance (11%)






Accelerated UNDP with Road clearance Oct 95 20,030,000
Demining Program Government Area clearance (21.5%)
(ADP)
Special Clearance Commercial Area clearance mid 96 4,813,000
Services (SCS) (Zimbabwean)  (5%)




CIDEV (French) Commercial Power lines clearance Jun 98 Dec 98 3,158,000
(French) (3.5%)
Canadian NGO Survey Level One (within the 99
International (Canadian) Survey Action Center framework)
Demining Center
(CIDC)
National Demining Government Replaced NMCC, but with more June 99
Institute (IND) autonomous position, and
linked to the establishment of
FUNAD, the National Demining
Fund
Afrovita Commercial Road clearance 99
(Mozambican)
a In addition to data gathered by AMAC, the table draws upon information from the following sources:
Human Rights Watch, 1997; ICBL, 1999; Roberts and Williams, 1995.
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fund, FUNAD. Again, donors have proved sceptical, not only because they have
been hesitant to lose control over funds, but also because INDs ability to establish
authority over the mine action domain is seen as doubtful.
One distinctive aspect of mine action in Mozambique has been the extent of commercial
involvement.8 By 1997 as much as 45 per cent of the total funding had gone to
commercial companies (Eaton et al., 1997:30). The percentage of commercial companies
appears subsequently to have fallen substantially. In total they are estimated to have
received between 26 and 30 per cent of the funding for the whole period 19942001
(ICBL, 1999:51) In addition to the 1994 UN-funded road clearance described above,
South African Mechem and Zimbabwean Mine-Tech jointly took on a large commercial
contract to clear parts of the Cahora Bassa power line.
Humanitarian agencies also continue to sub-contract commercial companies for
demining. The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) has hired Mine-Tech
 which has also been contracted by UNICEF and UNHCR  for the demining
component of its integrated development projects in Manica province. Another
Zimbabwean Company, Special Clearance Services, has been contracted by
humanitarian donors, including UNICEF, the European Union and the World Bank.
There has been less and less criticism of the technical quality of the commercial
demining.
Little attention has been paid to the mine clearance conducted by Mozambican armed
forces. In fact, the government started mine clearance during 1993, and in 1994 the
new joint defence forces received some demining training from the French military
(Human Rights Watch, 1997:84). The armed forces have also received some training
from the United States military.9 The Direcção Nacional de Estradas e Pontes has also
been active in clearance, hiring demobilised soldiers as deminers.
From early 1998, Canada started to explore the need for a more comprehensive
Landmine Impact Survey in Mozambique. Canada established a dialogue with the
Survey Action Center. With Canadian funding, it eventually became clear that the
Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC) was to be the implementing agency
in Mozambique for the SAC. After a slow start, further delayed by the serious flooding
in the south of the country,10 the Landmine Impact Survey is under way.
In several mine-affected countries there has been considerable self-help demining
 in the sense that private individuals have cleared on their own initiative, with no
institutional back-up. This is definitely a high-risk activity: a 1995 cross-national study
concludes that the risk of falling victim to a mine increases about fourfold if you
tamper with mines (Andersson et al., 1995). Interestingly, the same study finds that
this is almost a non-existent problem in Mozambique, as opposed to other countries
in the study. The finding is consistent with observations from mine action personnel
with experience from different countries. It seems that people are less inclined in
Mozambique to attempt self-help demining, and in general have higher respect for
the risks associated with mines.
8 There are now six Mozambican or joint venture companies working in mine action in Mozambique.
Information provided by Ted Paterson.
9 Information provided by Olaf Juergensen.
10 Information collected by PRIO research team.
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HI started mine awareness in 1993, both for rural populations and for returning
refugees. It was in charge of mine awareness education in the country until January
2000 and during that period, it co-ordinated the so-called National Co-ordination
Programme of Education Activities to Prevent Mine and UXO Accidents (ICBL,
1999:60). Partners in the programme were the national Red Cross society and the
Ministry of Education, in addition to a range of other organisations at different levels.
The programme was based on district-level mine awareness committees with one HI
co-ordinator at the provincial level.
There seems to have been a low level of integration between mine awareness and
demining in Mozambique. The 1997 DHA study accuses demining NGOs of having
marginalised mine awareness, which it recognises as a continued illustration to
programme managers and policy makers of military tendencies that focus on the
technical response to the mines threat while resisting the concept of integrated mine
action (Eaton et al., 1997:37). In other countries, demining units sometimes perform
mine awareness as a means to conduct an ongoing dialogue with locals about the
local mine problem and about the operation. As from 1 January 2000, the National
Co-ordination Programme has closed. A new Mozambican mine awareness
programme will include the old parties to the programme, but the responsibility will
rest with the National Demining Institute.
More recently, HI has engaged in demining. It works in Inhambane province and has
developed a concept called proximity demining. The basic premise is that there is a
need for a different organisational response in an area where most of the mine problem
consists of scattered mines that were originally aimed at the local population. HI teams
are small and flexible and clear areas that they perceive as being of great importance
locally but which would nonetheless be ranked low in national priorities. This approach
fundamentally exposes the irrelevance of conventional efficiency measures, such as
cost by area  a measure on which proximity demining would lose out.
Likewise, HALO Trust  which envisages that it will withdraw within the next couple
of years   has also started to think about how parts of the capacity it has developed
can be restructured to be functional in a new situation. In Niassa province two years
ago, for instance, it set up a small provincial level demining fire brigade to work on
low priority tasks. Similar thinking about fire brigades is also contained in
government documents (Republica de Moçambique, 1998:9).
Recently, the IDRC has been working with the Mozambican National Demining
Institute  in designing a methodology needed to bridge the local skills gap so that
mine action programming can also contribute to national development,
decentralisation, and governance issues. Based on this interaction, research reports
and stakeholder feedback, IDRC has been refining the Integrated Mine Action
Development Strategy (IMADS) concept with plans to pilot test in Nampula Province
in late 2000.  Based on a review of the pilot, a national IMADS will be developed for
Mozambique, and a project start date is envisioned for the first quarter of 2001.11
11 Information provided by Olaf Juergensen, IDRC Johannesburg.
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Mine action within reconstruction: Room for
co-operation
The reconstruction effort initiated by the 1992 peace settlement linked closely to the
World Bank structural adjustment package begun in 1987. Mozambique has had to
counter the dual challenges of post-war reconstruction and the reorientation of its
political economy from centralised planning to market economy. Mozambiques
economy has seen considerable improvements since 1992, although a high percentage
of the countrys population are among the most poverty-stricken in the world.
Broader overviews of Mozambiques economy are not particularly concerned with
landmines. In fact, no mention of mines was made at a June 2000 Consultative Group
meetingthe most important government/donor consultations of the year. One of
the countrys key challenges is its massive dependency on foreign aid, with as much
as two-thirds of imports being financed by aid in 1996. One central implication of this
aid dependency is that government capacities are stretched to the limit in dealing
with the special concerns of the variety of aid providers, in itself a major obstacle to
developing independence in the longer term.
Returning to mine action more specifically, lack of co-ordination with other kinds of
relief and development programmes appears to have been a staple of the effort in
Mozambique. One example is when an NPA team spent three and a half months to
clear 41.5 km of road in 1994, but the road remained out of use owing to lack of
rehabilitation (Hallam et al., 1997:80). This is but one of a number of examples where
the failure to follow up demining with other activities has prevented any short-term
impact of the investments. However, the conclusion that mine action and reconstruction
co-ordination has been poor in general  and nearly absent at the national level  must
not prevent us from identifying positive steps taken at local levels.
From 1998, NPA started to include community services  in the form of Quick Impact
Projects  in the demining sites where it was working. The idea is to take advantage
of the presence of the mine action operation in a community to provide limited services,
such as securing access to water, repairing a bridge or providing basic medical
assistance (Agenda, 1999:62). An additional motivation was that this contributed to
improving relations between demining personnel and the local population.
But NPAs 1999 Agenda evaluation raises the concern that an additional project
component might take the focus away from the basic task of communicating about
the demining process itself. The report fails to reflect upon the potential benefits that
the arrangement could have for the impact of demining. In the same report, the very
sustainability of the Quick Impact Projects is questioned  many of the projects seem
to require follow-up beyond the mine action engagement.
Another exception to the general rule of poor integration between mine action and
other programmes is the projects of GTZ, which explicitly aim to integrate demining
within a larger development effort. Zimbabwe-based Mine-Tech conducts the
demining for the GTZ projects. These organisations argue that co-ordination is key
throughout the project cycle. For example, the basic survey is set up as an extended
mine awareness exercise, in which the purpose is to gather not only landmines
information but also information for planning reconstruction efforts more broadly
(Mine-Tech, 1998:3).
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There is, though, certainly potential for a closer co-ordination between mine action
and other reconstruction efforts. But there are limitations in the capability of mine
action organisations taking a leading role in co-ordinating development-oriented
activities in a project area, one of them being that mine action organisations rarely
stay long enough in one area.
Overall, it is clear that the process of reconstruction in Mozambique has come out of
an emergency phase, and that the current challenge is to foster mid- to long-term
development. This is as valid for mine action as it is for reconstruction in general.
However, it seems that mine action, perhaps to an even larger extent than other
reconstruction sectors, has failed to adapt to changing circumstances and remains
focused on short-term priorities. The problem links with the larger issue of not realising
that impact results from the way the operation is conducted, not just from the physical
removal of mines.
Approaches to setting priorities for humanitarian
demining in Mozambique
This section refers to findings from three community case studies conducted in
Mozambique between 16 February and 21 April 2000.12 The community studies are
complemented with material from a few shorter site visits. We will also make
reference to a 1999 AMAC community study in Bandua, in Sofala province (Millard,
2000:420).
The first of the three village studies was located in Nairoto, in Cabo Delgado Province.
HALO Trust launched that clearance operation in 1999 and it is now close to
completion. Nairoto is provincial priority number two; the expected socio-economic
impact is not high, but the operation draws interest because of strong agency-
community relationships.
The second village studied was Capirizanje, Tete Province. This area was cleared of
mines between 1994 and 1995 by NPA. The operation was launched in response to a
request by UNHCR, because the mines in the area were thought to pose considerable
threat to returning refugees. The case study found that the impact goes far beyond
what was expected. The cleared land has become particularly important as a settlement
area for returning refugees from Malawi.
The third case was Nacala, in Nampula Province, where HALO Trust has an ongoing
operation. The Nacala task is ranked ninth at the provincial level. The minefield is
very large (expected 8 kilometres by 20 metres); the rationale is to open access to
enable maintenance of a functioning water pipeline that serves the town at Nacala
port. The Nacala task has been motivated by macro impact, and little attention has
been paid to securing impact at the local level.
General survey and preliminary ranking of mined areas
A Landmine Impact Survey is an effort to get an overview of the landmine situation
in a country. In Mozambique the 1994 HALO Trust survey, complemented by smaller
12 A brief outline of the methodological framework is (Harpviken and Millard, 1999), which can also be
found at the following website: <http://www.prio.no/amac>.
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survey efforts of new minefields, has been the main instrument used to date. It
contains exclusively technical minefield information, with no data on impact. The
ongoing CIDC Landmine Impact Survey represents a different line of thought with
a heavy emphasis on socio-economic data. Demining organisations are critical of
this because they feel that the CIDC survey will not give them the information they
require to assess whether, given individual organisational constraints, it is practically
possible to take on a task. While the authors think socio-economic impact is essential,
the need is, of course, acknowledged for organisations to collect technical information.
It remains an open question, however, whether detailed technical data is a necessary
component of a Landmine Impact Survey, or if such information should be collected
at a later stage.
In practice, there has been a tendency by operators to place constraints at the forefront
of priority setting. One example of this is the Songo minefield in Tête province, the
selection of which has been criticised in several evaluation reports (Agenda, 1999:31-
33; Hallam, 1997:81). This minefield was laid to protect the Cahora Bassa dam in the
1960s. Demining started in September 1995. Although the socio-economic impact is
potentially large, the task is huge and  in spite of continuous work by one or two
platoons since 1995  completion is not in sight. By 1997 the operator admitted that
the Songo task was not the highest priority, but argued that as a mine-dense field it is
a good training ground.13 Since then, considerable capacity has continued to be tied
up in Songo. This serves as one example where prioritisation seems to have been
motivated by organisational constraint (i.e., the need for a mine-intensive training
site), rather than by overall socio-economic impact.
The national policy for priority setting is outlined in The National Mine Clearance Strategy
Approach from November 1998, and still seems to be the principal foundation on which
a nationwide priority setting standard should be set. Here, priorities are ranked by
type of task, which includes considerations about level of impact (i.e., community to
national). There are three categories, high, medium and low priority, each with three
sub-categories. It has proved difficult to establish the extent to which those criteria
guide agency priority setting in practice. Overall, priority setting does not occupy a
central place in agency documents. The ADPs recent 17-page project document has
little to say about impact assessments and priority setting. This is the full section on
Prioritisation of ADP clearance tasks:
Task input is sought from national (National Demining Institute), provincial, and
district level authorities, with a final yearly list of clearance priorities submitted to
the National Demining Institute for confirmation. Although broadly based on stated
national priorities for landmine/UXO clearance (i.e. access roads, water points,
schools and health centres, agricultural land, economic infrastructure), the actual
determination of clearance priorities is, in practice, left largely to local (i.e. provincial)
discretion. (UNDP, 2000:7-8)
As the ADP document indicates, priorities are normally set in some sort of dialogue
with provincial authorities. HALO Trust, for example, gives a list of surveyed areas
to the provincial administrator, who comes back with a ranking of priorities which is
then held against HALOs own ranking. The overall impression is that in this final
decision-making phase of establishing priorities, there is little or no reference made to
the national indicators. Nonetheless, those indicators do figure in the survey forms
used by most organisations, and hence they do, to some extent, affect the ways
13 Information collected by PRIO research team.
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organisations rank priorities. In practice, ranking seem to be established on the basis
of relatively rough and impressionistic accounts of impact, particularly since the
information underlying decisions is limited.
Since the Landmine Impact Survey is supposed to cover all mine-affected areas within
a country, there are clear limitations on how detailed the information gathered can
be. In Mozambique, with some 2,000 mined sites, the general survey must rest upon
the formulation of simple and standardised indicators. The weight given to the various
components, though, is open for discussion. The role of each component should reflect
the character of the mine problem in that particular country, and the kind of effort
that has been made to deal with the problem, if any. A review of survey forms devised
by CIDC for the socio-economic survey indicates that accidents are given 30 out of a
maximum of 60 points. Within this system, any community that has had a mine accident
in the past 12 months will belong to the highest of three impact categories, Very
Severe, which is the case for any score above 14 points (Canadian International
Demining Centre, 1999).
In two of the four communities that we have studied in Mozambique, we found that
mine accidents were most likely to have happened in the past 12 months before
operations started. However, in both cases the accidents were one-offs rather than
part of a larger trend. The primacy given to accidents seems particularly surprising
given that Mozambican demining is long past the emergency stage. According to
CIDC officials, the ranking criteria are undergoing revision, yet the instrument
originally devised illustrates more broadly the problems with developing simple
measures to say something about complex social processes.
Detailed survey and the selection of mined areas for action
The Impact Survey might establish socio-economic indicators, and these serve as a
basis for selecting cases for further scrutiny. However, the data contained in a
Landmine Impact Survey is very rough, and hence a more comprehensive analytical
exercise is needed to make informed decisions about whether to take on the task, and,
if so, how it is to be done. A few illustrations follow here, identified from case studies
in Mozambique, as to the importance of making a more comprehensive socio-economic
impact assessment prior to operations. These are issues not addressed by the current
Impact Survey design.
First, there is the general issue of conducting operations with a focus only on automatic
impact, seeing impact as being largely equivalent to the physical removal of mines.
In the Nairoto case, there was very little impact of this kind. The minefield posed no
economic strain on the community, the area being demined having long since been
defined as unattractive for cultivation due to low fertility. The potential for accidents
is minimal. There has been one mine accident in the area, but the person killed was
mentally disturbed and entered the minefield in spite of the known risk. Nonetheless,
the Nairoto operation is likely to have a major impact, primarily because it allows the
local population to reassert ownership of the administrative centre from which they
have been repeatedly driven out.
The story dates back to the 1950s, when the Portuguese made locals settle closer to the
administrative centre in order to protect them from the war, but also to prevent them
from joining the independence movement. However, while the local population was
forced to move closer to the Nairoto administrative post, they were, by and large,
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forced to live outside the village administrative centre. After the Portuguese left,
the locals took control of the village administrative centre by expanding their
settlement area. Later, during the civil war, the locals were forced to flee, and upon
return they found that the perimeter of the administrative centre was mined, so
again they were forced to settle outside. In spite of the whole perimeter of the
village being mined, locals gave preference to clearing the Nairoto 1 and Nairoto 2
minefields, which are the ones that currently hinder existing residential areas from
expanding to include the administrative centre. This operation is important because
it is assisting a population with a long history of political marginalisation to reassert
ownership of the territory it sees as its own.
Secondly, the impact of any one particular factor depends on the extent to which
people have alternatives. Many mine-affected communities in Mozambique have
developed ways to compensate for the fact that certain areas or resources are unusable
due to mines. In Nairoto, the demining operation will give more easy access to the
village centre, and allow expansion of the settlement. However, access to the
administrative centre is not contingent on demining, since there is already a wide
trail linking it to the residential area. Both sides of the trail are mined, yet it does
provide safe access to and from the village administrative centre. The point to note is
that since people are not totally dependent on demining to have access to the village
centre, they will need a high level of confidence in order to use the cleared areas. For
organisations, it is essential to know the degree to which affected people are dependent
upon the resource that is being freed through demining.
Thirdly, and closely connected to the above, is the question of being able to
contextualise ones work, by seeking to understand the perspectives of those being
affected by the operation. The Capirizanje operation is interesting. The area selected
for demining was relatively large, and it was close to the road linking Tête City to the
Malawi border at Zobue (i.e., the Capirizanje village is five kilometres from the Malawi
border). The area was populated before the war. For refugees in Malawi, who had
little confidence in the peace process, Capirizanje was an ideal place to return to, since
it enabled them to keep open the possibility of a safe exit. Thus, although the initial
motivation for the operation was to facilitate the return of refugees that would pass
through the area, and to reduce the accident potential, a key impact was to allow for
the resettlement of returning refugees.
More generally, operators need to be able to identify the impact that an operation will
have for the local population. The Nacala operation was launched to demine eight
kilometres of water pipeline, which is the only source of fresh water to the city of
Nacala port; hence the operations primary impact is on a wider scale. However, the
area where the minefield lies is populated, hence the operation will also have a small-
scale impact. In this case the operator has concentrated on the wider impact, largely
disregarding the effects for local residents. While locals have developed alternatives,
such as new areas for cultivation or for production of coal, the failure to factor in local
impact represents considerable lost opportunities. A different example is from
Capirizanje, where Bairo Samoa, across the road from the minefield, suffered from
severe land subsidence due to bad water drainage. People fearing that homes
and animals would fall into the craters were under considerable pressure to relocate
to the demined area. Opening up for local relocation of the Bairo Samoa population
became a key impact of this operation, yet one that was unidentified prior to the
operation.
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Hence, the conduct of thorough impact assessments prior to setting final priorities is
necessary. This implies that organisations will have to invest in studying mine tasks
that may eventually not be taken on. The requirement for analytical capacity therefore
goes beyond attaching an analytical component to existing units. Furthermore,
organisations need to develop the courage to invest in socio-economic analysis of
tasks that may not become project areas. This requires not only capacity, but also a
planning horizon longer than that of most present operators.
As should be clear by now, there is immense variation between different demining
tasks, a variation that cannot be grasped by the rough nature of indicators applied in
the general Landmine Impact Survey. The detailed impact assessment therefore needs
to have as one objective the development of indicators that reflect the particular factors
that are key in the specific case. Such indicators are essential to give focus to conducting
the operation, and will serve as a basis for monitoring and evaluation. Locally-defined
indicators do not replace standardised indicators but rather complement them.
Standardised indicators by necessity only address a minimum common core of issues
across all cases. We can easily imagine cases where landmines have a severe impact
but where this impact is not registered because it is not addressed by the standardised
indicators.
The process of defining local indicators can also be used constructively to engage
stakeholders in discussing the design of the operation, as well as its expected impact.
This is valid regardless of whether the project has its main impact at the micro level or
at the macro level. However, in the former case it would seem sensible to engage the
local population, whereas in the latter case one would most likely relate to selected
representatives. In any case, the engagement of the affected population in the definition
of indicators serves a dual purpose: not only does it ensure that the project is geared
towards responding to locally defined needs and capacities, it also contributes to
strengthen the populations feeling of ownership in the project.
Conducting the operation and increasing
the benefit-cost ratio
In order for benefits to be increased in relation to costs, operators need to have in-
depth knowledge of the area in which they are to work. They also need to have the
ability to further their knowledge of the area while they are working. The latter issue
is central if operators want to be able to adapt to the changing dynamics in the area.
Central to the reinforcement of an organisations understanding of socio-economic
impact is the need to build strong relationships with the community.
Most basic is the need to understand how the resources freed by demining will affect
the distribution of wealth, and if power relationships among the population are affected
by mines. Land ownership is a good case in point, being an important theme in most
clearance operations. It is the authors experience that operators rarely establish
knowledge of land ownership prior to clearance.14 Yet, the question of land rights is
both a staple issue and one that often leads to disputes; hence any organisation
entering the local scene to free up resources must have basic knowledge of local land
tenure systems.15
14 NPA Cambodia has done interesting work in this regard, focusing on how land ownership can be
clarified, and in fact judicially established, prior to demining (Harpviken et al., 1999).
15 Mozambique has a new national land law in place since 1997. Information provided by Olaf Juergensen.
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In Nacala, all the minefield area belongs to one extended family. This is common
knowledge among the population and there is no sign that land rights are disputed. It
is interesting to note, though, that everybody is allowed to cut wood for sale, or to
produce coal in this area. In this particular case, one could imagine the operation
falling into disrepute since it only benefits the family that owns the land. On the other
hand, there are also reasons to think that everybody benefits, since the area is
available for the productive use of other community members in addition to the
owner. The basic point is that unless an operator knows the context well, the
potential exists for causing harm. Knowledge and understanding of local relations is
key; the operator must ensure that the local population understand the goals of the
task.
Land rights have not been an issue of dispute in either Capirizanje, Nairoto or Nacala,
but in Bandua they were a potential source of community conflict. (Millard, 2000)
Although rules for land tenure in Bandua are quite similar to those in other areas of
Mozambique, the issue of who would be able to relocate to the mined area once the
operation was finished was the source of confusion and contradictory accounts. A
variety of different scenarios were posited as the chain of events that would succeed
the hand-over of land, but it became evident that no one actually knew what would
happen. There is a common perception that the land being freed is agriculturally rich,
hence gaining access to parts of it will be very attractive. Under circumstances such as
these, it is easy to imagine that powerful actors in the community will take advantage
of their position and establish ownership over the land upon completion of clearance.
Contact with the community is often limited to the use of one single community
representative. Any external actor treads a fine line between respecting local authority
relations, while also maintaining diverse enough contacts to safeguard against severe
misuse or manipulation of information. At times, as when entering a local community
with a highly legitimate leader, relating to only one person might work reasonably
well. In Nairoto, the operator had established a strong relationship with one individual
who does not belong to any official administrative system. This person lives in the
area, he is in charge of mine awareness locally, and regards it as part of his duty to
inform the population about the local landmines situation. His effectiveness in
brokering information between the organisation and the local population was
compounded by the fact that this was a community with low levels of conflict and
with a smoothly working administrative system. Hence, the diffusion of information
worked relatively well, without the organisation having to invest heavily in working
with a range of locals.
Focusing specifically on relations with local leaders, operators need to pay attention
to the fact that local leadership is not standardised across communities. In
Mozambique, some operators have been focusing on the Regulo (a traditional
administrative figure in Mozambican society) as the standard community
representative, but in fact there are many areas in which the Regulo holds little or no
power, and performs no community functions. In such cases, establishing contact with
the Regulo exclusively can entail a risk to the whole operation.
In general, then, liaising with only one community representative is not enough. First,
it entails the risk of becoming severely dependent on one individual, who may be
subject to manipulation. More importantly, increasing benefits relative to costs is only
possible if broader relationships with the population are established. The Nairoto
village, as has been seen, is a case where the automatic impact is very limited.
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However, due to the operators investment in good community relationships, the
operation had a substantial social impact at the local level. The strong organisation/
community relationship is paralleled by strong local confidence in the clearance
operation. Now, there are several reasons behind this situation: Nairoto is an isolated
place; hence deminers living there have few alternative places to go. Importantly, the
minefield is very visible; hence the population can actually follow the work and
progress of the deminers. The trail that passes between the minefields is regularly
used, but when a mine is blown up, it is closed, and people are prevented from passing.
This arrangement in itself requires communication, and it makes people very aware
of the work that is going on.
For community relationships to be good, stability of organisation staff is a prerequisite.
Whereas all organisation staff should see that good local relationships are upheld, the
role of the supervisor is normally a key one. In the Nairoto case the supervisor had
very good relations with the villagers. When the supervisor was changed, people in
the community felt that the relationship with the mine action operator was potentially
in danger of disintegrating simply because they did not know the new supervisor.
In this case it would have been wise to make sure the old and the new supervisor had
a short transition arrangement. The Songo example is a more extreme case of the
same. Here, the operator rotates platoons through the area, with one platoon replacing
another at six-week intervals. This system reflects the use of Songo as a training site
for deminers since it is so mine dense. However, on the cost side, the local population
had no regular interlocutor within the clearance organisation. Aside from whether
Songo is truly a high priority, it would have been advisable to ensure that, when
rotating teams, at least a core staff with a senior community liaison function were
permanently on site so that relationships with locals could benefit from some
continuity.
The broad issue of community relationships is closely linked to the more specific issue
of confidence in clearance. In many cases it takes a long time for the population to
exploit the cleared areas, and it seems that this is often linked to confidence in clearance.
One example is Capirizanje, where clearance was completed as early as 1995 but it
took at least two years for people to start using the area, seemingly because of lack of
confidence that the area was truly safe. Such delays in taking demined territories into
use are not rare in Mozambique. It is believed that this is related to the routines that
demining organisations have for establishing confidence in cleared areas. Confidence-
building is often linked to a one-off hand-over event, to which the local population is
invited and where a certificate stating the technical standards of the demining is issued
to local authorities. To be effective, confidence-building ought to be a process rather
than an event. As the example of Nairoto illustrates above, close relationships between
agency and villagers, linked to strong visibility of the operation, fosters feelings of
confidence among local populations.
The issue of confidence in cleared areas can serve as a good illustration of the
reorientation of definitions of impact. Whereas most organisations would traditionally
have been satisfied with earlier minefields being cleared up to existing standards, it is
now increasingly realised that the operation has failed its purpose unless areas are
trusted and taken into use. The ability of operators to ensure that their projects have
an impact at all levels, including at the local level, should not be regarded as
unimportant. People need to know that operations are being conducted for their benefit,
and they need to see what this benefit is. An operator may be satisfied achieving only
the primary goal of the task, such as demining around the water pipeline in the case
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of Nacala. However, although this is a major impact in itself, we would argue that
there is considerable room for synergies and that operators should feel responsible
for maximising their impact at different societal levels.
Countries that go from war to peace-building and reconstruction are often flooded
with aid, and people may easily come to expect and depend on assistance. One
implication of this is that people, in particular communities, may feel that they are left
out. As with many communities hosting demining, people remain uninformed about
what the costs are, and may continue to feel bypassed even after massive investments
are made in mine action. The solution to this is not to spread a thicker layer of aid
over a country, but rather for individual agencies to work close to people, and to
demonstrate through practical examples that demining is to their benefit. Basically,
organisations need actively to seek synergies when addressing what they perceive as
their primary tasks.
One example of lost opportunities to serve the local population may be Capirizanje.
Here, it took years before the locals started using cleared land. The rapid growth of
vegetation means that people would have saved considerable time in opening up
new areas for cultivation had they been able to take the area into use immediately
after demining. Similarly, in Nacala locals think that the mined area currently does
not host wild animals. The demining personnel knew there was a hunting potential,
but because they did not communicate this fact to locals, another opportunity for
generating positive local interest was lost.
As in other post-conflict countries, communities in Mozambique do not only need
demining, but also a large number of other reconstruction efforts. The Nacala Velha
community, where the Nacala minefield lies, does not have a local school beyond
second grade, nor a health post. Hence, it is difficult for the local population to accept
that they are hosting a large reconstruction effort that has no impact on their daily
lives. Again, options for creating synergies have been lost. It is now broadly recognised
that populations need to see the benefit of reconstruction efforts taking place; if not
they will feel increasingly powerless. More broadly, communities must feel ownership
of emergency and development efforts in their area if these efforts are to be sustainable.
In the Nacala case, community interest in demining would have been much larger if
people had known that the area being freed up would be accessible for them to harvest
wood and make coal.
Being able to create synergies depends to a large extent on the local adaptability of the
individual organisation. Communities are highly varied entities, with very different
needs and capacities. One traditional criticism of demining organisations is that the
units they contain are too large, with the result that they become less mobile and are
unable to take on smaller tasks. Most organisations have now developed the flexibility
to do spot tasks, in itself a major confidence-building measure. However, it seems
that at a more general level, there is an inclination to standardise particular measures
of adaptability, spot demining being a case in point. In Songo, for instance, people
started to occupy areas that were cleared before any official hand-over had taken
place. It seems inflexible of the operators not to have been able to hand over sections
of the larger minefield at regular intervals.
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Impact studies and knowledge building
In current practice, the Level Three Survey is the completion report, written
immediately upon finalising the task and constituting the document that is given to
stakeholders as a certification of the operation. Whereas such documentation is
necessary within a larger process of mine action programming and evaluation, it is
written at a time when important elements of the impact cannot yet be established.
The only access one has to study the long-term impact of operations is to follow up
project areas regularly after project completion. Such follow-up studies should serve
as a primary information source for improving operational procedures in general and
indicator formulations and impact-assessment techniques in particular. It is
recommended that agencies institutionalise regular follow-up of past clearance tasks,
and that the knowledge gained thereby is systematically fed back to all organisational
personnel, particularly to those who work with the analysis and prioritisation of new
tasks.
Building analytical competence
A major difficulty of mine action programmes in Mozambique, as elsewhere, is the
failure to realise that socio-economic analysis requires time and competence (Horwood,
2000:13-14). At present such analysis is mainly the responsibility of personnel who do
not have basic skills in such matters, at times being tacked on to an array of other
operational responsibilities. Although there are some remarkable individuals who,
against all odds, do this work well, current arrangements cannot ensure quality
assessments. The belief still persists that if only good instruments (i.e., questionnaires,
ranking systems, computer packages) can be developed, the work can be done with
existing capacities, at least if short-term training is given to key personnel. As should
be clear at this stage of this report, data collection based on standardised indicators is
just one tool in a larger kit, and on its own is unlikely to bring substantial improvements
to mine action programmes. Furthermore, indicator-based systems are only as good
as the data that are fed into them, and at present the ability to collect quality data is
very limited. Below are two good illustrations of this.
The ongoing CIDC Landmine Impact Survey rests upon the assumption that a survey
team can spend a few hours with a group of key informants, fill in a standard
questionnaire, and, on this basis, form a qualified, yet coarse-grained, opinion about
the socio-economic impact of landmines in that locality. The assumption is problematic
for several reasons. For one, it is vital that the best informants are identified. Another
difficulty is that group meetings give limited information and are often dominated by
one or a few individuals. Group meetings are good for public information purposes;
less so for gathering solid data on socio-economic impact. Although there are obviously
constraints on the time and personnel that CIDC is able to devote to each task, the
data, as it is currently being collected, may not be of acceptable quality.
A different issue is about question formulation in surveys. There is an obvious risk of
respondents inflating the impact of mines when researchers come in and announce
their interest in the landmine issue. Efforts must be made to counter the risk through
attitudes, and through the way questions are put. It is therefore counter-intuitive when
existing surveys use questions such as the following (both from surveys conducted in
Mozambique):
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How many members of this house have been hurt by mines? (Roberts and Williams,
1995:503)
How many persons were killed by mines or unexploded ordnance in the area shown
on the map in the past 12 months? (CIDC, 1999:6)
By using question formulations that actively discourage the response that is likely to
be most common, namely none, this sort of questioning is unlikely to generate reliable
data.16
Building up competence in socio-economic analysis as the primary responsibility of a
few individuals within an organisation is not enough. As should be clear from the
above, a reorientation needs to be ingrained through the whole organisation. Unless
deminers, drivers and paramedics realise that their attitudes to, and interaction with,
locals are key to the success of the operation, organisations have a problem. Although
such relationships are often good, there is a need to ensure that their importance is
understood by building it into training programmes. Likewise, it needs to be ensured
that all staff realise the importance of socio-economic impact  without needing to
train every staff member as an analyst.
The requirement of dedicating resources to socio-economic impact assessments is
rooted in the redefinition of the objectives of demining. The removal of mines has
been seen as a self-contained objective, with all attention given to the technicalities of
the operation. Clearly, demining is both a demanding and a risky enterprise.
Nonetheless, we must not lose sight of the fact that the ultimate objective is making
an impact on peoples livelihoods. The challenge now is to build the required
competence into demining and mine action, without losing sight of the need to uphold
and develop technical skills.
Concluding remarks
Mine action in Mozambique has been characterised by many and varied types of actors.
There has been a general failure to build viable co-ordinating structures, and even
today there does not exist one standardised procedure applied by all operators in the
country. For prioritisation and impact assessments, as well as for the more technical
aspects of the operation, each organisation has its own procedures.
More generally, mine action operators in Mozambique have operated in tandem with
the wider reconstruction effort  with demining being separated out as a technically
demanding and highly different task. PRIO argues that mine action practitioners need
to work with a focus on the mid- to long-term impact of their work, and that such a
change of focus would also be conducive to an increased realisation of the potential
that there is for increasing benefits relative to costs through how one builds
relationships with host communities.
Socio-economic analysis needs to be strengthened in all phases of the mine action
process. It seems to be the case that socio-economic data is only gathered during the
Landmine Impact Survey. PRIO, however, suggests that a Impact Survey can only
give a rough overview on the basis on which one can select areas for more careful
16 Leading questions do have their role, particularly in cases where one is relatively certain that people
have information on something but might be inclined to respond that they do not, for example because
they regard it as unimportant.
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investigation. This investigation would serve as the socio-economic complement to
the technical information gathered during the Technical Survey, and ought to take
place before final priorities are established. Furthermore, it is argued that attention to
socio-economic factors, and the building and maintenance of strong community
relationships, is vital throughout the whole operation.
One implication is that the current attention to Post-Clearance Surveys is problematic,
since this tends to be linked to the assumption that building confidence in cleared
areas can be arranged as a singular event upon completion of demining. Building
confidence needs to be an objective throughout the whole project cycle. Demining
agencies have huge potential for increasing benefit in relation to costs if they invest
more in community relationships throughout the operation. It is also argued that the
attention to Post-Clearance Surveys is unhelpful in another sense: it veils the fact that
the real impact of operations can only be established in hindsight. There is a critical
need to follow up with socio-economic data gathering in demined areas at regular
intervals; this will help to build knowledge and inform future impact assessments as
well as project implementation routines.
Finally, it is suggested that the whole reorientation of mine action to take socio-
economic impact seriously requires a thorough upgrading of analytical skills across
the sector. Devising new tools to deal with socio-economic issues is not likely to be
effective unless backed up by a major investment in capacity-building to collect solid
data, draw sensible conclusions from that data, and ensure that this is reflected
throughout the demining process.
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